
Class C^ 1 1 
£75" 






THE BATTLES OF "GRAVELLY RUN", "DINWIDDIE COURT-HOUSE", 
AND "FIVE FORKS", VA., 1865. 



ARGUMENT 

ON BEHALF OF 

LIEUT. GEN. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN, U. S. A, 

RESPONDENT, 
BY 

ASA BIRD GARDNER, LL. D., 

JUDGE-ADVOCATE, U. S. A., 
OF COUNSEL, 

BEFOBE THE 

COURT OF INQUIRY 

CONVENED BY THE PRESIDENT OE THE UNITED STATES 

( S. O. 277, Ex. 6, Army lid. Qrs., A. G. O., 9 Dec, 1879) 

IX THE CASE OF 

LIEUT, COL, AND BVT, MAJOR-GENERAL GOUVERNEUR K, WARREN, 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 

Formerly Major-Genera/ Commanding the 5th Army Corps, 

APPLICANT. 




Delivered July 27th, 28th, and 30th, 1881. 

WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

18 81. 



I 



THE BATTLES OF "GRAVELLY RUN", "DINWIDDLE COURT-HOUSE", 
AND "FIVE FORKS", VA, 1865. 



ARGUMENT 



ON BEHALF OF 



XL 

LIEUT. GEN. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN, U. S. A, 

RESPONDENT, 
BY 

ASA BIRD GARDNER, LL. D., 

[i 
JUDGE-ADVOCATE, U. S. A., 

OF COUNSEL, 
BEFORE THE 

COURT OF INQUIRY 

CONVENED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

( S. O. 277, Ex. 6, Army Hd. Qrs., A. G. 0., 9 Dec, 1879) 

IN THE CASE OF 

LIEUT. COL, AND BYT, MAJOR-GENERAL GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN, 

CORPS OE ENGINEERS, 
Formerly Ma/or-Genera/ Commanding the 5 th Army Corps, 

APPLICANT. 



Delivered July 27th, 28th, and 30th, 1881. 



WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 

1881. 



e?l 



,6 



2-* 



SEP 5 1908 



<«3 



ARGUMENT 



ON I5EHAJ.F OF 



LIEUT. GEN. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN, U. S. A„ 

Respondent, 

BY 

ASA BIRD GARDNER, 

Of Counsel. 



After an inquiry which has resulted in the taking of over thirteen hun- 
dred printed pages of testimony, you will, gentlemen of the court, on 
the conclusion of the arguments in this case, be called on to report the 
facts and also to express an " opinion." 

The respondent, Lieutenant-General Sheridan, has, throughout this 
extraordinary investigation, been placed in an unusual and remarkable 
position, through the very peculiarly worded orders of the late incum- 
bent of the Presidential chair. 

Upwards of sixteen years have elapsed since the battle of "Five 
Forks." which compelled the immediate evacution of Petersburg and 
Richmond, and the hasty retreat of the Confederate army of Northern 
Virginia to the historic ground of Appomattox Court House, where, eight 
days after that battle was won, they laid down their arms, and by|that act 
terminated a rebellion against the United States, unprecedented in the 
history of ancient or modern times. 

Since then many of the principal actors in the battle of Five Forks 
have died, including the three major-generals — Devin and Custer, who 
commanded the cavalry divisions, and Griffin, who commanded a divis- 
ion of the Fifth Corps. 

These officers, as you know, had a large share of the confidence of 
the Respondent, and, from the positions they occupied during the battle 
of Five Forks, would, had they lived, have been able to give this court 
valuable information. 

THE LAW GOVERNING THIS INQUIRY. 

A commanding general, in the military dispositions he may make on 
a contested field of battle, is governed generally by many concurrent 
circumstances, some small and others great. 

If he is to be called upon " to explain " (p. 11, Record) why or wherefore 
he did a certain thing on such a field, common justice requires that he 
shall be called upon to do so when the circumstances are fresh in the 
recollection both of witnesses and of himself. 



He sliould not be required, after the lapse of sixteen years to account 
for his military conduct or affirmatively prove the declarations made at 
the time in his official reports, when memory may have become dim and 
principal witnesses have passed away. 

But, on the other hand, the argument can be urged that if any officer 
has been injured in reputation by the military conductor official reports 
of a superior, no time is too late for his vindication, as statutes of limita- 
tion do not run against courts of inquiry. 

To which I would answer that public policy interposes, particularly 
when there has been neglect to seek vindication on the part of the ap- 
plicant for an undue period. 

In this case the applicant — beyond a request for a court of inquiry 
more than sixteen years ago, on the 9th of April, 1865, and again on the 
1st of May, 1866 — appears to have made none during President John- 
son's or Grant's administration, 'and only obtains one in the last year of 
the term of President Hayes. 

Meanwhile he has been carefully preparing a case, publishing and 
writing and bringing to the notice of witnesses incidents, which in 
course of time have become interweaved with their own recollection. 
This is so common in the experience, particularly of lawyers, that I need 
but advert to it. 

Therefore. I say, the late President of the United States, in requiring 
the respondent herein, to prove affirmatively, in May, 1880 (p. 29, Kec- 
ord), the allegations in his official report, made in May, 1865, has done 
that which I believe to be without the contemplation of the 115th Arti- 
cle of War, under which this court is assembled. 

The 118th Article of War designates the applicant for a court of in- 
quiry as an " accused;" and ordinarily such a tribunal is in the nature 
of a grand jury, preliminary to a trial within two years of the commis- 
sion of an otfence. (121st Article of War.) 

Many years have elapsed since the applicant herein held the rank of 
Major-General in the volunteer service of the United States, and under 
which he alone exercised command over the Fifth Army Corps, but 
which he subsequently resigned on the 19th May, 1865. 

The basis of this inquiry, namely, the military action of Lieutenant- 
General Sheridan, as found described in his official report of the 16th 
May, 1865, was and has been known to the government since that 
time — indeed, since the 2d April, 1865 ; which only adds to the gravity 
of the inception of the order which instituted this tribunal. 

Had the order stopped at the point of requiring this honorable court 
to report the facts, so far as they can be ascertained after such a great 
lapse of time, simply as to what orders General Warren received on the 
31st March and 1st of April, 1865, and as to what he actually did under 
his orders and in the emergencies which arose, there would be less diffi- 
culty, and the issues susceptible of more ready adjustment. A grave 
constitutional question was, however, presented when President Hayes 
directed an " opinion" to be given on the facts in the case, because the 
order has been worded differently (p. 1, Kecord), and says that this 
court has been appointed " for the purpose of inquiring into Lieutenant- 
Colonel Warren's conduct as major-general commanding the Fifth Army 
Corps at the battle of Five Forks, Virginia, on April 1, 1865, and into 
the operations of Ms command on that day and the day previous, as far as 
they relate to his (Lieutenant-Colonel Warren's) conduct, or to imputa- 
tions or accusations against him." 

Of course, the " operations of his command" on the 1st of April, 1865, 
were an integral part of the operations of the whole command of Gen- 



eral Sheridan, and au inquiry as to those u operations," in order to re- 
port facts, impliedly includes a consideration of their propriety in order 
to give an opinion. As soon as this court assembled the full measure 
of this direction became apparent in the demand of the applicant that 
Lieutenant-General Sheridan should come before this court to "explain 
or confirm" his actions (p. 3, Record), and "to state any and all the 
grounds of complaint, and the reasons that led him to remove me from 
my command," &c. (p. 9, Record.) 

As comprising the applicant's kk chief grounds of complaint," he intro- 
duced Lieutenant-General Sheridan's Report of the 16th May, 1865, "as 
containing the only reasons known to him to justify the action of reliev- 
ing him from his command." (pp. 9, 11, 25, and 28, Record.) 

Now, this applicant formally states here (p. 974, Record) that the 
motives of Lieutenant-General Sheridan in relieving him of command 
of the Fifth Army Corps on April 1, 1865, are assumed to be good, and 
that he acted with the best intentions, and that "no act of his on 
that day is to be questioned at all, and that there is no one to be criti- 
cised before this court except the applicant." 

The court knows that the respondent had lawful authority to do that 
which he did on the 1st of April, 1865. (p. 901.) 

Therefore there is interposed to this order of the President, so far as 
it requires an opinion, the legal restriction that where an executive 
officer acts within the sphere of his legitimate authority, and has dis- 
cretion so to act, and he is not charged with acting from improper mo- 
tives, his conduct cannot be inquired into. 

In other words, any executive officer who exercises discretionary 
authority is intrusted, pro tanto, with quasi judicial power; and although 
he may even err in judgment, his acts, where malice is not imputed, 
cannot be questioned. 

If it were otherwise there would be an end of all responsibility in 
the administration of the affairs of government. 

The judge on the bench in giving discretionary judgment, the sheriff 
in ordering the militia to lire on a mob instead of trying milder means 
after complying with the prerequisites of the law, and others invested 
with discretionary authority would all decline to act if liable to be haled 
into court sixteen years later, to prove the grounds of their action and 
justify their opinions formed at the time. 

Therefore, I say, that the applicant, by his admissions as to Lieutenant- 
General Sheridan's motives, and the nature of the investigation which he 
pointed out here, has estopped himself from auy "opinion" on the merits 
of this case. 

These statements I make on my own responsibility, in the belief that 
had this constitutional question been considered President Hayes would 
never have required an opinion on the merits or issued the order in such 
objectionable form. 

The learned counsel for the applicant would say that the opinion re- 
quired is only as to the applicant's conduct, but as the respondent passed 
upon that on the 1st April, 1865, under his unquestionable authority, 
this court would have to give its opinion as to whether that opinion 
was judicious or not. 

I now leave this branch of the case with the remark that I would not 
have felt justified in not presenting these legal objections to a procedure 
which strikes at the root of the exercise of discretionary authority by 
any executive officer in the military service, and renders him liable at 
any future time, ten, twenty, thirty years afterward to be called on 
judicially to explain his conduct and prove affirmatively its propriety. 



6 

Lieutenant-General Sheridan has never sought to avoid any responsi- 
bility for his official action toward the applicant, and had the latter 
deigned to apply to him in 1865 or 1866, when the circumstances were 
fresh in every one's recollection, he would, in all probability, have secured 
the applicant a court to then report the facts. 

The inquiry required to be made by you is as to General Warren's 
conduct as major-general commanding the Fifth Corps at the battle of 
Five Forks, and on the day previous, and into the operations of his com- 
mand on those days as far as they relate to his conduct or to accusations 
or imputations against him. 

Now, the operations of Ms (General Warren's) command on the 31st 
March and 1st of April, must, for a proper understanding, necessarily be 
considered in connection with the command which operated on his left 
and which he was, on the 31st, ordered to support. 

His (General Warren's) conduct depended entirely, after supporting 
orders had been received, on what General Sheridan was expected and 
ordered to do. 

The importance of the results hoped for and apparent, even to the 
humblest soldier in that army, the urgency of the situation and the 
character of the movement to be effected, are all elements which the 
court cannot avoid considering in examining into the operations of his 
(General Warren's) command, and in expressing an opinion in the case as 
to his conduct. 

Had the court not been called upon to express an opinion, but merely 
to report facts found, the inquiry might have been confined merely to 
evidence as to what General Warren did and what the historic Fifth 
Corps did, on the 31st March and April 1st. 

The operations of the Fifth Corps were intimately associated with 
and dependent upon the operations of General Sheridan's cavalry divis- 
ions. 

For General Warren to mass and halt until daylight two divisions of 
his corps intended for an offensive movement, might have been very 
proper under certain circumstances and highly improper under others. 

To move into position for action in a slow and leisurely way, might 
be very suitable to one condition of affairs but involve the destruction 
of an army in another. 

For a corps commander to lead one of his divisions into action on one 
occasion might be foolhardiness, and on another the highest exhibition 
of sound military judgment. 

In order to express an opinion, if admissible, as to General Warren's 
conduct on the occasions in question, this court must first possess itself 
of all the surrounding circumstances in the military situation, and of 
the influences which were operating on the mind of General Sheridan 
under his orders and the situation as he saw it, in order to determine as 
to the operations of the Fifth Corps, so far as they relate to General 
Warren's conduct, or to the specific imputations, and as to the measure 
of General Warren's responsibility. 

It therefore has been necessary to show the orders under which Gen- 
eral Sheridan set out from below City Point, and which carried him to 
Five Forks. 

This, under the latitude of a cross examination would, of itself, be 
admissible, in order to clear up and explain General Sheridan's move- 
ments on the 31st March and 1st April, which have been inquired into, 
but the propriety of it is also placed on the broad ground that this 
court cannot express an opinion, if admissible, whether or not the state- 
ments made by Lieutenant General Sheridan in his official report of 



16th May, 1865) are true, until the court know? the standard of condi- 
tions under which he came to the conclusions therein expressed : as, for 
example, whether a march was too slow or not. 

At the opening of this inquiry the learned counsel for the applicant 

[>. 48- Record), stated as the basis of this investigation a paragraph 

from General Grant's report and three extracts from General Sheridan's. 

That from General Grant's report of the operations of these days is 

as follows : 

On the morning of the 31st General Warren reported favorably to getting possession 
of the "White Oak road, and was directed to t do s«t. To accomplish this he moved with 
one division instead or his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior 
force, and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and it in 
turn forced back upon the third division : when the enemy was checked. A division 
of the Second Corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with 
heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained. 

The three extracts from Lieutenant-General Sheridan's report of the 
16th May. 18G5. are as follows : 

(1) * * * had General Warren moved according to the expectations of the 
Lieutenant-General. there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape 
of the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddle Court-House. 

(2) * * General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly 
as he might have done, and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the 
sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed. 

(3) * * * During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. 
In the engagement, portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy fire, 
and simply tor want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren 
did not exert himself to inspire. 

PEELOITN'AEY MOVEMENTS CONSIDERED. 

Before I begin to discuss these grounds of complaint, if they may be 
so termed, of the applicant, it would seem desirable, for a proper under- 
standing of this case, that the preliminary movements leading up to those 
movements which he was required to perform should be considered. 

In the statement submitted by Lieutenant-General Sheridan, the re- 
spondent, found on page 1060 of this record, which was duly authenti- 
cated by him. under oath — although that authentication does not appear 
upon the face of this printed record, but is to be discovered in the origi- 
nal manuscript copy — in that statement General Sheridan has discussed 
somewhat the preliminary movements. 

He was an independent army commander, commanding in the Shen- 
andoah Valley, the •• Army of the Shenandoah." precisely as Maj. Gen. 
George G. Meade, commanded the ••Array of the Potomac." or Maj. 
Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, the •• Army of the James." all. however, under 
the orders of the then Lieutenant-General. U. S. Grant. General in 
Chief. 

General Sheridan, having driven the enemy out of the Valley of the 
Shenandoah, in a series of brilliant actions, and effectively closed up the 
campaign in that direction, moved, of his own volition, with the three 
cavalry divisions of his Army, down to the James Biver. with a view of 
assisting the Army of the Potomac in its movement around Kichmond 
and Petersburg. 

In his Lieutenant-General Sheridan's statement, page 1060 of the 
Record, is given an account of his movements. 

That statement is as follows:" 

The tendency to subordinate the important events of that battle (Five Forks . and 

the responsibilities with which I was charged, to the incident of General Warren's 

"The extracts from certain papers and dispatches that follow, together with the 
numbers of the pages of the Eecord. where they can be found, are printed exactly as 
delivered in the argument, without reference by me for verification. 

L. L. L.. Recorder. 



removal by me from the command of the Fifth Army Corps, necessitates a reference to 
the facts in detail which led up to the operations of that day. 

Early on the morning of the 29th of March, 1865, I moved out from my camp, near 
the James River, below City Point, under written instructions from Lieutenant -Gen- 
eral Grant, dated the day before. I submit a copy of these instructions herewith, 
marked A, from which I quote as follows : 

" Passing near to or through Dinwiddle, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as 
you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, hut to force him 
out if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, 
move in with your entire force, in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army 
will engage or follow the enemy, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and, 
ivill probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the 
enemy keeps ivithin his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road." 

It will be seen that from the outset it was impressed on me by Lieut. General Grant 
that he hoped for an opportunity, by means of the operations of my command, to 
attack the enemy outside of his intrench men ts. 

On the 29th of March, Lieut. Gen'l Grant again wrote to me from his headquarters 
dated on Gravelly-Run Creek. I submit a copy of this dispatch herewith, marked B. 
I was then at Dinwiddle Court- House. General Grant said: 

" I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not 
want you therefore to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning 
push round the enemy, if you can, and get onto his right rear." 

During the night of the 29th of March, to the disappointment of the whole army, 
a heavy rain set in, and early the next morning, March 30th, being still in the vicin- 
ity of Dinwiddie Court-House, with my command, I received a dispatch of that date 
from Lieut. General Grant, from his headquarters on Gravelly Run, a copy of which 
I submit herewith, marked C. General Grant wrote: 

"The heavy rain of to-day will make it impossible for us to do much until it dries up a 
little, or we get roads round our rear repaired. You may therefore leave what cavalry you 
deem necessary to protect the left and hold such positions as you deem necessary for that pur- 
pose, and send the remainder back to Humphrey' 's Station, where they can get hay and grain. 
* * * Could not your cavalry go back by the way of Stony Creek depot and destroy the 
store of supplies there?" 

On receipt of this dispatch I rode immediately to the headquarters of the Lieut. 
General to confer with him. Although the rain continued to fall heavily, Lieut. Gen- 
eral Grant reconsidered his order to withdraw the main body of my cavalry from 
Dinwiddie, and the hope being renewed that some good might result from the pres- 
ence of my troops towards Five Forks, General Merritt, who was near J. Boisseau's, 
was ordered to reconnoiter in that direction. 

He succeeded in gaining temporary possession of the White Oak road, at Five Forks, 
after a skirmish with the enemy, and on this being reported to Lieut. General Grant 
he wrote to me on that day, March 30th, from his headquarters on Gravelly Run as 
follows : 

" Your positions on the White Oak road are so important that they should be held even if 
it prevents sending back any of your cavalry to Humphrey's Station to be fed. * * • * 
Cannot you push up to Burgess' Mills, on the White Oak road?" 

I submit herewith a copy of this dispatch, marked D. 

Again, on March 30th, from the same headquarters, Lieut. General Grant wrote to 
me as follows : 

"From the information I have previously sent you of Warren's position, you will see that 
he is in danger of being attacked on his left flank in the morning. If such occurs be pre- 
pared to push up with all your force to his assistance. Do not send any of your cavalry to 
Humphrey's Station to-morrow." 

I submit herewith a copy of this dispatch, marked E. 

Again, on March 30th, from the same headquarters, Lieut. General Grant wrote to 
me as follows : 

"If your situation in the morning is such as to justify the belief that you can turn the 
enemy's right icith the assistance of a corps of infantry entirely detached from the balance 
of the army, I will so detach the Fifth Corps, and place the whole under your command for 
the operations. Let me know as early in the morning as you can your judgment in this 
matter, and I will make the necessary orders." 

I have already testified before this court as to my request for the Sixth Army Corps, 
instead of the Fifth Corps, which was for the reason that while I had not the slightest 
prejudice against the Fifth Corps, I did not know what I could do with it, nor were my 
staff officers acquainted with the various officers commanding in it, while on the other 
hand I knew what I might reasonally expect from the Sixth Corps, which had served 
with me in the Shenandoah Valley campaign, and borne a distinguished part in the 
battles of the Opequan, or Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek. 

I submit herewith a copy of the last-mentioned dispatch, marked F. 



On March 31st, from his headquarters at Mrs. Butler's house, on the Boydton pla: k 
road, Lieut. General Grant wrote to me as follows (but of course he was not then aware 
that my command near Dinwiddie Court-House and Five Forks had been attacked by 
the enemy and was then heavily engaged). Lieut. General Grant said: " IVai ren and 
Miles' division of the Second Corps are now advancing. I hope your cavalry is up where it 
it will he of assistance. Let me know how matters stand now wit It the carat ry, where they 
are, what their orders, <fc. / understand that the enemy have some infantry and a brigade 
of cavalry at Stony Creek Station. I think it possible, too, that Johnson may he brought up 
that road to attack us in the rear. They will see now that Sherman has halted at Golds- 
borough, and may think they can leave Raleigh ivith a small force." 

I submit herewith a copy of this dispatch, marked G. 

Here terminates what I may describe as the first phase of my instructions from Lieut. 
General Grant during - the campaign in question. 

It will be seen that, except where the storm seemed to forbid all military operations, 
my instructions uniformly looked to a hope, on the Lieut.* General's part, of important 
results from the threatening movement of my command in the direction of Dinwiddie 
and Five Forks. They evince also but little hope of accomplishing anything definite 
by direct assaults of the enemy's works by the infantry, and they give evidence of 
some anxiety lest re-enforcements from the Confederate general, Joseph E. Johnston, 
should reach General Lee. 

The battle of Dinwiddie Court-House on March 31st, fought between my cavalry and 
the cavalry and infantry of the enemy, inaugurated a new phase of conditions for me 
and promised to realize to some extent the hope indulged in by Lieut. General Grant 
in the dispatch to me marked A, already referred to, that the enemy would come out 
and attack us, or get himself where he could be attacked. 

My report to General Grant of the battle of Dinwiddie Court-House and his dispatch 
to me in reply, dated Dabney's Mills, March 31st, 10.05 p.m., are already before the 
court of inquiry. The urgency of Lieut. General Grant in supporting me after this 
battle is apparent in dispatches not addressed to me, but before this court, and also in 
others which I might produce, but I confine myself to my own instructions from the 
Lieut. General. In his dispatch to me just referred to he gives his expectations as to 
the prompt movement of the troops ordered to my support, and he requires me to use 
them to the best of my ability to destroy the force with which I had been engaged at 
the battle of Dinwiddie Court-House. 

The isolation of the enemy's force sent to attack me at Dinwiddie Court-House and 
Five Forks, on the 31st of March, and the troops dispatched to my support, led me to 
believe that great results might possibly now be accomplished. The importance of 
the results hoped for was the measure of my desire to fulfill the expectations of the 
Lient. General, and of my impatience to see his orders promptly obeyed by those troops 
which he had directed to my support on the night of March 31st. 

My dissatisfaction with the non-arrival of General Warren's command with prompt- 
ness was in proportion to the urgency of the occasion, as I regarded it ; so it was with 
the slowness of the formation of his corps before the battle of Five Forks, and so it 
was with General Warren's part in the- battle itself. 

I do not pretend that I judged of these things by an ordinary standard. I felt that 
a great opportunity had arisen, and besides I had to realize as well as I could the 
expectations of the Lieut. General. I judged by this standard of conditions as well as 
duty and without prejudice. 

.General Warren in my opinion fell far short of the occasion and of what it required. 
This is still my opinion, and I relieved him from the command of the Fifth Corps, and 
ordered him to report in person to the Lieut. General commanding, under the discre- 
tionary authority given me, of which, by the nature of my position and my instruc- 
tions, as I believed, I was the judge. 

There still remains to be considered the military position in which I found myself, 
and the great responsibilities which devolved on me immediately after the battle of 
Five Forks. » 

I was aware that our success on that day had securely established my command in 
a position from which the enemy would be compelled to drive me or abandon Rich- 
mond and Petersburg. My own dispositions made as soon as the battle was over, the 
counter-marching of the Fifth Corps on the White Oak road, and the taking up of a 
line facing towards the enemy in the direction of Petersburg, will indicate to the 
court, without other proof and without argument, how strongly I was impressed by the 
risks of the position I then held. I therefore make no particular reference to the 
urgency of Lieut. General Grant, of which I might furnish abundant proofin the measures 
he took for my further re-enforcement and for keeping the enemy from deserting their 
lines nearer Petersburg and coming to attack me. I confine myself to the influences 
which directly affected me. In view of these and of the possibilities within our grasp 
if I could hold my position won at the battle of Five Forks, I still further regarded it 
as my duty to remove from command a corps commander in whom I could no longer 
feel confidence. 



10 

The removal of General Warren was done in the midst of circumstances of great 
urgency and stress ; circumstances similar to those under which I formed the impres- 
sions which led to his removal. It was an incident of a campaign fruitful of great 
results. Surrounded by difficult conditions and urged on by the expectations of the 
Lieut. General as evidenced in the dispatches referred to, there was no room in my 
action towards General Warren for anything but a consideration of the perilous situa- 
tion of my command and of the best interest of the service. 

P. H. SHERTDAN, 

Lieut. General. 



A. 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, 

City Point, Fa., March 2Hth, 1865. 
To Major-Gen. P. H. Sheridan : 

The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 a. m. to-morrow morning. 
The Second moves at about 9 a. m., having but about three miles to march to reach the 
point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth Corps after the latter reaches 
Dinwiddie Court-House. 

Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can and without being confined to any 
particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth 
Corps ; pass by its left, and passing near to or through Dinwiddie reach the right and 
rear of the enemy as soon as yon can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his 
intrenched position, but to force him out if possible. Should he come out and attack us or get 
himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way and with the 
full reliance that the Army will engage or follow theenemy as circumstances will dictate. I shall 
be on the field and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do 
so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut 
loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to 
cross the Southside road between Petersburg and Burksville and destroy it to some 
extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville 
road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make 
your destruction on that road as complete as possible ; you can then pass to the South- 
side road, west of Burksville, and destroy that in like manner. After having accom- 
plished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply 
to Lee's Army, you may return to this Army, selecting your road further south, or you 
may go into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter 
course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to 
meet you at Goldsboro. 

(S'g'd) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieut. General. 



B. 

Headquarters Armies of the U. S., 

Gravelly Run Creek, March 29, 1865. 
Major-General Sheridan : 

Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, 
however, to give up all from the Jerusalem plank road to Hatcher's Run whenever 
the force can be used advantageously. 

After getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's 
position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road intersects the 
Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about 100 men. Humphreys reached 
Dabney's Mill, and was pushing on when last heard from. 

I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not 
want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the 
morning push round the enemy if you can, and get on to his right rear. The movements 
of the enemy's cavalry may of course modify your action. We will act together as 
one army here until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal officer 
at Cobb's Hill reported, at 11. 30 a. m., a cavalry column had passed that point, from 
Richmond towards Petersburg, taking 40 minutes to pass. 

(S'g'd) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieut. General. 



11 



Headquarters Armies ok the United States, 

Gravelly Bun, March 30, 1865. 
Major-General She kid ax : 

The heavy rain of to-day will make it impossible for us to do much until it dries up 
a little or we get roads arouud our rear repaired. You may, therefore, leave what 
cavalry you deem necessary to protect the left, and hold such positions as you deem 
necessary for that purpose, aud send the remainder back to Humphrey's Statiou, where 
they can get hay and grain. Fifty wagons loaded with forage will be sent to you in 
the morning. Send an officer back to direct the wagons back to where you want 
them. Report to me the cavalry you will leave back and the position you will occu- 
py. Could not your cavalry go back by the way of Stoney Creek Depot and destroy or 
capture the store of supplies there ? 

(S'g'd) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieut. General. 



Headquarters Armies of the United States, 

Gravelly Run, March 30th, 1865. 

Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan: 

Your positions on the White Oak road are so important that they should be held, 
even if it prevents sending back any of your cavalry to Humphrey's Station to be 
fed. 

The fifty wagon loads of forage ordered will be increased, if you think it necessary. 
Let the officer who goes back to conduct it to your cavalry call on General Ingalls at 
mv headquarters. 

1 (S'g'd) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieut. General. 

P. S. — Cannot you push up to Burgess' Mills, on the White Oak road? 



Headquarters Armies of the United States, 

Gravelly Bun, March 30, 1665. 

Major-General Sheridan : 

From the information I have previously sent you of Warren's position, you will see that 
he is in danger of being attacked on his left flank in the morning.* If such occurs, be pre- 
pared to push up with all your force to his assistance. Do not send any of your cav- 
alry to Humphrey's Station to-morrow. 

(S'g'd) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieut. General. 



F. 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, 

Gravelly Bun, March 30, ] 865. 
Maj. General P. H. Sheridan: 

If your situation in the morning is such as to justify the belief that you can turn the 
enemy's right with the assistance of a corps of infantry entirely detached from the bal- 

*In the dispatches quoted in the argument portions have been italicized merely to 
draw attention to particular expressions. The dispatches quoted are not italicized in 
the originals. A. B. G. 



12 

ance of the Army, I will so detach the 5th corps, and place the whole under your com- 
mand for the operation. Let me know as early in the morning as you can your judg- 
ment in this matter and I will make the necessary orders. Orders have been given 
Ord, Wright, and Parke to he ready to assault at daylight to-morrow morning. They 
will not make the assault, however, without further directions. The giving of this 
order will depend upon receiving confirmation of the withdrawal of a part of the enemy's 
forces in their front. If this attempt is made it will not he advisable to he detaching 
troops at such a distance from the field of operations. If the assault is not ordered in 
the morning then it can he directed at such time as to come into co-operation with you 
on the left. Pickett's entire division cannot he in front of your cavalry; deserters 
from Stewart's brigade of that division came into Humphrey's front this afternoon. 
(S'g'd) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieut. General. 



G. 

Headquarters Armies oe the United States, 

Gravelly Run, March 31st, 1865. 
Major-General Sheridan : 

I am now at Mrs. Butler's house, on Boydton plank-road. My headquarters will be 
at Dabney's saw-mill to-night. Warren and Miles' division of the Second Corps are 
now advancing. I hope your cavalry is up where it will be assistance. Let me know 
how matters stand now with the cavalry, where they are, what their orders, &c. If 
it had been possible to have had a division or two of them well up on the right-hand 
road taken by Merritt yesterday they could have fallen on the enemy's rear as they 
were pursuing Ayres and Crawford. I would like you to get information from the 
Weldon road. I understand the enemy have some infantry and a brigade of cavalry 
at Stoney Creek Station. I think it possible, too, that Johnston may be brought up 
that road to attack us in the rear. They will see now that Sherman has halted at 
Goldsboro, and may think they can leave Raleigh Avith a small force. Word has just 
been brought in that Warren has got possession of the White Oak road. 

(S'g'd) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieut. General, 

From this statement of Lieutenant-General Sheridan it will be per- 
ceived that his undertaking around the right of the enemy was in order 
to draw them out of their intrenchments, so that they could be attacked ivith 
some definite prospect of success, and thus bring about great results to the 
advantage of the cause of the Union. 

If we study his movements with these three small cavalry divisions, 
which culminated in the battle of Dinwiddie Court-House, we will see 
that he fully carried out the expectations of the General-in-Chief of the 
Army by drawing out the enemy far beyond their intrenchments, so 
that they could be attacked with some prospect of success. 

BATTLE OF DINWIDDIE COURT-HOUSE BRIEFLY SKETCHED. 

In looking at the movements of what is commonly known as the 
battle of Dinwiddie Court-House, of March 31, 1865, fought by a con- 
siderable portion of the three cavalry divisions of General Sheridan 
against a combined force of infantry and cavalry of the enemy, some 
interesting facts are discovered. 

General Sheridan having previously sent a small cavalry force towards 
the White Oak road, to the neighborhood of Five Forks, the enemy 
immediately began to send troops to that position, and on the 31st of 
March, after a preliminary Hank attack, they attacked the three brigades 
of Fitzhugh, Davies, and Stagg, which were south of that position. 

These three brigades contested the ground with great determination, 
gradually falling back ; but the enemy being in great force endeavored 
to come in upon their left flank with Fitzhugh Lee's, William H. F. 
Lee's, and Rosser's cavalry, and Pickett's and Johnson's divisions of in- 
fantry to the south and west. 



13 

General Sheridan had not advanced all his three cavalry divisions to 
the point of this contest, because the object of the movement which he 
had made was to draw the enemy ont of their works into such a posi- 
tion as to enable them to be attacked with a reasonable prospect of 
complete success. 

Therefore, when these three brigades were assailed upon their left 
flank and rear, the enemy almost interposing" between the main body of 
the cavalry near Dinwiddie Court-House, and these three brigades 
towards Five Forks, these brigades, under the orders they received 
from General Sheridan, retired to the eastward, towards the Boyd ton 
plank road; and thus, as the enemy pursued to the eastward, their 
flank and right rear was directly presented to the main force of the U. 
S. cavalry near Dinwiddie Court- House (pp. 852, 1314). 

A movement of Gregg and Gibbs's brigades to the front from Din- 
widdie to attack the enemy in flank and rear necessitated that they 
should let go their hold upon the three brigades of cavalry with which 
they had been previously contesting' and which were retiring towards 
the^Boydton plank, and compelled them to face towards the south, 
towards Dinwiddie Court- House. 

The consequence was that, as Gregg and Gibbs's brigades slowly re- 
tired towards Dinwiddie, the entire force of the enemy was brought 
down in close proximity to Dinwiddie Court-House at the close of the 
day's operations. 

Meanwhile the three brigades of Fitzhugh, Stagg, and Davies, which 
had begun the contest near Five Forks, having continued their retreat 
eastwardly toward the Boydton plank, then moved down to the Boyd- 
ton plank southwesterly and rejoined the main cavalry command of 
General Sheridan at Dinwiddie. 

Consequently, when night set in the entire cavalry command of Gen- 
eral Sheridan was placed in position in front of Dinwiddie to make such 
offensive movement as would afford a prospect of success when the in- 
fantry of our Army should be placed in a position to co-operate. 

The wishes of the General-in-Chief had been complied with; the 
enemy in force had been drawn out of their lines at Five Forks 4J 
miles (p. 484) ; the Fifth Corps, or a portion of it at least, under Bartlett, 
by dusk was directly on the rear of their left flank ; and the enemy down 
near Dinwiddie were becoming anxious to get out of the position in 
which they found themselves. 

Thus, this masterly movement of General Sheridan's had, up to this 
point of time, been completely successful; and one eannot study the 
operations of the cavalry in that day's action, known as the battle of 
Dinwiddie Court-House, without being impressed by the remarkably 
skillful manner in which, with little detachments, the ground had been 
contested and the enemy finally decoyed to the neighborhood of Din- 
widdie Court-House. 

ACTION OF GRAVELLY RUN OR WHITE OAK RIDOE. 

But, while these operations were being conducted, a very different 
series of operations of a military nature were taking place on the left of 
the Army of the Potomac and nearest to the cavalry position of General 
Sheridan. 

The Fifth Corps held the left of the lines of the Army of the Potomac. 

In considering the operations that General Warren, its commander, 
undertook on the same day some curious facts are discoverable. 

Whether he ever before that time undertook, of his own volition, any 



14 

independent military movement sufficiently extensive to require the co- 
operation of an entire corps in action I am not prepared to say. I am 
inclined to believe that the previous movements of the Fifth Corps, 
while under his command in action, in which any success was obtained, 
were the result of a positive line of operations laid out by superior 
authority and conducted under the immediate observation of some su- 
perior military commander. 

General Grant, with the discernment of true military genius, had fore- 
seen that the position in which General Warren's corps was placed on 
the afternoon of March 30 was such that General Lee would make vig- 
orous efforts to compel his retirement. 

And thus we find in his dispatch to General Sheridan (p. 1063, Bee- 
ord), dated " Headquarters of the Army of the United States, Gravelly 
Run', March 30, 1865," he said: 

From the information I have previously sent yon of Warren's position, you will see 
that he is in danger of being attacked on his left flank in the morning. If such 
occurs, he prepared to push up with all your force to his assistance. 

And again, on the same day, General Grant wrote to General Meade, 
and transmitted by telegraph a dispatch, in which he said: 

Warren should get himself strong to-night. (Record, p. 1241.) 

And again, at 9.50 p. m. of the same day, General Grant, in a dispatch 
to General Meade, said : 

From what General Sheridan reports of the enemy on White Oak road, and the 
position of his cavalry to-night, I do not think an attack on Warren's left in the 
morning improbable. I have notified Sheridan of this, and directed him to be pre- 
pared to push in to his assistance if he is attacked. Warren, I suppose, will put himself 
in the oest possible position to defend himself, with the notice he has already received, hut in 
adding to this I think it will he well to notify him again of the position of Sheridan's cav- 
alry, what he reports the enemy's position on White Oak road, and the orders he has 
received. 

If the enemy does attack, I think it will be well to instruct Humphreys also to help 
Warren if he is attacked, either by sending troops to him or by a direct attack on his 
own front." (Record, p. 1243.) 

In reply to this, General Meade, at 9.55 p. m., 30th March, said to Gen- 
eral Grant that he told Warren " to put Ayres on his guard, as he might 
be attacked at daylight, and directed that he should move Crawford up 
at once to his support, if not already there, and to move Griffin into sup- 
porting distance as soon as relieved." That "Warren, by daylight, should 
have his whole corps in hand ready for the offensive or defensive, and 
ought to be secure in either contingency, particularly as he can always 
fall back on Humphreys." 

General Meade added, however, that he could not see how the enemy 
could have a sufficient force to do him any damage, and added (p. 1243) : 

I presume you understand Warren has no orders to advance, but simply to strengthen 
and secure his position. 

He will not he allowed to advance unless you so direct. 

Now, as the evidence shows, although the enemy did not have a suffi- 
cient force there to do General Warren any damage if properly resisted, 
they nevertheless did do him considerable damage, and caused an utter 
and complete repulse and route of Ayres 7 and Crawford's divisions. 

The battle of " White Oak Bidge," as it is termed by General Warren, 
or the action of " Gravelly Kun," as it is more generally designated (p. 
627), fought March 31, 1865, at first between a portion of the Fifth Corps 
and a detachment of the enemy, and, latterly, between the Second and 
the Fifth Corps and the enemy, was the result of a movement made by 
General Warren on his oivn responsibility, although he subsequently 
received permission from Major General Meade, on the imperfect report 
he made to continue that which he had undertaken. 



15 

It is not necessary for this; investigation, so far as General Sheridan 
is concerned, that much attention should be given to this action of White 
Oak Eidge. 

General Warren complains of an extract already given from General 
Grant's report (p. 48, Record). For a better understanding of this 
matter I will repeat that extract, which is as follows : 

On the morning of the 31st General Warren reported favorably to getting possession 
of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this he moved with 
one division instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior 
force and driven back on the Second Division before it had time to form, and in turn 
forced back upon the Third Division, when the enemy was checked; a division of the 
Second Corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy 
loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained. 

General Warren's plea as to this report of General Grant's is that the 
General-in-Chief must have been misinformed in relation to his (War- 
ren's) reports; and of the orders that he (Warren) received, he urges 
that the operation proposed by himself and subsequently sanctioned by 
General Meade after, hoivever, they had begun to take place, were in the nature 
of a reconnaissance only, the result of which was to determine what 
should be done, and says that the action of the enemy, however, inter- 
fered with the plans, as they often did, and produced the resulting 
ope rations. 

This, it would seem, is an argument upon technicalities rather than 
upon the intent of the dispatches which passed and the purpose of the 
movement. 

At 9.40 a. m. on the 31st of March, the applicant sent a dispatch to 
Bvt. Maj. Gen. A. S. Webb, chief of staff of Major-General Meade, 
commanding the Army of the Potomac, in which he said : 

I have just received a report from General Ayres that the enemy have their pickets 
still this side of the White Oak road, so that their communication is continuous along 
it. I have sent out word to him to try to drive them off, or to develop with what force the 
road is held by them (Record, p. 1274). 

General Meade undoubtedly understood this dispatch of General War. 
ren's precisely as General Grant did, because he replied at 10.30 a. m. : 

Your dispatch giving Ayres' position is received. General Meade directs that should 
you determine by your reconnaissance that you can get possession of and hold the White 
Oak road you are to do so, notwithstanding the orders to suspend operations to-day 
(Record, p. 1275). 

If General Warren did not think that General Ayres could drive the 
eneiny off the White Oak road, so that it would have been commanded 
by his own corps, why did he direct him to make the movement ? 

Certainly his dispatch, upon its face, is favorable to the idea that he 
may be able to get possession of that road. 

General Grant, as we have seen, knew the importance of maintaining 
his position, and felt assured that the Confederate Commanding General, 
E. E. Lee, would appreciate the necessity of using every exertion to 
drive him from it. 

He had already given every possible warning for the information of 
General Warren, which the latter did not seem to comprehend or to 
accept in its fullest significance. 

Consequently, in making the movement towards the White Oak road, 
he acted in a manner to call forth the criticism found in General Grant's 
report, namely : 

He moved with one division instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the 
enemy in superior force and driven back on the Second Division before it had time 
to form, and it in turn forced back upon the Third Division, when the enemy was 
checked. 



16 

General Grant there assumed that the enemy attacked in superior 
force. 

But we have seen frooi the evidence of the witnesses already produced 
here by General Warren that the enemy which attacked him was in 
much inferior force. 

One of two conclusions only can be drawn from the first phase of the 
action of White Oak Ridge or Gravelly Run : 

First. That the discipline, efficiency, and gallantry of the Second and 
Third Divisions of the Fifth Corps were not what they should have been, 
which conclusion, however, is contradicted by their subsequent conduct 
when under the immediate command of General Sheridan and led by 
Griffin. 

Second. That the military dispositions made by General Warren of 
his corps on the morning- of March 31, 1865, before the forward move- 
ment began, were faulty and the direct cause of the unfortunate and 
otherwise unexplainable repulse of the two divisions which took part in 
the action in the morning. 

General Grant appears to have read the thoughts of the Confederate 
General-in-Chief, Lee, so far as this day's movements were concerned. 

Despite his reiterated warnings for Warren to "make himself strong, 77 
to look out for an attack, the latter had but one idea, namely, to drive 
off the enemy's pickets from the White Oak road or endeavor to develop 
with what force the road was held by them. 

Kow, the enemy's works were on the line of the White Oak road a 
little further to the east, and it was hardly supposable that they held 
the road itself with more than a line of pickets. 

From the evidence of the Confederate general, Eppa Hunton (p. 630 
Record), it appears that the Confederate general, Lee, himself, came 
down there on the morning of March 31 and superintended in person on 
the field the movement which resulted in the rout of the Second and 
Third Divisions of the Fifth Corps. 

The effective strength of the Filth Corps on that day is admitted to 
have been as follows : 

First Division (Griffin) ,. 5,985 

Second Division ( Ayres) 3, 308 

Third Division (Crawford) 4,698 

(Kecord,/p. 761.) 

Thus, on the morning of March 31, at 10.30, when that movement 
began to drive the enemy's pickets off the White Oak road, there were 
8,000 men on the field in the Second and Third Divisions of the Fifth 
Corps., 

The three brigades which attacked them were Eppa Hunton's, Oracle's, 
and McGowan's. 

Subsequently, after they had been successful in their advance and 
had driven the Second and Third Divisions back across Gravelly Run 
near the Boydton plank, Wise's brigade was brought out of the works 
by General Lee's orders, that they might prolong their line, so as to 
present a face towards the position of the Second Corps, which was on 
the right of the Fifth Corps. 

As to the number of troops which the enemy had, the Confederate 
general, Hunton, says, at page 630 of the Record, after having discussed 
the matter with friends and given it considerable reflection : 

I am now satisfied that the aggregate of the three brigades did not reach 5,000 
men. 

He says that his own brigade, by estimation, was from 1,500 to 1,750 
strong. 



17 

The Confederate Brigadier-General, McGowan, says that his aide-de- 
camp, Caldwell, estimated the strength of his brigade at about 1,000 
men, which is his own recollection ; and that Grade's brigade was about 
the same size, 1,000, and could not have been more; and in that way 
there were in the two brigades at the opening of the fight about 2,000 
(page 652, Eecord). 

Thus, according to the evidence of these witnesses for the applicant, 
the entire strength of the force which attacked his two divisions, aggre- 
gating 8,000 strong on the morning of March 31, was between 3,500 and 
3,750 men. 

From the Confederate Brigadier General McGowan's evidence, at page 
650 of the Eecord, Robert E. Lee himself came out of the works and went 
down with them in the pursuit. 

In his pamphlet published on the 10th of December, 1865, in which 
the applicant, General Warren, undertook to give an account of this 
movement towards the White Oak road of a portion of his corps, he 
said : 

General Wiutlirop, with his hrigade of General Ayres's Division, advanced accord- 
ingly about half -past ten a. m, and was repulsed ; and simultaneously an attack which 
had been prepared against General Ayres was made by the enemy in heavy force both 
from the north and west, and General Ayres's Division was forced, back. 

In his evidence before this court the applicant says that these two 
divisions got back as far as Gravelly Eun and across it by eleven 
o'clock. 

It is true that he has endeavored to qualify his statements as to the 
length of time after which they came back, but either his statement 
before this court or his statement in his pamphlet must be erroneous j 
or the only conclusion that remains is that the men of the two divisions 
must have come back on a run. 

Capt. Holman S. Melchor, of General Warren's staff, says (p. 461) 
that when Crawford and Ayres came back " it looked as if they were 
repulsed ; they were badly broken." 

Col. Theodore Lyman, aide-de-camp to General Meade (p. 520, Eec- 
ord), says that General Meade got to Warren's headquarters at eleven 
o'clock, and learned that the Second and Third Divisions had been 
attacked and driven back in confusion, but that the First Division in 
reserve had stopped the retreat. 

Brig. Gen. J. L. Chamberlain says (p. 229, Eecord) that Ayres and 
Crawford were repulsed. 

As showing how little General Warren comprehended the actual mili- 
tary situation on that morning, despite the repeated warnings of General 
Grant, General Ayres, who commanded the Second Division of the Fifth 
Corps, says that he received an order from General Warren to make a 
reconnaissance, "but by no means to bring on a battle " (p. 247, Eecord). 
Ayres says : 

I had been up to the skirmish line, and I had seen that there was a heavy force of 
the enemy in front of me. 

He says his troops knew very well there was a heavy force there. 
"They were just preparing to attack me when I made this reconnais- 
sance;" and he further says (p. 258, Eecord) that he commenced about 
10 o'clock, and by 11 or 11 J o'clock he was back on the Boyd ton plank 
and again advanced iu the afternoon. 

Now, General Warren bad placed General Griffin's division, the First 
Division, to the south of Gravelly Bun, and in the neighborhood of the 
Boydton plank road at daylight (p. 1218). Consequently he was sep- 
2 GAR 



18 

araoed from the advance divisions of Ayres and Crawford, not only by 
the Gravelly Eun Creek, but by a considerable intervening space of 
ground which General Ayres has testified was rather difficult ground to 
get over, although apparently on that morning the troops found no such 
difficulty. 

The advance of the enemy when they came out of their works and 
struck Ayres 7 and Crawford's divisions necessarily exposed their left 
flank and rear to auy attack which might be made by the Second Corps 
of the Army of the Potomac. 

How much the Confederate General, Lee, in these movements, calcu- 
lated upon the disposition or peculiarities of mind, in a military sense, of 
those commanders immediately opposing him on that particular ground 
we never can know. But it is in evidence that he actually came down 
with those three brigades close to Gravelly Kuu, and nothing stopped 
their movement but Gravelly Eun and the position of Griffin's division 
behind it. 

Griffin's division itself was nearly double the size of the three attacking 
brigades ; and to reach his position it would have been necessary for 
them to have gone across Gravelly Kun, which was then almost impas- 
sable. 

During these movements General Warren says he was back at his 
quarters, which were south of the Boydton plank road and to the rear 
of the position of Griffin. 

When he came forward and passed to the front of Griffin's division, 
where it was in position, and reached Gravelly Bun, he says that to his 
u great astonishment" the stream was 60 feet wide and 4 or 5 feet deep, 
and, as to the two retreating divisions, u the men came back very rapidly 
without any particular order at all, each man for himself ■' (pp. 717, 762, 
Becord). 

He says he heard firing at 10.30 and the troops got back across the 
run somewhere about 11 o'clock (p. 762, Becord). 

He furthers says that when he reached the run he saw that the "men 
were coming back in great numbers" (p. 717). 

" They crossed the stream in any way they could get over and reformed 
on the other side" behind Griffin's division. 

Both Ayres' and Crawford's divisions reformed behind Griffin (p. 1220). 

In his official report, dated 1 p. m., 31 March, to Major-General Meade, 
he says : 

\p. m., Mch. 31, 1865. 
Gen'l Webb, 

Ch'f of Staff: 
Gen'l: Gen'l Ayres made an advance with a small force at 10 a. m., which the enemy 
drove back and followed up in heavy force, compelling both Ayres and Crawford to fall 
back on Griffin, and, of course, in much confusion. Griffin's troops held the enemy at 
the run west of the plank road. 

Gen'l Miles' division afterwards attacked the enemy, and were forced back on my 
right. My skirmish line in front of Griffin, most of it, has advanced on the left. 

I am going to send forward a brigade from my left, supported by all I can get of 
Crawford and Ayres, and attack, swinging on our right. 

Arrangements are being made for this, and it will take place about 1.45 p. m., if 
the enemy does not attack sooner. 
Resp'ly, 

G. K. WARREN, 

Maj. Genl. 
A true copy of the original manifold dispatch in General Warren's file. 
A copy of this is found in General Webb's file of copies of dispatches received at 
General Meade's headquarters Army of the Potomac, and with it the following note : 

II Sent to Gen'l Humphreys, l.-30jp. m. ; to Gen'l Grant, 1.35." 

LOOMIS L. LANGDON, 
Brevet Lieutenant- Colonel, V. S. Army. 
(Record, p. 1275.) 



19 

General Meade then sent the following- dispatches to General Grant 

(Eecord, p. 1240): 

v March 31, 1805—12 m. 

Lt. Gen. Grant: 

Genl. Crawford & Ayres have been driven back on Griffin. Griffin is about to 
assume the offensive supported by an attack on Humphreys' left. 

Humphreys will withdraw from his right all he can spare to attack with Miles. 
Since the enemy are trying to turn oar left, 1 deem it important to attack with Sheri- 
dan and to let Ord assume the offensive if practicable. 

(S'd) G. G. MEADE, M. G. 

March 31, 1865. 
Lieut. -Gen'l Grant, 

Gen'l Warren reports by staff officer that Ayres' advance on White Oak road was 
repulsed. Ayres fell back to Crawford, the enemy following and attacking both Ayres 
and Crawford and compelling both to fall back to Griffin. Here the enemy was 
checked, the fighting still continuing. Gen'l Warren expresses confidence in his ability 
to hold his present position. Miles has been ordered to be prepared to support Warren. 
Humphreys will be ordered to attack as soon as I can communicate with him by tele- 
graph, if the affair is not over by that time. 

G. G. MEADE, 

Maj. -Gen. Cont'd' g. 

To which General Grant replied as follows (Record, p. 1247) : 

Printed: (U. S. Military telegraph.) 1 p. m., M'ch 31, 1865. 
Printed: (By telegraph from) Gravelly Run, 31st, 18<i5. 
To Maj. Gen. Meade: 

If the enemy has been checked in Warren's front what is to prevent him pushing in 
with his whole corps — attacking before giving him time to entrench or return in gocd 
order to his old line of entrenchments. 1 do not understand why Warren permitted his 
corps to be fought in detail ivhen Ayres was pushed forward. Re should have sent othir troops 
to their support. 

U. S. GRANT. 

This criticism of the then general-in- chief is a controlling one. He 
knew all the surrounding circumstances, and had done everything possi- 
ble to put General Warren on his guard, but without success. 

Eepeated warnings, however, for that day's work were of no avail. 

Even Bvt. Maj. -Gen. E. B. Ayres (Colonel Second United States 
Artillery), who commanded his Second Division, warned him, but unsuc- 
cessfully. 

The following is what General Ayres says (Eecord, p. 1089) : 

By the Court : 
Q. How far did your brigade advance ? — A. As far as their own skirmish line. 
Q. How in relation to the White Oak road? — A. About halfway from its position 
on the map to the White Oak road. 

By Maj. Asa Bird Gardner, counsel for the respondent: 

Q. In making that movement did you receive any intimation from General Warren 
that you might be attacked by the enemy ? — A. I knew I should myself. I had seen 
it for a couple of hours — the enemy in great force along there ; I had crawled up to the 
skirmish line and had inspected them. I was ordered to make a reconnaissance with- 
out bringing on a fight. 

Q. Did you notify General Warren to that effect? — A. I think so; I think that is 
the way I came to get this other brigade that General Crawford sent to me. I suppose 
it was on account of that information. 

Q. Do you recollect substantially what the information was that you sent back to 
General Warren ? — A. No ; I do not recollect ; I think General Warren came over there 
once to me, if my memory serves me ; he was there before I made this reconnaissance ; 
I think he told me General Meade did not want a battle brought on. I was aware very 
well that it would bring on a battle. 

Q. And so reported ? — A. I presume I so reported. 

******* 

Q. You are quite positive you received your order to make that reconnaissance after 
you had given that information to General Warren as to the condition of the enemy's 



20 

forces ? — A. I am quite certain of it ; I am quite sure I must have given the informa- 
tion ; and then my getting this brigade from General Crawford confirms me in the 
belief that I had stated it. And I think General Warren came over there, and we had 
a discussion that the enemy were in heavy force and that an advance there would 
bring on a fight. I knew it would myself, and I had made every preparation for it 
before I started. 

Brig. Gen. S. W. Crawford, U. S. A. (retired), then commanding the 
Third Division, Fifth Corps, says that General Ay res on this morning 
pointed and said he thonght that an attack was going to come from 
that direction and that he believes it did come from that direction (p. 
568). 

General Warren does not appear to have communicated to General 
M 3ade the positive information General Ayres had of a " great force " and 
only mentioned, in his 9.40 a. m. dispatch (already quoted), that the 
enemy had their pickets still this side of the White Oak road. General 
Meade accordingly, at 10.30, by his dispatch (already quoted) sanctioned 
a movement which General Warren had already blindly begun, and even 
while General Meade was preparing his reply the rout had begun. 

General Meade did not wish to bring on a battle. 

General Ayres knew if he advanced there would be a battle. 

The consequences have been shown. The aggregate loss on that day 
of the Fifth Corps was 1,407 (Record, p. 1326). 

Bvt. Brig Gen. J. Tarbell, Colonel Ninety -first New York Volunteers, 
Kellogg's Brigade, Crawford's Division of the Fifth Corps, says his 
regiment on that day was about 1,400 strong (Record, p. 996), and that 
when the enemy attacked he made two stands while retreating with his 
own regiment. 

He has testified as follows (Record, p. 995) : 

Q. Who was exercising command during this stand that was made ? — A. I was. 

Q. In those stands that you made did you receive any orders from any of your 
superior officers ; if so, from whom? — A. None whatever; I made two other stands 
where I thought I had good positions, and finally came to where the line re-formed. 

Q. In going back from where you were attacked by the enemy were any of our 
forces in front of you? — A. Not to my knowledge. 

Q. There was one division in front of you ? — A. That parsed to the rear. 

Q. In going to the rear did you notice whether it was in order or not ? — A. Some of 
it in order and some not. 

Q. In going back did you cross any stream? — A. A small stream that I think was a 
branch of the Gravelly Run ; stopped just on the other side of that, where the new 
line was formed. 

Q. On the south side ? — A. On the south or east or southeast. 

Q. Was it a deep stream or shallow ? — A. Where I crossed there was no difficulty ; 
but where some of my officers and men crossed it was up to the waist ; after I got 
across I found a new line. 

Q. You do not know what division that was ? — A. I joined my own division imme- 
diately. 

Q. How long was it before you made another advance ? — A. I should suppose, at 
this distance of time, an hour or two — perhaps a couple of hours. 

Q. Before you made any advance did you hear any firing? — A. There was a good 
deal of firing ; there were perhaps a couple of pieces — a small battery — upon our right 
that were very busy. 

Q. Do you know where the Second Corps was at this time ? — A. I do not. 

Q. In going forward again, did you meet with any resistance? — A. Nothing serious; 
met with some, I think, on one of the flanks, perhaps the right flank — but nothing to 

retard our progress. 

******* 

Q. On the day, 31st March, when the enemy made this attack upon you, do you 
know what precautions, if any, had been taken against any surprise ? — A. I do not 
know of any ; my impression at the time was, that there were not any proper precau- 
tions. It appeared to me thai; there was nobody there, and that the falling back was 
a piece of folly, because we were not prepared — it seemed to me that way. 



2L 

On cross examination he answered as follows (Record, p. 1005) : 

Q. Your words were, as I understood, that your impression at the time was, that 
that Calling back was a "piece, of folly " ?— A. Yes. 

Q. Precisely. What do you mean the court to understand you by that ? — A. I shall 
have to explain. I took it for granted, without knowing anything about it, that the 
body of the enemy was engaged, and they could spare but a small detachment to 
attack us. My opinion is, that they fooled us. My theory was, that the body of the 
enemy would be engaged — actually engaged, and that they could not spare a large 
body to attack us, and that therefore they would spare only a small detachment. I 
thought then it was only a small detachment of the enemy. I think so now, and that 
they fooled us— fooled somebody ; I thought so then and I think so now. I do not 
know : I tell you what 1 thought then, and what I think now. 

On the next day while hearing his evidence read for correction, the 
witness, Bvt. Brig. Gen. J. Tarbell, late United States Volunteers, said 
(Record, p. 1018) : 

Referring to the falling back of the Fifth Corps on the 31st March, I used the word 
" fo ly," and again the word " fooled." I do not like the phraseology ; I think I should 
not use such words. My idea was, and is now, better expressed, if I say I thought 
then, and still think, that that attack ought to have been resisted, and successfully 
resisted. Then, again, as to the action after the new line was formed on March 31 — I 
did not say so yesterday — if it is proper to add this further remark, I would say I 
thought then, and still think, that that detachment of the enemy that attacked and 
drove us back ought to have been cut otf by the Fifth Corps without any aid from 
anybody. That is only an opinion, but I like the language better. I did not see any 
attempt to cut it off and capture it. 

There can be no profitable conjecture as to what would have been the 
result, if those three triumphant brigades, led by R. E. Lee in person, 
had not been stopped by the condition of Gravelly Run Creek. 

The subsequent advance, later in the day, of the Fifth Corps, was one 
which probably might have been effected without any special exertion in 
consequence of the extremely advanced position held by the enemy. 

Brig. Gen. kelson A. Miles, U. S. A., then on duty as a Brevet Major- 
General of Volunteers, commanding four brigades of the Second Corps, 
made a movement against the enemy after they had gotten down to Grav- 
elly Run Creek and begun to intrench. 

He says he struck the rebel force in flank and partly in rear (Record, 
p. 6 13), and that his " movement broke them and drove them back towards 
their works and toward the White Oak road" (Record, p. 647). 

Of course the Fifth Corps followed up. 

General Chamberlain says that they got to the north of the White 
Oak road between 5 and- 6 p. m., when firing ceased (pp. 230, 232). 

The applicant, General Warren, says that at 3.40 p. in. the enemy 
had been driven into their works on the White Oak road, because at 
that hour he sent a dispatch to the chief of staff of General Meade in 
which he said, "We have driven the enemy, I think, into his breast- 
works," and that they met with but little opposition in this advance. 

As a matter of fact he was not in a position to advance again, even 
with the Second Corps on the flank and partially on the rear of the 
enemy, until at a quarter to two, or two o'clock, in the afternoon. 

Thus did it take three hours after the repulse of his divisions before 
he was able to take the offensive. 

Therefore, so far as the criticism of the General-in-Chief (Grant) was 
concerned upon the operations of the applicant on the 31st of March, 
1865, I submit that it was not only mild but well giounded, and more 
lenient to the applicant than the facts warranted, because he thought 
that the enemy attacked in superior force, which was not the case. 



22 

OPERATIONS OF THE NIGHT OF THE 31st MARCH, 1865. 

The acts of omission or commission on the night of the 31st March, 
of General Warren, are intimately connected with and caused the first 
statement contained in General Sheridan's report, which the applicant 
complains of, viz : 

That had he moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant-General (Grant), 
there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry 
in front of Dinwiddie Court House (Record, p. 48). 

At 4.30 p. m, on the afternoon of the 31st March, after the enemy had 
retired into their breastworks, General Meade sent a dispatch to Gen- 
eral Warren (LXXXIX, Record, p. 1276), to secure his position and 
protect as well as possible his left flank ; and that word had been sent 
to Sheridan and it was believed that he was pushing up. Also contain- 
ing these words : 

* * * You might, if you think it worth while, push a small force down the 
White Oak road and try to communicate with Sheridan ; hut they must take care not 
to fire into his advance. 

At this very time General Warren could hear the firing in the battle 
of Dinwiddie Court House receding towards that place, thereby showing 
that General Sheridan was retiring and the enemy advancing southward 
and away from the White Oak road and to the left and rear of General 
Warren's position. General Warren accordingly dispatched Bartlett's 
Bridgade of Griffin's Division. He says that it was not in consequence 
of that 4.30 dispatch from General Meade, but because "of his duty as 
a soldier to send re-enforcements, if he could, in the direction of a portion 
of our Army that was evidently hard pressed." 

So he says: " I sent him on my own responsibility towards the sound 
of the firing" (p. 768). 

This was about 5 p. m., and soon afterwards he received a dispatch 
from Major-General Meade's chief of staff, dated 5.15 p. m. (marked as 
received 5.45 p. m.), as follows: 

The major-general commanding directs that you push a hrigade down the White 
Oak road to ox>en it for General Sheridan, and support the same if necessary (p. 
1277). 

In a postscript to this dispatch it was intimated that the firing was 
so near that the command would not have far to go, which was errone- 
ous, as the firing had meanwhile receded. 

General Bartlett's brigade was a large one, containing nine regiments 
and over 3,000 men (Becord, p. 406.) 

At 5.50 p. m. General Warren telegraphed to General Meade, report- 
ing what he had done. 

Soon afterwards General Meade sent a dispatch to General Warren 
that the enemy had penetrated between General Sheridan's main com- 
mand and his, Warren's, position, and said : 

Let the force order (sic) to move out the White Oak road, move down the Boydton 
plank road as promptly as possible (Record, pp. 1277, 1278.) 

This could not be literally done, because the force ordered to move out 
the White Oak road had already gone. 

General Warren, therefore, very properly, did not wait until he could 
withdraw that force under Bartlett, and thus, by the delay, defeat the 
spirit and intent of the order , which required prompt compliance. 

He accordingly, at a little before 6.30 p. in., ordered General Pearson, 



23 

with three regiments that were then "on the plank road, right down to 
Dinwiddle Court-House? and so reported by telegraph at 6.30 p. m., to 
Major-General Meade (Record, pp. 1278 and 768), as follows: 

6.30 p. m., M'ch 31. 
Gen'l Webb: I have ordered Gen. Pierson, with three regiments that are now on 
the plank road, right down toward Dinividdie C. H. I ivill let Bartlett work and report 
result, as it is too late to stop him. 

We can see the enemy's breastworks for two miles east, along thfl White Oak road. 
If they are well manned they cannot be carried. I am within 200 yards of where they 
turn otf north from the White Oak road. 
Resp'y, 

(J. K. W ARK EN, 

Maj. Gen'l. 

It will be perceived that General Pearson was quite near to the point 
where Gravelly Eun Creek crossed the Boydton plank road, because 
General Warren puts him in the neighborhood of the Wilson House, 
guarding trains (Record, p. 769.) 

Nevertheless, General Warren does not know when General Pearson 
started — in fact, has no positive knowledge whether he moved at all, but 
supposes he did. 

Of course, if the Gravelly Run bridge was down and the stream not 
fordable, the applicant would have been immediately informed ; but he 
has testified here he had no information that General Pearson went as 
far as Gravelly Run. 

However, on being jogged in his memory, on cross-examination, that 
he bad stated, in his published pamphlet, dated 10th December, 1865, 
that General Pearson had been compelled to stop at Gravelly Run on 
account of the swollen stream and broken bridge, he expressed the 
supposition that he did have knowledge to that effect. 

At 7.30 Major-General Meade sent a dispatch, which was received at 
8 p. m. by General Warren, which was as follows : 

Rec'd 8 p. m. 
Nunan, 7.30.] U. S. M. T., Hd. Qrs. A. OF P., 

March 31, 18G5. 
To Maj. Gen. Warren: 

Despatch from Gen. Sheridan says he was forced back to Dinwiddie C. H. by a 
strong force of cavalry supported by infantry. This leaves yonr rear and that of the 
2d Corps, on the Boydton plank [road] open and will require great vigilance on your 
part. If you have sent the brigade down the Boydton plank it should not go farther 
[than] Gravelly Run, as I don't think it will render any service but to protect your 
rear. 

(S'd) GEO. G. MEADE, 

(P. 1279). ' Maj. Genl. 

Before the receipt of this dispatch at 8 p. m , General Pearson had 
been in possession of his orders at least an hour, even according to the 
applicant's own story, and probably an hour and a half or longer. 

General Warren did not report to General Meade that the bridge was 
down, but says he " thought that was a matter of common knowledge 
at the time" (Record, p. 771.) 

If so, why did he himself order General Pearson " right down towards 
Dinwiddie Court-House " without first sending his engineer officer to 
reconstruct the bridge, unless he knew of his own knowledge that the 
stream was fordable and could be crossed by infantry with no more 
difficulty than was experienced by Ayres and Crawford's divisions in 
fording it that morning at another point? 

He says he thought General Meade must know that the bridge was 
down, although he does not know whether General Meade had been to 
the bridge (Eecord, p. 771). 



24 

This is but the poorest of excuses, and only convicts him of being in 
a bewildered condition, to order three regiments, at 6.30 p. m., " right 
down to Dinwiddie Court- House," and formally report to General Meade 
that he had done so, which presupposed that they could readily march 
there, when he knew, as he now pretends, that they could not possibly 
get there until a bridge was built. As a matter of fact he never sent to 
ascertain the condition of the bridge until between three and four hours 
afterwards ; possibly not until about 11 o'clock ; as in his 1.20 a. m. dis- 
patch (Record, p. 1287) he fixes a time. 

At 8.20 p. m. he sent the following report (p. 1279) : 

Mar. 31st, 8.20 p. m. 
Genl. Webb, Chf. of Staff: 

Gen'l : I sent Gen'l Bartlett out on the road running from the White Oak road and 
left him there ; he is nearly down to the crossing of Gravelly Run. This will prevent 
the enemy communicating by that road to-night. I have about two regiments & the 
artillery to hold the plank road toward Dinwiddie C. H. 

It seems to me the enemy cannot remain between me and Dinwiddie if Sheridan keeps fight- 
ing them, and I believe they will have to fall back to the Five Forks. If I have to move, to- 
night, I shall leave a good many men who have lost their way. Does Gen'l Sheridan 
still hold Dinwiddie, C. H.? 
Resp'ly, 

G. K. WARREN, M. G. 

Major-General Meade then sent him this dispatch (Record, p. 1279) : 

Rec'd 8.40 p. m. 

[Confidential.] 

Nunan, 8.35 p. m. ] U. S. M. TV, Hd. Qrs. A. of P., 

8.30 p. m.,M'ch 31st, 1865. 
To Maj. Gen'l Warren : 

The probability is that we will have to contract our line to-night. You will bo re- 
quired to hold, if possible, the Boydton plank-road & to Gravelly Run. Humphreys 
& Ord along the run, be prepared to do this on short notice. 

ALEX. S. WEBB, 

Bvt.M. Genl. 

Thus, at 8.40 p. in., General Warren had due instructions and warn- 
ing to be prepared on u short notice " to move back from the White Oak 
road in the night-time. 

In the course of this argument it will soon be seen how he neglected 
to be prepared. 

At 8.40 p. m., General Warren telegraphed as follows (Record, p. 1280) : 

8.40 p.m., Mch. 31, 1865. 
Genl. Webb, Ch?f Staff: 

The line along the plank road is very strong. One division, with my artillery, I 
think, can hold it. If we are not threatened south of Gravelly River, east of the 
plank road, Gen'l Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely and 
let me move down and attack the enemy at Dinwiddie on one side and Sheridan on the other. 
From BartleWs position they will have to make a considerable detour to re-enforce their troops 
at that point from the north. 

Unless Sheridan has been too badly handled I think we have a chance for an open- 
field fight that should be made use of. 
Resp'ly, 

G. K. WARREN, M. G. 

Here he made an offer for a night attack* which, if successful, as made 
on his own motion, w 7 ould have redounded immensely to his military 
reputation. 

It was, however, a proposition for him to act wholly as an independent 
military commander with his entire corps. 

He evidently thought the plan was feasible of attacking the enemy on 
one side and General Sheridan on the other, or, presumably, he would 
not have proposed it. 



25 

If he expected to cross Gravelly Run in this proposed movement 
down to Dinwiddie Court-House, he made no efforts even to collect ma- 
terials to construct a bridge, should it be required. 

If he expected to move across the country in the night-time, two things 
are plain : 

1st. That he believed it feasible; 

2d. That he believed he could withdraw from the White Oak road 
promptly and without difficulty. 

At 9 p. m., Major- General Meade sent him this dispatch (Record, p. 
1280): 

Rec. 9.17 p. m. [L.) 
Nmiaii, 9.15 p. m.] U. S. M. T., Hd. Qrs. A. of P., 

9 p. m., Mch. 31, 1865. 
To Maj. Gen. Warren : 

You -will, by the direction of the Maj. Genl. conidg. draw back at once to your posi- 
tion within the Boydton plank road & send a division down to Dinwiddie C. H. to 
report to Genl. Sheridan. This division will go down the Boydton plank road. Send 
Griffin's division. Genl. Humphreys will hold to Mrs. Butler's. 

(S'd) A. S. WEBB, 

Bvt. M. G., C. d> S. 

This order was apparently a damper to his expectatious of an " inde- 
pendent n military command. 

Then he received, by the hands of a staff officer, the following order, 
in almost identically the same language, showing the importance Gen- 
eral Meade attached to his receiving it (Record, pp. 725 and 1280) : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 

March 31st, 9 p. m., 1865. 
Maj. Gen. Warren : 

You are to draw back at once to your position within the Boydton plank road, and 
to send a division down to Dinwiddie House to report to Genl. Sheridan. This divis- 
ion will go down Boydton pl'k road. Send Griffin's division. Genl. Humphreys will 
hold to Mrs. Butler's. 
By order Genl. Meade. 

ALEX. S. WEBB, 

B. M. G., C. o> S. 

Immediately after receipt of this telegraphic dispatch from General 
Meade's headquarters, at 9. 17 p. m., General Warren says he " sent a 
staff officer to report upon the condition of Gravelly Eun" (p. 775). 

Thus, up to this time, the applicant, although he says he thought it 
was within common knowledge at the time, did not Jcnow the condition of 
Gravelly Run or its bridge three hours after he had been ordered to send 
a force across it. 

Of course he could hot send Griffin's whole division down, because 
Bartlett was away, and he evidently had no fear of his, Bartlett's, posi- 
tion, as is evidenced by his 8. 40 p. m. dispatch to General Meade. 

The apparent importance of the order he had received, discoverable 
both from its context and the efforts made, by duplication, for its receipt, 
was sufficient to authorize the exercise of, at least, the same degree of 
discretion and responsibility as the applicant had been exercising. 

Circumstances, however, had now changed, because he was required 
to place nearly half his effective corps under another. 

He, however, issued this order (p. 1281) : 

General Orders, No. — .] Hd. Qrs. 5th Army Corps, 

9.35 p.m., Mch, 31, 1865. 

I. General Ayres will immediately withdraw his division back to where it was massed 
yesterday, near the Boydton plank road. 

II. Genl. Crawford will follow Genl. Ayres and mass his troops behind the entrench- 
ments, near Mrs. Butler's. 



26 

III. Genl. Griffin will immediately withdraw GenL Bartlett to his present position, 
then move back to the plank road and down it to Dinwiddie Court-House, and report 
to Genl. Sheridan. 

IV. Capt. Horrill, with the escort, will remain where Genl. Griffin's hd. qrs. now are 
till daybreak & then come back to the plank road, bringing in all stragglers. 

V. Division commanders in executing this movement, which is ordered by Genl. 
Meade, to see that none of their pickets or any portion of their troops are left behind. 

VI. Genl. Ayres and Gen. Crawford will have their troops under arms at daybreak 
and the chief of artillery will have all the batteries in readiness to move. 

By command of Maj. Gen. Warren. 

(S'd) FRED. T. LOCKE, 

Bvt. Col., A. A. G. 

On the previous occasion lie had not withdrawn General Bartlett, but 
ordered General Pearson " right down to Dinwiddie." 

Now, instead of directing what remained of Griffin's division to march 
at once, and completing its numbers by the addition of the conveniently- 
placed three regiments of General Pearson and others, he began to re- 
tard, although keeping as far as possible within the letter, though not 
within the spirit and plain intent of his orders. 

Although General Meade had at 9 p. m. sent both a dispatch and iden- 
tical written orders to him, there seems to have been no reply or report 
of progress in execution. 

At 9.20 i>. m., General Mea<le, evidently impatient under this condi- 
tion of affairs, telegraphed again as follows (p. 1282): 

Nunan, 9.45.] U. S. M. T., Hd. Qrs. A. of Potomac, 

9.20^. m., Mar. 31, '65. 
To Maj. Gen. Warren: 

The division to be sent to Sheridan will start at once. You are to be held free to act 
within the Boydton plank road. Genl. Humphreys will hold to the road and the 
return. 

(S'd) ALEX. S. WEBB, 

B. M. G., C. ofS. 
Rec'd 9.50 p.m. 

To which General Warren replied and for the first time reported the 
bridge down at Gravelly Run Creek (p. 1282) : 

11.5 p. m. — Nunan.] Hd. Qrs. 5th A. C., 10 p. m., March 31. 

Maj. Genl. Webb: 

Your dispatch of 9.20 is just rec'd. I had already sent out my orders, of which I 
send you a copy. You asked Gen. Griffin to be sent to Genl. Sheridan, and at once. 
It will take so much time to get his command together that I withdraw the other 
divisions first, they being unengaged; but this will not retard Gen. Griffin. The 
bridge is broken on the plank road, and will take, I hardly know how long, to make 
passable for infantry. I sent an officer to examine it as soon as your first order was 
received. He now reports it not fordable for infantry. It requires a span of 40 feet 
to complete the bridge, and the stream is too deep to ford. Nevertheless, I will use 
everything I can get to make it passable by the time Gen. Griffin's division reaches it. 
Resp'ly, 

G. K. WARREN, 

Maj. Genl. 

We can imagine General Meade's astonishment when he received, at 
11.15 p. m., General Warren's dispatch that the bridge over Gravelly 
Eun was gone and the creek not fordable, when the latter had four and 
a half hours before (6.30 p. m.) telegraphed that he had ordered General 
Pearson right down the Boydton plank to Dinwiddie Oourt-House, which 
information of course carried the presumption that the order could be 
promptly executed. 

Before, however, this 11.15 dispatch was received by General Meade, 



27 

the latter, apparently in order to close any further literal construction of 
his orders in the way of delay, sent this order (Record, p. 1282): 

Nunan, 10. 15 p. m.] U. S. M. T., Hd. Qrs. A. ok P., 

9.40, March 31, 1865. 
To Maj. Genl. Warren : 

Since your despatch of 8.20 p. in., the Genl. Com'd'g finds that it is impossible tor 
Bartlett to join Griffin time to more with any promptitude down the Boydton plank ; he 
therefore directs that yon. send another good brigade to join Griffin in the place of 
Bartlett in this movement. Sheridan was attacked by five brigades, one from Gor- 
don's Corps, three from Pickett's, possibly by two from Gordon's, one of them being 
Hoke's old brigade. 
A trne copy. 

(S'd) * ALEX. S. WEBB, 

B. M. G. } 4-c. 

This was received by General Warren at 10.15 p. ra., and is admitted 
by him (Record, p. 776) to have been an urgent order. 

Nevertheless he did not substitute some other brigade for Bartlett's 
although he acknowledges he was acting on his own responsibility (p. 
778), just as he had in the morning when he moved against the enemy 
on the White Oak road, and in the afternoon when he sent Bartlett out. 
His excuse is that he thought Bartlett would be back in time to go with 
Griffin when the bridge was finished (Eecord, p. 728). 

He does nob appear to have acknowledged this last-quoted dispatch, 
and General Meade, apparently more and more impatient and anxious 
for a resolute and prompt compliance with his reiterated instructions, 
telegraphed again at 10.15 p. m. as follows (Record, p. 1283) : 

Rec'd 10.50 p. m. 
Nunan, 10.48.] U. S. M. T., Hd. Qrs. A. of P., 

10.15^. m., Mch 31, 1865. 
To Maj. Gen. Warren : 

Send Griffin promptly as ordered by the Boydton P. R., but move the balance of your 
command by the road Bartlett is on, and strike the enemy in rear who is between him and Din- 
ividdie. Genl. Sheridan reported his last position as north of Dinwiddie Court-House, 
near Dr. Smith's, the enemy holding the cross-roads at that point. Should the enemy 
turn on you, your line of retreat will be by J. M. Brooks & R. Boiseau's, on Boydton 
plank road. See one inch maps. You must be very prompt in this movement, & get the 
forks of the road at J. M. Brooks' before the enemy, so as to open to R. Boiseau's. 
The enemy will probably retire toward the Five Forks, that being the direction of their main 
attack this day. Don't encumber yourself with anything that will impede your progress or 
prevent your moving in any direction across the country. Let me knoiv when Griffin starts Sr 
when you start. 

GEO. G. MEADE, 

Maj. Genl. 

Acknowledge receipt. 

General Meade had now got into that condition of mind as to send the 
dispatch himself and direct the applicant to " acknowledge receipt," and 
to let him know when they started. 

This dispatch, as found in the " official" report of General Warren and 
in the pamphlet written by him 10th December, 1865 (pp. 728, 779), was 
mutilated by the omission of the important words " across the country." 

In his excuses for non-compliance he says that he knew that the 
enemy held the road to E. Boisseau's, which he had learned from his aide- 
de-camp, Maj. E. B. Cope, who had gone down the Crump road with 
Bartlett's brigade and then returned to headquarters, and therefore, as 
there was a misconception on this point, no amount of promptness could 
get him there before the enemy, who was already there ; consequently 
he exercised Ms discretion (p. 729). 

The applicant has entered into a labored explanation (Eecord, p. 781) 
as to why he failed to obey this positive order. 



28 

He fastens on the remark in the dispatch that if the enemy turned 
upon him the line of his retreat would be by J. M. Brooks' and R. Bois- 
seau's, which he thinks showed a "good deal of solicitude" on General 
Meade's part as to his getting to the forks of the road at J. M. Brooks'. 

General Meade, however, stated in his dispatch what General War- 
ren perfectly comprehended, viz, that the enemy " would probably re- 
tire towards the Five Forks, that being the direction of their main 
attack." 

General Warren himself, at 8.20 p. m., and again as late as forty min- 
utes after midnight (1st April), (which was exactly two hours after receipt 
of this dispatch from General Meade), expressed precisely the same opin- 
ion in a dispatch to General Humphreys, who commanded the Second 
Army Corps, saying : 

I think the enemy that drove General Sheridan to-day must withdraw to-night. 
I have a brigade on the road north from J. Boisseau's (p. 1304). 

As early as between 8 and 9 p. m. General Warren had been in- 
formed by his aide, Major Cope, of the exact position of Bartlett's con- 
siderable force (3,000) in rear of the enemy at J. Boisseau's (Record, p. 
729). 

General Warren meant to say G. Boisseau's in his dispatch to General 
Humphreys, and incorrectly designated a place perfectly well under- 
stood, however, just as General Sheridan did in a later dispatch (of 3 a. 
m., Record, p. 1288) to Warren himself, relative to the same position of 
Bartlett. 

Brevet Major-General Bartlett has testified how, from the position he 
was in at G. Boisseau's, on the Crump road, he could see the whol^ cav- 
alry of the enemy in camp across the run, he being directly in their 
rear. Subsequently he begged to be allowed to attack them. Major 
Cope was with him, and went back to report to General Warren this 
gratifying situation (p. 11C6). 

At 9.17 p. m. Warren had received the order to draw back at once 
from the White Oak road to his position within the Boydton plank 
road, which he had previously, at 8.40 p. m. (date of receipt), been 
warned to be prepared to do on short notice ; consequently when General 
Meade's order came at 10.50 p. m. (date of receipt) to move across the 
country by the road Bartlett was on with his remaining two divisions 
to u strike the enemy in rear" between him and Dinwiddie, as he had had 
an hour and a half to get ready in, he should have been ready to do it 
at once. 

Did he do so ? The answer is, he did not even leave the White Oak 
road with the remaining two divisions until daylight. 

In his cross-examination on this subject he answered as follows (p. 
779) : 

Q. This paragraph, therefore, occurring in that order of General Meade, received 
by you at 10.50, "Do not encumber yourself with anything that may impede your prog- 
ress or prevent your moving in any direction across the country"; that, therefore, 
contemplated that you should go right across the country to a road that Bartlett was 
on or had been ? — A. He did not mean to go the route you marked. 

Q. I make no mark ; I merely give a general direction. — A. Of course it meant when 
I moved that I should move in that direction. 

Q. And strike the enemy in his rear f — A. It is not in the order, is it ? 

Q. Yes ; you will see it there. — A. Well, that is not in the copy I have. 

Q. Will you be good enough to read the beginning of the copy that you have there, 
the first few words, and see if that expression is not there ? — A. Yes ; it is in the first 
part of it. 

Q. Did you not, when you received that order, telegraph to General Meade substan- 
tially as follows : "I will now take Generals Griffin and Crawford and move against 
the enemy, as the last dispatch directed I should" ? — A. Yes. 



29 

Q. You were also directed to be very prompt in that movement ? — A. Yes. I have 
explained that. 

Q. What was there to prevent your moving across the country to the road that 
Bartlett was on at that time? — A. The tirst thing to do was to make preparation 
for it. 

Q. Had you made any preparations to that end ? — A. I think I had to give some 
instructions to those that we left behind, and attend to matters of that sort, that I 
was to leave behind. 

Q. Did you issue any orders to do that thing which was directed there? — A. I did 
not. That was my intention when I wrote that order to General Ay res, but circum- 
stances, before I could execute it, caused me to change it ; there was a change of con- 
dition. 

General Warren acknowledged General Meade's peremptory dispatch 
as follows (Record, p. 1285) : 

Headq'rs 5th Army Corps, 

10.55 p. m., M'ch 31, 1865. 
Genl. Meade : 

I issued my orders on Genl. Webb's first despatch to fall back, which made the 
divisions retire in the order of Ayres, Crawford, and Griffin, which was the order they 
could most rapidly move in. I cannot change them to-night without producing con- 
fusion that will render all my operations nugatory. I will now send Gen. Ayres to 
Gen. Sheridan, and take Genl. Griffin & Genl. Crawford to move against the enemy, 
as this last despatch directs I should. 1 cannot accomplish the apparent objects of 
the orders I have received. 
Resp'ly, 

G. K. WARREN, 
Maj. Genl., Comd'g. 
(2.12 a. m. — Nunan — line down.) 

In this he says, "I cannot accomplish the apparent objects of the 
orders I have received," but, appreciating the present effect of such a 
declaration as evidence of intent, he says, although he signed this dis- 
patch himself and must have known its contents, that the word "other- 
wise" should be interpolated (p. 730). 

The preparations General Warren made are found in the following 
orders, the second of which entirely defeated General Meade's last order 
(received at 10.50 p. m.) to move across the country and strike the enemy 
in the rear (Kecord, p. 1284) : 

Headq'rs 5th Army Corps, 

11 p. m., M'ch 31, 1865. 
General Ayres : 

Instead of halting your command, as directed in your last order, you will proceed 
down the plank road to Dinwiddie Court-House and report to Genl. Sheridan. Send a 
staff officer to report here at this house when the head of your column gets here. 
By command of Maj. Gen. Warren. 

(S'd) FRED. T. LOCKE, 

Bvt. Col., A. A. G. 

H'dq'rs 5th A. C, 

lip. m., M'ch 31, '65. 
Order : 

Gen. Griffin and Genl. Crawford will mass their divisions at the point at which this 
order reaches them, and report their positions by the officer that brings it. 
A change of plan makes this necessary. 
Eesp'ly, 

G. K. WARREN, 

Maj. Genl. 

As a matter of fact, Generals Griffin and Crawford were, as late as 1 
a. m., April 1, actually in bivouac near the White Oak road, at the point 
they had reached the previous afternoon (Record, p. 734), and never left 
it until after 5 a. m. on the 1st of April, although Warren had reported 
to General Meade at 10.55 p. m. that he would then take them against 
the enemy. 



30 

As showing the inefficiency, or bewilderment, or negligence of this 
applicant, he did not, he says, receive a report of Griffin's or Crawford's 
positions under this 11 p* m. order of his until 1 a. hi. (p. 731.) 

We know that during the morning of the 31st March it took two of 
his divisions, with such resistance as they made, but little, if any, over 
half an hour to come back from near the White Oak road to the Boyd- 
ton plank, and although at 8.40 p. m. he had orders to be prepared to 
move back his divisions at short notice, and at 9.17 had received posi- 
tive orders to do so, nevertheless at 1 a. m. the two are still in their 
original positions on the White Oak road. 

In consequence of a break in the telegraph line, of which he was not 
informed at the time, General Warren did not send his last above quoted 
dispatch to Major-General Meade of 10.55 p, m. until 12.30 a. m., and 
then accompanied it with the following dispatch (p. 1285) : 

Hd'q'rs 5th Corps, 

11.30 a. m., April 1, 1865. 
General Webb, 

Chief of Staff: 
I find that the dispatch copied on the next leaf has not heen sent you because of a 
break in the telegraph line. I believe it impossible efficiently to change the direc- 
tions I have given before daybreak. 
Kesp'y, 

G. K. WAKREN, 

Maj. Gen'' I. 

Meanwhile he had ordered his remaining two divisions, as we have, 
seen, to be massed (which was not, however, done), and deliberately told 
General Meade, despite the latter's reiterated orders, that he believed 
it impossible efficiently to change the directions he had given before 
daybreak. 

As General Warren never started to go in person to where those two 
divisions were until after 5.15 a. m., we here perceive, without reference 
to the additional evidence on this point, to which your attention will be 
invited, that he had no intention of "moving across the country to the 
road Bartlett was on" during the night- time, although peremptorily or- 
dered to do so. 

In his further cross-examination, in the effort to discover some ten- 
able reason for his failure to do what he was so ready to do at 8.40, 
provided he could be independent of other commanders, he has testified 
as follows (p. 780) : 

Q. The next dispatch you received from General Meade you received at 1 a. in. ; is 
that so ?— A. Yes, that is so. 

Q. Therefore, there was between the two dispatches of General Meade, the one to 
strike the enemy's rear and to move across the country — between that dispatch and 
the next dispatch there were two hours and ten minutes 7 time? — A. Yes. 

Q. So ; why didn't you go up, when you received that dispatch from General Meade 
at 10.50, and take those troops that were there near the White Oak road right across 
to where Bartlett was, as the order directed ? — A. I want again to go into an explana- 
tion of the question. When I halted those divisions, a staff officer was to bring me 
back a report of their position. I was also responsible for seeing that the troops 
reached General Sheridan by the Boydton plank road. I had not up to 1 o'clock re- 
ceived reports back from those officers where the divisions were halted, I believe, and 
I had not- got word from Major Benyaurd that the bridge was done, or what was 
going on, and under those circumstances I deemed it important to remain where I was 
until I could fully understand the condition of things around me, and wait until Gen- 
eral Meade understood what I reported to him. 

Q. Yet you are of the opinion that the enemy could not have remained between 
you and Dinwiddie if General Sheridan was re-enforced at that place ? — A. That was 
my opinion. 

Q. Was it not your opinion that the enemy could not remain there at all if you held 
your position where Bartlett was, at Crump's ? — A. If he just staid there it would not 
do them (the enemy) harm — they could have taken Dinwiddie Court-House. If Bart- 



31 

lett had just staid at that position — do you mean if I advanced with my corps? — my 
opinion expressed was, if I advanced with my corps, not with Bartlett's brigade. 

Q. It was just as easy for you to have taken the fragment of Griffin's division and 
Crawford's division out to where Bartlett was as it was for Bartlett to come back from 
Ciuinp's J — A. Well, it is more difficult to move a large body over an unknown country 
than ir is to bring back a smaller one that has traveled the road before. I do not see 
why I should be compelled to go into such contingencies. 

Q. You were directed in that order not to encumber yourself with anything that 
would impede your progress or prevent your moving in any direction across the 
country f — A. Not exactly. 

Q. And that you "move the balance of your command by the road Bartlett is on 
and strike the enemy's rear"? — A. Yes. 

Q. I understood that you did not do it. — A. I did not do it at that time, and, as to 
moving on the road Bartlett was on, or across the country, the line of travel I should 
have to take might depend somewhat upon where the division would be when I moved 
with them. . 

Q. You had not then withdrawn them from the White Oak road vicinity ? — A. They 
had orders a good while before to withdraw, and tho officer I had sent out to halt 
them had not'come back. 

Q. You did not go up to where they were in order to make this movement ? — A. No ; 
I would not have made this movement until I was satisfied that General Meade under- 
stood the situation clearly, and I was waiting for that; that was all that kept me 
waiting, for that and for the knowledge of the condition in which the bridge was. 

At 1 a. m., General Warren says he received the following dispatch 
from General Meade (Record, p. 1286): 

Hdqr. A. P. 11.452?. m., Mar. 31. 
Rec'd 1 a. m., April. 1. 

G. K. W. 

Maj. Gen'l Warren: 

A despatch, partially transmitted, is received, indicating the bridge over Gravelly 
Run is destroyed, and time will be required to rebuild it. If this is the case, would 
not time be gained by sending the troops by the Quaker road ? Time is of the utmost 
importance. Sheridan cannot maintain himself at Dinwiddie without re-enforcements, 
& yours are the only ones that can he sent. Use every exertion to get the troops to him 
as soon as possihle. If necessary, send troops by both roads & give up the rear at- 
tack. 

GEO. G. MEADE, 

Maj. Gent. 

If Sheridan is not re-enforced &, compelled to fall back, he will retire by the Vaughn 
road. G. G. M. 

His explanations as to this urgent dispatch are found in the continua- 
tion of his cross-examination, from above, as follows (p. 781): 

Q. Then about 1 o'clock in the morning you got that dispatch from General Meade, 
that " A despatch, partially transmitted, is received, indicating the bridge over Gravelly 
Run is destroyed, and that time will be required to rebuild it." You were told that 
"time is of the utmost importance," and to "use every exertion to get the troops to 
him (General Sheridan) as soon as possible," and, "if necessary, send troops by both 
roads and give up the rear attack." You did not send troops by the Quaker road? — 
A. I did not. 

Q. You did not send troops by both roads ? — A. I did not. 

Q. Nevertheless you gave up the rear attack? — A. No; I did not give it up. I 
waited developments and to see what information I would get. I had then to decide 
this question, but General Meade leaves the question to me — "If necessary," he says, 
"send troops by both roads and give up the rear attack." I could not tell whether it 
would be "necessary" until I could get some more definite information from General 
Ayres, and I had the belief that he (General Sheridan) would get re-enforcements by 
General Ayres, because the thing to he done by General Meade's dispatch was to re- 
enforce General Sheridan and not make the rear attack. So I was left responsible in 
my judgment whether I would send troops by the Quaker road and give up the rear 
attack or hold on to what I had already done, and not make the rear attack at once — 
await developments. 

Q. Were you not of opinion at that time that the enemy would fall back that night 
from Dinwiddie to Five Forks? — A. That was my opinion in the early part of the 
evening, but when I got that dispatch from General Meade — General Meade also in- 



32 

formed me so; but when I received this last one I had no longer any right to act up- 
on an opinion of my own except I met the requirements of his, General Meades, own 
order, as in it I regarded the re -enforcement of General Sheridian as the most impor- 
tant point. 

Q. You were aware that Bartlett's brigade was at Crump's? — A. When? 

Q. During that evening of the 31st? — A. Yes. I was aware of it. 

Q. And at what time were you informed that Bartlett had come back from Crump's? — 
A. I don't recollect exactly I stated in my report, it muse have been by information 
brought by Major Cope, that they had returned. I am not certain now at what time 
they returned. If I had put it in my papersor memorandums anywhere, that will fix it. 

Mr. Stickney, counsel for the applicant. It does not appear there. 

Q. If General Sheridan was in such a condition there that re-enforcements were 
necessary to him in order that he might maintain his position, would not a movement 
by the rear attack, as you had been directed to make by General Meade, have materi- 
ally assisted him in maintaining his position at Dinwiddie? — A. I certainly think it 
would. The position of the troops of the Fifth Corps in the rear of the enemy was a 
powerful inducement for them to let go of Sheridan. 

Q. And General Meade said that time was of the utmost importance, in his dispatch 
received by you at 1 a. m. ? — A. Yes; that time there was in reference to getting re- 
enforcements to General Sheridan. 

Q. To succor General Sheridan? — A. Yes, to assist General Sheridan. 

Q. And if necessary to do that, to give up the rear attack by going around by the 
Quaker road? — A. Certainly. 

Q. Which I understand you did not do? — A. I did not. 

Q. And did not make the "rear attack"? — A. I did not send troops by the Quaker 
road because that would necessarily have compelled me to give up the rear attack. 
But trusting to what I had already done to get re-enforcements to him, I kept the 
rear attack as an open question. 

Q. In the morning, you went across country in the very direction that you had been 
directed to do by the order of General Meade, received by you at 10.50 the night 
before? — A. Yes. 

Q. You had no other orders to do that than this one of General Meade of 10.50 p. m. 
u Strike the enemy in his rear"? — A. That is an implied order to do it, this last one. 
" If necessary send troops by both roads, and give up the rear attack." If I could 
save sending them by both roads, then I must make the rear attack. 

In his excuse here for his delays in executiug this order the applicant 
says he could not tell whether it would be "necessary" to send troops 
by the Quaker road until he could get more defiuite information from 
General Ayres. 

Gravelly Bun Crossing, however, was near (Becord, p. 164) his own 
headquarters at the Wilson House, and this explanation is deprived of 
anv value by his own dispatch, dated 1.20 a. m., as follows (Becord, p. 
1287): 

Hd. Qrs. 5th A. C, 1.20 a. m., Apr. 1. 
Genl. Meade : I think we will have an infantry bridge over Gravelly Run sooner 
than I could send troops around by the Quaker road. 

But if I find any failure I will send that way. I have sent Benyaurd 2 hours ago 
with what he thought necessary to make it practicable in one hour, and I trust to 
that. I am sending to Genl. Sheridan my most available force. 
Resp'ly, 

G. K. WARREN, 

Maj. Genl. 

At 2.05 a. m. he reported to General Meade that the bridge was prac- 
ticable for infantry and Ayres's division crossing (Becord, p. 1287). 

It is to be noticed that General Meade only suggested in his latest 
dispatch to give up the rear attack, provided it was necessary to send 
troops to General Sheridan by the Quaker road as well as by the Boyd- 
ton plank road. Otherwise, of course, his orders to make the movement 
in rear of the enemy via the Crump road aod G. Boisseau's continued 
good, and Warren has positively to admit this on cross-examination and 
also because he finally did make the movement u across country," though 
so late after daylight the next morning that the object was defeated by 
the retirement of the enemy. 






33 

The plain context of General Meade's latest urgent order, received at 
1 a. in., was to get re-enforcements to General Sheridan; a time was of 
the utmost importance." 

General Warren, having decided that he could get them quicker by 
the Boydton plank than to send any by the other (Quaker) road, the 
next plain duty which devolved upon him, as he is forced to admit, was 
to make a rear attack, which would have been, under his orders, as 
effective a way of re-enforcing General Sheridan as could have been 
devised. 

He believed the enemy would not stay long in their dangerous posi- 
tion, liable to be cut off, and promptness was therefore of the utmost 
importance. 

Nevertheless, with General Meade's peremptory order, received at 
10. 50 p. m., "to strike the enemy in rear,' 7 he ordered, at 11 p. m., Grif- 
fin's and Crawford's divisions to halt and mass where his order should 
find them. 

As a matter of fact the two divisions did not mass or leave their posi- 
tions (Kecord, p. 7SG). 

This change of plan was ostensibly to send Ayres instead of Griffin 
down the Boydton plank to General Sheridan, but why halt Crawford 
and Griffin where they were ? 

The explanation is found in the fact that General Warren had deter- 
mined in his own mind to ignore the urgency of General Meade's order 
to move across country by the road Bartlett was on and strike the 
enemy in rear. 

Although he coincided in opinion that they would probably withdraw 
before dawn towards Five Forks, he determined not to make the move- 
ment until daylight and thus defeat the very object of those orders. This 
is clearly exhibited in his dispatch to General Humphreys sent at forty 
minutes after midnight and before receipt at 1 a. m. of General Meade's 
latest dispatch on which he has, as we have seen, founded his excuses 
for non compliance. 

The dispatch from General Humphreys and his reply are as follows 
(Record, pp. 1285,1286): 

Kec'd 0.40 a. m. Apr. 1. 

G. K. W. 

Maeci 31, 11$ P. M. 
Maj. Gen'l Warren, Com'dUj hth Corps : 

I am directed to resume my position of this morning, &c, &c. 

At what time do you propose to move ? I propose to move simultaneously with you. 

A. A. HUMPHREYS, 

Maj. Genl. 

b 40 m a. 
Genl. Humphreys : 

I have just rec'd your dispatch, by Capt. Wistar. Under the order to withdraw at 
once, I thought we each could do so individually under the cover of darkness, and so ordered. 
I hare since rec'd orders to attack the enemy with two divisions, sending one down the plank 
road to report to Genl. Sheridan, and do so to-morrow. My artillery, live 4-gun batteries, 
under Geul. Wainwright, will remain on the line of the plank road. 

I think the enemy that drove General Sheridan to-day must withdraw to night. I have a 
brigade on the road north from J. Boisseau's. 

J hare )tow orders to move against the force that attacked Sheridan to-day, and shall send 
all I have to move there, or wherever the firing of a battle near us may indicate. 
Resp'lv, 

G. K. WARREN, M. G. 

In his own mind he had given up for that night the rear attack so 
positively ordered by General Meade but having received orders to at- 

3 GAR 



34 

tack the enemy with two divisions would "do so to-morrow," "or wher- 
ever the firing of a battle near us may indicate." 

His evidence on this point is peculiar. 

Referring to that portion of General Meade's order which had refer- 
ence to moving across the country the applicant has testified on cross- 
examination as follows (p. 781) : 

Q. How so ? What important point is there ahout it, so material as to make you 
cease that movement ? — A. The darkness which protected General Sheridan from the 
enemy protected the enemy as well, probably, from the operations of my troops. It 
is a Tery rare thing in this country, in all our battles, that a successful fight was made 
in a dark night through the woods in an unknown country against an enemy. 

Q. Didn't you suggest that to General Meade? — A. Yes, hut I should have done it 
next morning. / never had any idea of doing it in such a night as that. 

Q. Did your dispatch, in which you made that suggestion, indicate that you were 
not to make the movement at night ? — A. It did not say so. 

Thus, despite General Meade's reiterated orders for prompt movement 
to strike the enemy in rear, and to report when he started, General 
Warren says he " never had any idea of doing it in such a night as that. " 

No wonder General Grant the next day sent to General Sheridan an 
unsolicited order to relieve him if necessary — fearing he would probably 
fail hini (Record, p. 1030). 

At 3 a. m., General Sheridan, having heard nothing from General 
Warren, and there being then no prospect of a night attack, sent him 
by the hands of Bvt. Brig. Genl. George A. Forsyth, IT. S. A., the fol- 
lowing dispatch (Record, p. 1287): 

Headquarters Middle Military Division (Printed), 

Dinwiddie C. H., April 1st, 1865, 3 a. m. 
Major-General Warren, 

Comdg. bth A. C. : 
I am holding in front of Dinwiddie C. H., on the road leading to Five Forks, for 
three-quarters of a mile, with Genl. Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate 
front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adams's house, which leads out 
across Chamberlain's bed or run. I understand you have a division at J. Boisseau's ; if 
so, you are in the rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flank. I will hold on 
here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, have this division attack 
instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight anyway, & I will make an effort to get 
the road this side of Adams's house, & if I do you can capture the whole of them. 

Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in 
the enemy's rear, & in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank 
attack. Do not fear my leaving here ; if the enemy remain I shall fight at daylight. 
(S'd) P. H. SHERIDAN, 

Maj. Genl. 
Eec. 4.50 a. m., Apl. 1st. 

G. K. W. 

The receipt of this by General Warren at his headquarters at the 
Wilson House, south of the Boydton plank road, is 4.50 a. m. 

It showed that direct re-einforcements to join General Sheridan were 
not necessary (p. 739). At 5.15 a. m. General Warren wrote an order 
to his chief of artillery, in which he said : 

General Ayres has gone down to support General Sheridan at Dinwiddie Court 
House, and I am going to operate in front, Griffin and Crawford independently (p. 1288). 

Yery soon afterwards he went up to the White Oak road, joined his 
two divisions, and moved across the country the way Bartlett had pre- 
viously taken, as originally ordered by General Meade in the dispatch 
received at 10.50 p. m. He, himself, lingered behind, aud did not arrive 
at the junction of the Crump and Five Forks road until 8 a. m. 

Of course an attack then in flank or rear was impossible as the enemy 
iiad fallen back, and the battle of Five Forks would never have been 
fought and won but for the new combinations and plans which General 



35 

Sheridan was compelled to form and execute in consequence of the fail- 
ure of this applicant to carry out the one conceived by Generals Grant 
and Meade. 

In these closing days of the great drama acting around Petersburg 
and Richmond, he seems either to have been bewildered and incapable 
of sound judgment, or else had an overweening opinion of his own mili- 
tary abilities and a proportionate undervaluation of those senior to him- 
self with whom he was called upon to serve, which made him fail to 
give efficient support in an emergency. 

The deluding reports which he sent to General Meade on this night 
of the 31st March as to what he should do and as to what he had done, 
more particularly as to taking the two divisions to move against the 
enemy (10.55 p. m.), and that he had ordered General Pearson (6.80 p. m.) 
right down to Dinwiddie; his want of knowledge of his own immediate 
surroundings, more particularly as to where Crawford's and Griffin's 
divisions were (between 9.35 p. in. and 1 a. in.), and his assumed igno- 
rance of the condition of Gravelly Run Creek (up to 10 p. m.); his pri- 
vate determination not to move against the enemy as ordered until after 
daylight, thus defeating the object of the order, are all circumstances 
which bear hard against this applicant and which would not probably 
have come under the notice of the historian but for his unfortunate 
application for this court of inquiry. 

Some other little subsidiary matters connected with this night's move- 
ments and failures of co-operation may here appropriately be considered. 

Thus, was Gravelly Run Creek fordable at the Boydton plank road ? 

If it was, of course there was no necessity for a bridge, and that long 
delay would have been avoided. 

As, however, General Warren did not propose to operate during the 
night time with the other two divisions, it made no difference when 
Ayres's division arrived within supporting distance of General Sheridan. 

Maj. W. H. H. Benyaurd, corps of engineers, was the officer sent by- 
General Warren to examine the ford at about 10 p. m. (Record, p. 181) 
or 11 p. m. (p. 164.) He says : 

I cannot say whether it was fordable at the bridge. 
I got off the causeway and measured it below (p. 166). 

As he did not ride into the stream himself, or measure its depth 
where the bridge had been, or apparently above, never having been 
there before, and did not notice whether or not there were places on 
either side where persons were in the habit of crossing with horses and 
wagons, fording and as he -was not prepared to say here when asked 
(Record, p. 165) that he would not have been able to cross there if he 
had made an effort to do so, it is quite reasonable to assume that the 
bridge put up below the position of the old structure was built without 
due consideration. 

If, therefore, respectable witnesses positively testify to fording that 
creek at that place at a concurrent period, it will only add to the measure 
of responsibility of the applicant for the needless delay ; or else he knew, 
as can be presumed from his order to General Pearson at 6.30 p. m., 
that the stream was fordable, and that his instruction to Major Ben- 
yaurd " to see about building a bridge," to see if it required rebuilding, 
and report how long it would take (Record, p. 155), was sufficiently 
misleading to lead him to believe that the duty required of him was to 
put another bridge there rather than to see if it was possible to get a 
division of infantry over more expeditiously. 

Capt. James W. Wadsworth, aide-de-camp to General Warren, went 



36 

down to this stream about 10 p. rn., before Major Benyaurd did, and says 
(Eecord, p. 186) lie does not know positively from any effort of his own 
how deep it was or whether it was actually fordable, but while there an 
officer, who had a patrol of cavalry with him, came across, and his recol- 
lection is that the horse almost swam, but he is not positive as it was 
dark at the time. He was full girth deep or more. 

On the afternoon of the 30th March, before dark, Lieutenant- General 
Sheridan returned from General Grant's headquarters via General War- 
ren's at the Wilson House and crossed Gravelly Kim. The bridge was 
down on the Boydton plank road, and his recollection is that he crossed 
above the position where the bridge had been and watered his horse in 
the run. 

General Sheridan expressed the opinion that the stream was fordable 
for infantry. 

Now, as those little streams run out quickly after a rain storm it is 
presumable that it was not as high on the night of the 31st March as 
when General Sheridan crossed it (Becord, pp. 86, 129). 

On the afternoon of the 31st March, Bvt. Brig. Gen. Horace Porter — 
late U. S. A., then major of ordnance and aide de-camp to the General- 
in-Chief, was sent from Army Headquarters to General Sheridan at 
Dinwiddle Court House. 

He says he went down the Boydton plank road and found the bridge 
gone at Gravelly Bun and had to ford the stream, and to do so went up 
above a hundred or two yards. 

This was at nearly 4 p. in., and it was nearly dark when he and his 
orderly returned and forded Gravelly Bun at the same place (Becord, 
pp. 907, 908, 914). 

General Porter gave the following evidence: 

Q. You think a column of infantry — a division — could have crossed where you 
crossed in the night time ? — A. They could have crossed. 

Q. If there was an emergency requiring a rapid movement? — A. Yes; I have seen 
infantry cross just such streams and of that derjth (Record, p. 210). 

On the morning of the 1st April, he went again to General Sheridan 
the same way, and does not appear to have noticed the bridge constructed 
further down by Major Benyaurd (Becord, pp. 910, 916). 

General Sheridan's statement to General Porter for the information 
of General Grant, at the interview near Dinwiddie, after the close of the 
battle of Dinwiddie Court House on the 31st, is quite important. 

General Porter says (Becord, p. 908): — 

I found General Sheridan a little north of Dinwiddie on the road. He explained to 
me the operations of the day, and said that he had had a heavy force of infantry in 
front of him, and he had contested the ground and fallen back slowly ; that he could 
hold on at Dinwiddie and vicinity; that the enemy were moving easterly and might 
get possession of the Boydton plank road, but he could communicate and keep his 
communication open by the Yaughan road. He was very impressive about this, and 
he said that a situation had occurred which had been looked forward to in previous conver- 
sations, with General Grant, in which the enemy had been drawn out of his earthworks and 
at some distance from them, and there would now be an opportunity of fighting him in 1he open 
field, and that he thought that the combined attack of his cavalry and an infantry command 
sufficiently large — that the enemy could be struck a very decisive blow, taken in front and funk, 
but that time was of the utmost importance in this movement; that the next morning might 
change the circumstances entirely ; that the enemy's infantry would no doubt discover itself in 
a dangerous position and naturally fall back or be re-enforced — the circumstances might 
change. I hurried back to General Grant, going this time by the Boydton plank road, 
from Dinwiddie. They had gone into camp, and headquarters had been established 
for that night at Dabney's Mill, between the Vaughan road and the Boydton plank 
road. I got back to General Grant a little after dark. I explained somewhat in detail 
the conference I had had with General Sln j iidau, and General Grant took a very 
encouraging view of the situation, and stated that it had always been his desire to 
draw the enemy out of his earthworks, and he hoped they might be able to strike a 



37 

Mow against the infanJry that bad heen so withdrawn. A couple of hours after that 
Capt. M. V. Sheridan came to General Grant's headquarters, and he brought some 
message, written or verbal, from General Meade. He then explained to General Graut 
the circumstances pretty much as I had explained to him, though bringing the situa- 
tion down to a more recent time — probably two hours later. General Grant had been 
that evening communicating with General Meade, and General Meade sent him mes- 
sages upon this subject. General Grant expressed a desire, in view of a plan that he 
had had in mind a few days before, of sending the Sixth Corps — to put it under the 
command of General Sheridan for this operation. But General Meade had suggested 
the Fifth Corps ; in fact there were no two courses to be pursued — the Sixth Corps 
was to the right, time was of importance, and it would have been impracticable to 
withdraw that corps and move it there in time, and by common consent the Fifth 
Corps was directed to move to General Sheridan's support, and the necessary messages 
were sent to General Meade to that effect in the evening. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. George A. Forsyth, TJ. S. A., who was sent by Gen- 
eral Sheridan with the 3 a. m. dispatch of the 1st April, to General 
Warren, says, that when he got to Gravelly Run on the Boydton plank 
road, he had a short parley with the picket, who called the corporal of 
the guard. General Forsyth asked him if he could ford there. The 
corporal said he could, and remarked that somebody else had been 
across there. 

He crossed just below the old bridge, but did not see the new bridge, 
which was placed still farther down stream. The reason he did not see 
the new bridge, hidden as it was by the underbrush and woods and 
sitting low to the stream, was because Major Benyaurd, the engineer 
officer, had placed it at least 100 feet below the site of the old bridge 
and off the main Boydton plank, so that' a rough side road 100 yards 
long had to be constructed (pp. 156, 157, 165, 166). 

General Forsyth says he had no difficulty, and, returning the same 
way, watered his horse in the stream (pp. 198, 199). 

The curious thing about General Forsyth's evidence, he being so accu- 
rate an observer, is, as to what had become of Ayres's division. 

Either it did not pass down until after General Forsyth got to Gen- 
eral Warren's headquarters, or else it had gone off the road into the 
Brooke's road. The learned counsel says that General Forsyth met 
Ayres's division while going up the Boydton plank road, and comments 
on the remarkable fact that he (Forsyth) does not recollect the circum- 
stance, which the learned counsel says is substantiated by the evidence 
of Bvt. Maj. Gen. R. B. Ayres and Col. W. W. Swan. 

General Ayres says that he thinks "it was George Forsyth. I have 
been told since that it was not, but still I think it was" (p. 250). 

The message, however, which General Ayres says he received from 
this officer (p. 260), "that he had come from General Sheridan to have 
him turned off on a road which he had passed so as to come in the rear 
of the enemy," is not reconcilable with the 3 a. m. dispatch (p. 1317) 
which General Forsyth was carrying to the applicant. 

That General Sheridan sent some one about daylight, or just before, 
to meet anything coming down the Boydton plank in order to turn them 
off is quite probable, because he proposed to advance his cavalry at day- 
light, and such a message to any troops coming down the Boydton plank 
would save them a useless march to Dinwiddie Court-House, and make 
them more available by being broken off to the west. 

The other witness, Colonel Swan, whom the learned counsel says rec- 
ognized General Forsyth as the officer whom they met, corrected his 
evidence when recalled by the applicant as follows (p. 292) : 

When I came here the other day I was pretty positive that his name was Forsyth, 
hut now I am convinced that I made a mistake. 

Lieut, CoL Frederick C. Newhall, of General Sheridan's staff, says 
that on the night of the 1st April he crossed Gravelly Run at the Boyd- 



38 

ton plank, and although lie believes there was a bridge there, as it was 
dark, he preferred the stream to the bridge from choice (p. 152). 

It has now been made plain that Gravelly Run ivns fordable, and the 
applicant must have known it, else how could officers and men be com- 
ing and going by that important line of communication, 

General Ayres says that as he came down the Boydton plank, hav- 
ing passed about a mile beyond the junction of the Brooke's road, he, 
being at the head of the column, met a staff officer of General Sheridan,, 
who said : 

The General wishes you to turn oif a road farther hack. It was not expected that 
you would get up as soon as this, or I would have been here sooner to meet you (p. 
250). 

The column merely faced about, and the left of the column turned to 
the left into the Brooke's road, and marched a short distance just as the 
day was breaking. 

It is plain from General Sheridan's dispatch of 3 a. m. to Warren, 
sent by the hands of General Forsyth, that General Ayres must have 
misunderstood the officer, whoever he may have been who was sent, 
after General Sheridan had vainly waited all night for the promised 
force, to turn it at daylight into the Brooke's road and thus save it a use- 
less march to Dinwiddie, whence he was just about to set out and push 
towards Five Forks. 

Even this late and almost useless arrival caused the enemy, in falling 
back, to oblique to the left and west, away from the Dinwiddie Court 
House and Five Forks road. 

Had General Warren taken the remainder of Griffin's and Crawford's 
divisions over to where General Bartlett was posted, great and conclu- 
sive results might have followed. 

Several officers have testified as to the threatening position of General 
Barlett's brigade when at G. Boisseau's, on the Crump road, viz : Col. 
Ellis Spear, Twentieth Maine Volunteers (Record, p. 401) ; Capt. Charles 
F. Sawyer, First Maine Sharpshooters (Record, p. 413), and General 
Bartlett himself (p. 1166). 

The enemy in their advanced position in front of Dinwiddie Court 
House were anxious, and the Confederate Col. Joseph Mayo, Third Vir- 
ginia Rebel Infantry, of Terry's Brigade, Pickett's division says, (Record, 
p. 496) they began to withdraw at 1 or 2 a. m. 

I was very anxious about it. 

An effort has been made to show that General Bartlett did not rejoin 
Griffin's division until about daylight, but General Bartlett says he got 
back about 12 or between 12 and 1 a. m. (Record, pp. 1168, 1177), and 
Colonel Spear thinks they got back " some time before daylight." 

As General Warren did not send orders to Bartlett to retire until 9.35 
p. m. and at 10.50 p. m. was in receipt of orders to go out across country 
to where Bartlett was, it is plain that it was just as easy to move 5,000 
men out as to bring 3,000 back, had he been disposed to carry out effi- 
ciently General Meade's orders. 

Quite an effort has been made by the applicant here, through his coun- 
sel, to show by Confederate witnesses that m uch of the rebel forces under 
Pickett retired towards Five Forks before daylight. 

What object there could be in this, unless to attempt to lessen the 
applicant's responsibility, by showingthat even if he had obeyed General 
Meade's orders promptly and earnestly nothing would have been gained 
by it, is not apparent. 



- 39 

If the enemy could move across country, certainly General Warren 
also could. 

The dispatch of the Confederate cavalry general, W. H. F. Lee, signed 
by his assistant adjutant-general, and captured by Bvt. Brig.-Gen'l J. 
Irwin Gregg, of General Sheridan's cavalry (Record, pp. 475, 1317), 
shows conclusively the time fixed for withdrawal to Five Forks. It is 
as follows : 

2 o'clock a. m., April 1st, 1865. 

To General Beal : 

General : General Lee wishes yon to withdraw your command to this side of the 
creek, when General Pickett's infantry is withdrawn at 4 a. m. You will hivouac on 
this side. 

L. TIERNAN BRIEN, 

AssH Adjutant-General. 

The resistance which the cavalry divisions met in the advance to Five 
Forks, as testified to by so many officers, all proves that the enemy con- 
tested the movement as much as it was possible. 
I now conclude this branch of the case with these remarks. 
General Grant had sent to General Sheridan the following dispatch 
(Record, p. 1316): 

Dabney's Mills, 
March 31, 1865—10.45 p. m. 
Major-General Sheridan : 

The 5th Corps has heen ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. Bois- 
seau's and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent McKeuzie's 
(Mackenzie's) cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughn road. All these forces, ex- 
cept the cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-niqht. 

You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you, and use it to 
the best of your ability to destroy the force which your command has fought so gal- 
lantly to-day. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 

General Warren's division did not put in an appearance, nor did he 
send General Sheridan any word why he did not come. 

We have seen the reason why no divisions came by J. Boisseau's (in- 
tended for G. Boisseau's) was because General Warren, in his own mind, 
did not intend to make a night attack. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Horace Porter, when sent again on the 1st April to 
General Sheridan, has graphically described the latter's feelings, as fol- 
lows (Record, p. 912) : 

Q. On the next day, did you carry any orders to General Sheridan from General Grant ? 
— A. Yes. Next morning, April 1, General Grant manifested a great anxiety about the 
movement upon our left, and directed me to go there in the morning and send him frequent 
bulletins during the whole day of the progress of the operations. I took about a dozen 
orderlies with me, showing them the nearest roads, and sent by them during the day 
communications freq uently to General Grant. I went by the way of the Boydton plank 
road and the Brooke's road again, and found General Sheridan on the road leading to 
Five Forks, looking to the west of that road, and I think he was with General Mer- 
ritt's headquarters. I suppose I reached him about ten o'clock ; it may have been half 
an hour earlier or later than that. By General Grant's direction I told him of General 
Grant's anxiety in regard to the movement and the interest he felt in it, and that he 
wanted me to impress upon General Sheridan that General Grant was fully alive to 
the importance of the movement ; that General Sheridan on the spot must judge of the 
circumstances himself; that he would be held responsible for everything that occurred 
in his front — must assume that responsibility and make everything bend to success. 
The language was made about as emphatic as it could be. That was the substance 
of it. 

Q. Will you go on and narrate what transpired, what conversation, if any, you had 
with General Sheridan on the subject, where you went, and what you did at that 
time ? — A.. General Sheridan said in response to this that he fully appreciated the im- 
portance of the operations, and he expressed some disappointment that the infantry 
had not reached him. At that time I think General Warren had not reported to him ; and 



40 

he said lie Lad reason to hope that the infantry would have reached him during the night 
or the early morning, and expressed some disappointment that they had not reached 
him ; said that the enemy was falling back — this large force of infantry, and they had 
lost the opportunity of striking them in flank; that they would probably fall' back 
upon their earthworks — he had lost his opportunity. I do not pretend to repeat his 
language ; that was the impression conveyed to me. 

Q. Then what did you do as near as you can recollect ? — A. Abcut noon or a little 
before noon General Babcock arrived from General Grant's headquarters — I had some 
conversation with him — and I was present when he delivered his communication to 
General Sheridan from General Grant, which I see is in evidence. 

Q. Had General Sheridan's force pushed the enemy into their works — the cavalry ? — 
A. About that time the cavalry had gained some advantage in the front ; and there 
was a report that the cavalry had captured Five Forks, but it was some little position 
near Five Forks ; the Forks themselves had not been captured. 

Q. Was there firing going on at this time ? — A. Yes; firing by the cavalry ; I cannot 
tell at what particular hour. 

General Grant, by his dispatch above quoted, expected that General 
Warren would have been within supporting distance of General Sheri- 
dan by midnight. 

It was a reasonable and well-grounded anticipation, which, however, 
was defeated by General Warren in the manner pointed out in this 
argument. 

Lieutenant- General Sheridan therefore adheres to the statement made 
in his official report, which constitutes the first cause of complaint of 
General Warren, viz: that — 

Had he moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant-General [Grant], 
there would appear to have been little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry 
in front of Dinwiddie Court House. 

Before considering in detail the operations known as the battle of 
" Five Forks," of the 1st of April, 1865, it is desirable to give a synopti- 
cal statement of it for preliminary comprehension. 

This is found in concise language in General Sheridan's examination 
here as a witness in answer to the question by the court (Eecord, p. 51) : 

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 

PRELIMINARY SKETCH. 

During the 31st of March, my cavalry had been driven back from Five Forks to 
within a short distance of Dinwiddie Court-House, and about the time of the final 
attack of the enemy that evening I sent Captain Sheridan, of my staff, to General 
Grant, to report the condition of affairs. On his way to General Grant's headquarters, 
I believe Captain Sheridan stopped at General Meade's to ask that some one be sent 
with him as a guide to General Grant's headquarters, as he did not know where they 
were located. While Captain Sheridan was waiting for this guide General Meade 
questioned him as to the situation around Dinwiddie Court-House, and had the posi- 
tion of my lines pointed out to him on his maps by Captain Sheridan. 

Shortly after this interview General Meade sent the following dispatch to General 
Grant : 

■' Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"March 31, 1865—7.40 p. m. 
" Lieut. General Grant: 

"Captain Sheridan, from Sheridan's cavalry, is here, and is directed to you by a 
staff officer. He reports that General Sheridan is just north of Dinwiddie Court- 
House, having been repulsed by the enemy's infantry on the dirt road running north- 
west from north of Dinwiddie. General Sheridan states that if he is forced to retire 
it will be on the Vaughn road. The staff officer leaves here to report to you. 

"G: G. MEADE, Maj. General." 

And later the following : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"March 31, 1865—9.45 p. m. 
"Lieut. General Grant: 

"Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps and smash up 
the force in front of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the line to the Boydton plank- 



41 

road and the refusal along with it. Bartlett's brigade is now on the road from G. 
Boisseau's, running north, where it crosses Gravelly Run, ho having gone down the 
White Oak road. Warren could go at once that way, and take the force threatening 
Sheridan in rear, or he could send one division to support Sheridan at Dinwiddie and 
move on the enemv's rear with the other two. 

" G. G. MEADE, Maj. General:' 
General Grant replied as follows : 

"Headquarters Armies of the IT. S., 
"Dabneifs Mills, March 31, 1865—10.45 p. in. 
""Maj. Gen. Meade, 

" Commanding Army of Potomac: 
" Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for anything. 
Let Griffin go on as he was first directed. 

<?U. S. GRANT, Lieut. General:' 

It will he observed that General Meade said that " Warren could go at once," and 
it will also be noted that General Grant in reply told Meade to " urge him not to stop 
for anything." 

At 10.50 o'clock p. m., March 31st, Warren received the following order from Gen- 
eral Meade, of which I was informed by a staff officer from General Meade's headquar- 
ters. The time is not given on the dispatch, but Warren received it at 10.50 p. m.: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" March 31, 1865. 

"Maj. General Warren, 5th Corps: 

" Send Griffin promptly, as ordered, by the Boydton plank-road, but move the bal- 
ance of your command by the road Bartlett is on, and strike the enemy in rear, who 
is between him and Dinwiddie. General Sheridan reported his last position as north 
of Dinwiddie Court-House, near Dr. Smith's, the enemy holding 'the cross-roads at 
that point. Should the enemy turn on you, your line of retreat will be by J. M. 
Brooke's and R. Boisseau's, on Boydton plank-road ; see one-inch map. You must be 
very prompt in this movement, and get the forks of the road at J. M. Brooke's before 
the enemy, so as to open the road to R. Boisseau's. The enemy will probably retire 
towards the Five Forks, that being the direction of their main attack this day. Don't 
encumber yourself with anything that will impede your progress, or prevent your 
moving in any direction across the country. Let me know when Griffin starts and 
when you start. Acknowledge receipt. 

"G. G. MEADE, Maj. General:' 

I submit that this order was one that required prompt obedience. General Meade 
said to Warren, "You must be very prompt in your movements," and again, " Don't 
encumber yourself with anything that will impede your progress or prevent your 
moving in any direction across the country." It was not obeyed in this manner; 
Ayres' division (which had been substituted for Griffin's) was ordered by Warren, at 
11 o'clock p. m., to move down the Boydton plank-road to Dinwiddie Court-House, and 
the same order directed the other two divisions to mass wherever they would be 
reached by the staff officer bearing the 11 p. m. order. Ayres moved down the Boyd- 
ton plank-road as directed, and, as stated in his report, was met in the morning by 
one of my staff officers, who conducted him into a road leading from Dinwiddie Court- 
House to the White Oak road, and thus coming upon the left of the enemy. My object 
in turning Ayres upon this road was; that having left Dinwiddie Court-House and 
advanced on the enemy, I wished to save Ayres a fruitless march to the court-house. 

Griffin's and Crawford's divisions moved after daylight, as their official reports 
state, in obedience to orders from General Warren, he having, as regards these two 
divisions, disregarded the orders of General Meade, which directed him to be very 
prompt in this movement. 

During the night of March 31st I received from General Grant the following dis- 
patch, written at 10.05 o'clock p. in. : 

"Dabney's Mills, 
" March 31, 1865—10.05 p. m. 
"Major General Sheridan: 

"The Fifth Corps has been ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. 
Boisseau's and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this, I have sent Macken- 
zie's cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughan road. All these forces, except the 
cavalry, will reach you by 12 to-night. 

" You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you, and use it 
to the best of your ability to destroy the force which your command fought so gal- 
lantly to-day. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut. General:' 



42 

General Warren's corps not having reached me by 12 o'clock, in nccordance with? 
these expectations of General Grant, I did what I thought the next best thing, and I 
therefore sent by one of my staff officers the following dispatch, requesting him to 
attack at daylight: 

" Cavalry Headquarters, Dinwiddie Court-House, 

11 April 1, lb65— 3 a. m. 
"Major-General Warren, 

" Commanding 5th Army Corps: 
"lam holding in front of Dinwiddie Court-House, on the road leading to Five 
Forks, for three-quarters of a mile with General Custer's division. The enemy are m 
his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adam's house,, 
which leads across Chamberlain's bed, or run. I understand you have a division at J*. 
Boisseau's ; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flank. I will 
hold on here, Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight ; if so, attack instantly 
and in full force. Attack at daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the 
road this side of Adam's house, and, if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any- 
force moving down the road I am holding or on the White Oak road will be in the 
enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank 
movement. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains I shall tight at day- 
light. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN. Major-General." 

I began to move against the enemy at daylight, and then discovered his infantry- 
line retiring from my front. 

The two divisions of the 5th Corps, that General Grant had informed me would move 
by J. Boisseau's, did not come on that road the previous night, nor did they appear ob 
the enemy's rear at daylight as requested in my 3 a. m. dispatch. As a matter of fact,, 
they were just about then breaking from the bivouac in which General Warren had. 
placed them the night before and from which they had not moved. The enemy 
remained in my front during the night ; Ayres says he saw him hastily moving off,. 
after his arrival, and the reports of General Merritt, Hayes, and others confirm this. 
In addition, however, I submit the following dispatch from J. Irwin Gregg, command- 
ing a brigade of the cavalry, inclosing a captured dispatch of General Lee's, whichi 
shows that Pickett's infantry was to withdraw at 4 a. in., April 1st: 

"Headquarters 2d Brigade, 2d Division Cavalry Corps, 

" April 1, 1865. 
" Major-General Sheridan : 

" General : I am just in receipt of a report from Lieut. Colonel commanding 8th 
Pa. Cavalry, which says he has driven the enemy two miles from this point on what 
I call the Dinwiddie Court-House road. From the firing the resistance seems to be 
determined. The country is all woods ; no enemy has moved in the direction of 
Stoney Creek, except a picket of fifteen or twenty men. 
" I send a dispatch of General Lee's. 

"J. IRWIN GREGG. 

" Brevet Brigadier-General.^ 

[Enclosure.] 

"2 o'clock a. m., April 1, 1865. 
" To General Beal : 

"General: General Lee wishes yon to withdraw your command to this side of the 
creek when General Pickett's infantry is withdrawn at 4 a. m. You will bivouac on> 
this side. 

"L. TIERNAN BRIEN, 

" Assistant Adjutant-General." 

I would in this connection refer the court to the official report of General Pickett 
of this battle in which he states that he fell back from my front at daylight, April lst„ 
to Five Forks, " pressed by the enemy." 

As the enemy fell back he was followed by Merritt's two divisions, and I at this: 
time determined to drive him to Five Forks ; still hoping that Griffin's and Craw- 
ford's divisions would come in at J. Boisseau's in time to effect some results. 

He was pushed rapidly back, and at 8 or 9 o'clock, General Bartlett says his brig- 
ade joined Ayre's division, which was moving on the right of the cavalry. The point 
of junction was near J. Boisseau's, and at this point the whole of the 5th Corps was 
directed to mass for the purpose of refreshing the men, and to await developments. 

I may state here that I was in error in my report in saying J. Boisseau's house, in 
my dispatch of 3 a. m. to General Warren; I should have said Dr. G. Boisseau's. I 



43 

had learned from the reports of my officers who had returned from General Grant and 
General Meade, the point that Bartlett's command occupied, and understood that a 
division was there, and although I wrote J. Boisseau in the order, J. Boisseau's house 
could not have been in my mind, because my cavalry had had possession of it during 
the greater part of the afternoon of the 31st, and after they were driven from it the 
enemy held it. 

I was considerably disappointed that we had thus far attained no other result than 
obliging the retirement of the enemy ; but feeling confident he would not give up the 
Five Forks without a struggle, I pressed him back to that point with the cavalry. 

The 10.05 dispatch of the 31st, from General Grant, had informed me that all the 
support he had ordered, consisting of the whole of the 5th Corps, and Mackenzie's, 
cavalry, should reach me, with the exception of the cavalry, by 12 o'clock that night. 
The order to Warren to move and the exigencies which Generals Grant and Meade 
considered that the situation demanded, were of such a nature, that they did not 
admit of anything but prompt and resolute compliance ; and I felt that there was no> 
circumstances in existence during the night which should have prevented the move- 
ment of these two divisions in obedience to the order, and not enough to justify the 
delay at the bridge by the other division, as the creek could have been forded. I do- 
not remember at what time General Warren reported to me, but his official report 
says about 11 a. m., April 1st, and I have no reason to doubt its correctness. 

I now quote from my report : 

" I directed General Warren to hold fast at J. Boisseau's house, refresh his men, and 
be ready to move to the front when required ; and General Mackenzie was ordered to 
rest in front of Dinwiddie Court House until further orders. 

" Meantime, General Merritt's command continued to press the enemy, and by im- 
petuous charges drove them from two lines of temporary works, General Custer guiding 
his advance on the Widow Gilliam's house, and General Devin on the main Five Forks 
road. 

"The courage displayed by the cavalry, officers and men, was superb, and about 2 
o'clock the enemy was behind his works on the White Oak road and his skirmish 
line driven in. 

" I then ordered up the 5th Corps on the main road, and sent Bvt. Major Gillespie., 
of the engineers, to turn the head of the column otf on the Gravelly Run Church road, 
and put the corps in position on this road obliquely to, and at apoiut but a short dis- 
tance from, the White Oak road, and about one mile from the Five Forks. Two- 
divisions of the corps were to form the front line, and one division was to be held in 
reserve in columns of regiments opposite the centre. 

" I directed General Merritt to demonstrate as though he was attempting to turn 
the enemy's right flank, and notified him that the 5th Corps would strike the enemy's 
left flank, and ordered that the cavalry should assault the enemy's works as soon as 
the 5th Corps became engaged, and that that would be determined by the volleys of 
musketry. I then rode over to where the 5th Corps was going into position, and 
found them coming up very slowly. 

" I was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, for the sun was getting low, and we 
had to fight or go back. It was no place to intrench, and it would have been shameful 
to have gone back with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave men who 
had fallen during the day." 

At one o'clock p. m., Gen. Warren says in his official report, he received my order 
to move his corps from the point where it was massed at J. Boisseau's house, and 
shortly thereafter he reported to me. I think he is correct as to the time. 

I explained to him the state of affairs, and what my plans were. I then directed 
General Merritt, who commanded the cavalry, to make a demonstration as though, 
attempting to turn the enemy's right, and ordered that the cavalry should assault the 
enemy's works as soon as the 5th Corps became engaged. I had then received the 
authority from General Grant to relieve General Warren. This authority was verbal 
and brought by General Babcock. It authorized me to relieve him in case I thought it 
for the best interests of the service. I cannot now recall the exact wording of the 
message. It was, however, left to my judgment. I rode over to where the 5th Corps 
was to go into position and found it slowly coming up. The distance from J. Bois- 
seau's house to Gravelly Run Church is two miles, and the formation of the corps near 
the latter place was accomplished about 4 p.m. Three hours had elapsed from the time 
the order was given General Warren, and this time had been consumed in transmitting- 
the order and in marching two miles and forming the corps. Only a few moments 
should have been lost in transmitting the order from General Warren to his division % 
they being massed as before stated. While the corps was arriving and forming, 1 
was anxious that it should come up rapidly, expressing to General Warren my fears- 
that the cavalry would expend its ammunition before the attack could be made, and 
I also feared that part of General Lee's force defending Petersburg and strongly 
intrenched at the crossing of the Claibornes road, about three miles away, might 
move down the White Oak road, and by attacking or even threatening my flank,, 



44 

prevent me from accomplishing my design on Fire Forks ; and I did not know then, 
nor do I know now, of any especial effort General Warren made to hring up his corps, 
nor did I see any indications of solicitude for the active execution of his orders in order 
that the combined movement might produce the success intended, although I was 
with him the principal portion of the afternoon, until the battle commenced. 

His corps had been divested of all impediment. It even had no artillery, and 
although the ground was muddy from recent rains it consumed three hours of valua- 
ble time in marching two miles and forming in line of battle, with which I was dis- 
satisfied. My directions to General Warren for the formation were, to place two 
divisions in the front line, and hold one division in reserve in rear of his centre (he 
says the right in his official report, in which I have since discovered he was correct). 
I knew that the left flank of the enemy was turned to the rear, so as to make a right 
angle with the White Oak road. I did not know the extent of that reserve flank, nor 
its strength, but it was the objective point of the attack that was made by the 5th 
Corps, and when it was carried the remaining portion of the enemy's works would be 
taken in rear. I presumed that an extent of front of two divisions was enough to 
cover the works of the enemy, and supposing that I would meet with a pretty obsti- 
nate resistance I put one division in rear as a reserve and for the purpose of turning 
the extreme left of the enemy's line, after the two front divisions and Merritt's cavalry 
had become hotly engaged. This was the plan of battle usually followed in most of 
the engagements I fought during the war ; precipitating a turning column close in on 
the enemy's flank when ascertained, and after I had engaged his whole front ; and 
Griffin had been instructed to this effect by myself in person. 

The front of the corps was lying obliquely to the White Oak road, and when that 
road was reached the corps was to swing around to the left perpendicular to the 
White Oak load, and keep closed to the left. Ayres obeyed this order, and the move- 
ment brought him directly on the enemy's flank and in front of his works, which 
were thrown to the rear, and which were about one hundred yards in length. Craw- 
ford's division, on reaching the White Oak road, did not wheel to the left as ordered ; 
in fact, it deflected to the right and continued to move from the objective point, 
making its co-operation at the desired moment extremely uncertain, and rendering- 
disaster possible. 

It went so far to the right, breaking the line of battle, that his left finally came 
out near C. Young's house, on the Ford road, where he first encountered the enemy in 
any considerable force, who was then retreating from his works, having by this move- 
ment broken the line of battle and completely isolated his division, and also prevented 
Mackenzie's cavalry from occupying the position which it had been directed to gain 
on the Ford road, near where it crossed Hatcher's Run. 

It will thus be seen that the diversion of Crawford destroyed the plan I had in my 
mind on making the attack, and the gap left by him was taken advantage of by the 
enemy, and he succeeded in throwing the right of Ayres's division into confusion, 
which I believe would have resulted in disaster but for the exertions of General Ayres 
and the officers of his command. I do not recollect that General Warren was present 
anywhere near the line on this occasion, or of any efforts he made to bring Crawford's 
division into the position contemplated by the orders, and I did not know then, nor 
do I know now, of any directions which he gave at this portion of the line with a view 
to remedying the disorder here. 

I wish to direct the attention of the court to the fact that the place called Five Forks 
was not the essential point in this battle; but the angle made by the enemy refusing 
his left flank was the essential and objective point, and that the point called Five 
Forks had no more real significance than any other portion of the enemy's line fronting 
■on the White Oak road. 

The angle, and that portion of the enemy's works which were perpendicular to the 
White Oak road, was the point on his line on which I had directed the attack of the 
5th Corps, and General Crawford did not conform to the instructions in moving to- 
wards the Ford road in an oblique line, instead of wheeling to the left and keeping 
closed on Ayres. 

His exposed left flank, only, encountered the enemy, which would not have been the 
case had he wheeled to the left. It was not contemplated that he should gain the 
Ford road by that wide detour, isolating his division from the rest of the Fifth Corps, 
General Mackenzie having previously received orders to go to that road and capture 
any force fleeing down it. Crawford's movement displaced Mackenzie, however, and 
the latter was crowded over towards Hatcher's Run. Crawford's division captured 
some artillery and a number of prisoners on the Ford road, the order for which was 
originally given by one of my staff officers, Colonel George A. Forsyth, to Colonel West 
Funk, of the One hundred and twenty-first Penn. Regiment, who was in command of 
two regiments. Previous to this, however, the enemy had been driven out of his entire 
line of works, and Colonel Funk's capture was the result and not a part of the main 
attack. 

After the battle was practically over it became necessary for me to consider the 



45 

position of my command with reference to tli e main rebel army. I felt that though 
my troops were victorious they were isolated from the Army of the Potomac, and the 
extreme left of that army having been thrown back so as to occupy a position fronting 
on or parallel to the Boydton plank road, while the enemy held strongly at the inter- 
section of the White Oak road and the Claiborne road, and directly in my rear, and 
distant from Five Forks not to exceed three and a half miles, I surmised that they 
might march down the White Oak road that night or early next morning and take my 
command in rear. It was therefore necessary for me to make new dispositions to meet 
this new emergency. 

General Warren having disappointed me in the movement of his corps and in its 
management during the battle, in the new emergency that had arisen, and by the 
new phase that had been given our situation about Richmond by the battle just won, 
I felt that he was not the man to rely on, and I deemed it, after due deliberation, to 
be in the best interest of the service to relieve him, which I accordingly did, and I 
put the corps under the command of Geueral Griffin. 

I directed General Griffin, after pursuing the enemy a short distance, to withdraw 
the Fifth Corps from the pursuit as quickly as possible and form it in line of battle at 
right angles to the White Oak road near Gravelly Church, facing towards the enemy, 
who was occupying the position heretofore referred to, at the junction of the White 
Oak and Claiborne roads. 

DID GENERAL WARREN PROPERLY EXERT HIMSELF AT FIVE FORKS ? 

We now coine to the consideration of the second formal complaint by 
General Warren as to the report of General Sheridan. 
General Sheridan says that General Warren — 

Did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, and his 
manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions 
for the attack could be completed (Record, p. 48). 

There has been an effort on the part of General Warren to show to 
this court that he sent orders to his officers to hurry up the divisions of 
his command $ and that he, by making diagrams and specially instruct- 
ing his officers as to his movements, showed a proper degree of zeal in 
the execution of the orders of his superior. 

The evidence of General Sheridan, which I have just read under the 
previous heading, has graphically depicted, in a condensed form, the 
movements which culminated in the great victory at Five Forks. 

It must not be forgotten that the three divisions of the Fifth Corps 
were lying on the right or easterly side of the road that ran from Din- 
widdie Court House, up to the Gravelly Eun Church road. 

Two of these divisions were massed at the junction by J. Boisseau's, 
a distance of two and three-sixteenths of a mile from Gravelly Eun 
Church (Eecord, p. 168), which was a little in advance of the position 
where the final formation was made; and the third, under Ayres, was 
not quite three miles from Gravelly linn Church. 

These troops were massed by divisions. They had no wagons or artil- 
lery with them, and were perfectly free to move in any direction without 
any impediment in the form of trains or camp and garrison equipage, 
They had had abundant opportunity for rest from the time of their arri- 
val early in the morning up to the time of the receipt of the order which 
carried them to Graved Eun Church. 

General Warren says that at forty minutes past twelve he wrote a 
certain dispatch about getting ammunition, and so forth, and that he 
received General Sheridan's order to bring his division up after that ; he 
fixes it as between that and 1 p. m., or about 1 p. in., when he received 
the order to move forward. 

It is worthy of remark, as bearing upon the inclinations and disposi- 
tion of General Warren, that although he came over across country in 
the morning to the Dinwiddie and Five Forks road, wiiere the Crump 
road joins it, where he arrived at about eight o'clock, as he says himself, 



46 

and joined Griffin's division halted there (p. 740, Eecord), yet lie never 
undertook personally to communicate with General Sheridan until about 
11 a. m. (p. 741, Eecord). He says: 

Then I thought it was best for me to go up the road and find General Sheridan and 
see what he would require of me. I found him on the west side of the road that leads 
up to Five Forks, on the southwest side of it, a few steps off from the road. I found 
Ms headquarters I might say (p. 741, Eecord). 

After, he had been there an hour with Griffin's division, before he went 
up to find General Sheridan, and at nine o'clock he received the following 
dispatch (p. 740, Eecord) : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

April lst—Q a, in., 1864 (5). 
Maj. Gen. Warren : 

Gen'l Meade directs that in the movements following your junction with Gen'l Sher- 
idan, you will be under his orders, and will report to him. Please send a report of 
progress. 

ALEX. S. WEBB, 

B. M. G., C. 0. S. 

Nevertheless, although he thus received a written order from his own 
army commander directing 1 him to report to General Sheridan an hour 
after he had joined Griffin's division he permitted two hours more to 
elapse before attempting personally to communicate with General Sher- 
idan, meanwhile remaining inactive at the Crump road. 

His explanation, such as it is, is found in his cross-examination at 
page 786 : 

Q. You received General Meade's written order to report to General Sheridan about 
nine o'clock in the morning ? — A. Yes. 

Q . When you arrived on that Crump road in supporting distance at eight o'clock, 
why did you not at once report to him? — A. Because he left word with General Grif- 
fin to remain there, and he would send us word. 

Q. That was so far as the movement of troops was concerned ? — A. Yes; well, I con- 
cluded that it applied to me, too. 

Q. You received from General Meade this order to report at 9 a. m. You did not, 
however, report in person until 11 ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Did you not think it your duty to see General Sheridan? — A. I had already 
directed General Griffin to report to him, and General Ayres had reported to him, but 
as he left word behind to remain there and he would send for me — he did not leave 
any word for me to find him — I stayed where he told me to stay. 

Q. You did not send any staff officer or make any efforts to find him inside of those 
three hours that you were there ? — A. Yes; when 1 came there I considered that 1 was 
doing just what he had told us to do. 

Q. But he never told you to do that? — A. I understood that the message was a mes- 
sage to me. 

Q. From General Griffin ? — A. A message from General Sheridan through General 
Griffin to me. 

Q. That you were all to remain there ? — A. Yes ; I supposed, and I think it was the 
truth, that General Griffin told him I was to come on with General Crawford, and 
that he understood fully all about it and that was the thing he, General Sheridan, 
expected me to do. 

Q. Was not that the order, simply for the divisions to halt there and get their break- 
fast, that came from General Sheridan ? — A. It did not come to me as to getting their 
breakfast ; of course they did that. 

Q. If you had not received that order, then, you would have considered it your 
duty to report immediately to General Sheridan ? — A. Yes. 

Q. And then you did not go and report to General Sheridan ? — A. I went up ; I began 
to be a little anxious, having waited so long under that order. 

Q. Then you did not consider that that order absolutely held you, a mandatory com- 
munication, there personally ? — A. No. 

Q. So that after waiting three hours you then concluded that you had better see 
General Sheridan and report in person ? — A. Yes ; and I will mention further that dur- 
ing that time I got my breakfast — you said we waited three hours — it was only two 
hours after I received General Meade's dispatch, and one hour I had waited before. 
But I regard General Meade's dispatch as not of any weight on me, because I should 



have acted the same way without it. General Sheridan was ranking officer ; I would 
report to him as a matter of course. 

Q. But, as a matter of fact, you did not report to him until after you had received this 
order ?— A. I considered that I had practically reported to him when I sent word to the 
head of my column to report to him, and he gave them instructions what to do; that 
was instructions tor me, as I considered. 

This comprises the explanation that General Warren gives why he 
did not report to General Sheridan in person at an earlier hour. 

Griffin's division had arrived before lie himself did in person, and had 
been reported to General Sheridan at 7 a. in. (p. 234). 

It is for the court to consider, under military practice, whether or not 
this applicant did his whole duty in permitting that length of time to 
elapse before lie reported in person to General Sheridan. 

He says he considered that he had practically reported to him when 
he sent word to the head of his column to report to him. 

If he was at all responsible as commanding officer for the movement 
of the Fifth Corps, orders for this movement should be received through 
him. He was the next ranking officer to General Sheridan on the field. 

JBe admits that he did not consider the instructions for Griffin's divis- 
ion to remain where it was mandatory upon himself, because he subse- 
quently went to find General Sheridan nearer the front. 

The explanation is not a strong one. 

Had he been earnest and anxious for the success of the operations, 
when lie first arrived he would have immediately sought the command- 
ing general to let him know that he was there in person, and in order to 
ascertain exactly what was being done and what was proposed to be 
done. 

But he seems to have resolved upon a line of conduct for himself con- 
trary to the one I have indicated. 

Subsequently, after three hours' reflection, he says he began to be a 
little anxious, and then went to report in person as he ought to have 
done immediately upon his arrival. 

Even on his own assumption that the order to Griffin's division to 
remain where it was implied an order to him personally to remain there 
when he came up, although his divisions were scattered along that road, 
military custom would have required that he should immediately upon 
his arrival have at least sent a staff officer to General Sheridan acquaint- 
ing him with his presence upon the field. 

Even this he did not do, and the conclusion must be that he was 
either indifferent or inattentive. 

All this time the cavalry, which had moved out from Dinwiddie at 
daylight, were gradually pressing the enemy back into their intrench- 
ments, and skirmishing was being carried on. 

The concurrent evidence as to this skirmishing is so considerable that 
it is hardly necessary to allude to it. 

Lieut. Col. J. W. Forsyth, U. S. A., says (Eecord, p. 192): "There 
was heavy fighting " 

Lieut. Col. George A. Forsyth, aide-de-camp, U. S. A., savs (Eecord, 
p. 201) : 

u Once or twice there was pretty sharp firing. * * * Our troops 
kept pressing them more or less." 

Bvt. Col. A. C M. Pennington, Captain Second United States Artil- 
lery, then commanding the First Brigade, Third Cavalry Division (Cus- 
ter's), says that his brigade skirmished all the way up from Dinwiddie 
{p. 600). 

Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, United States Volunteers (colonel Fifth 
United States Cavalry), says (Eecord, p. 844) that the cavalry in its ad- 



48 

vance towards Five Forks met resistance ; that he first saw a picket 
line as he moved out from Dinwiddie, and then u a stronger force"; and 
that he saw no led horses over on the Gravelly Eun Church road. 

Brig. Gen. Francis T. Sherman, United States Volunteers, Inspector- 
General of the Middle Military Division, says (Record, p. 856), that there 
was skirmishing in going out, and that the enemy got into their works 
at noon. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. George L. Gillespie, Major, Corps of Engineers, U. 
S. A., says (Record, p. 931) that the cavalry met resistance at several 
points in moving out. 

Lieut. Col. O. Durland, Seventeenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Fitzhugh's 
brigade, says (Record, p. 955) substantially the same, and that they 
met two barricades, and at the second " had a right lively time.' 7 

Several officers of Pennington's brigade, Bvt. Col. A. M. Randol 
Captain First United States Artillery (Colonel Second New York Vol- 
unteer Cavalry) (Record, p. 690), and others, have spoken of the fight- 
ing in moving up that they had in the " Gilliam field," where the enemy 
used artillery upon them. 

Maj. H. E. Alvord, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, of Gibbs' brigade, 
then aide-de-camp, says they reached the line of works at 1 p. in. (Record, 
p. 818). 

Capt. H G. Wood, Twenty-fifth New York Cavalry, on the staff of 
Stagg's brigade, First Cavalry Division, says (Record, p. 828) that 
" there was skirmishing all that forenoon." 

Maj. E. M. Baker, Second United States Cavalry (Record, p. N41), has 
described with some degree of particularity the charge of the First Regu- 
lar Cavalry upon the enemy's temporary works while going up from 
Dinwiddie Court-House towards Five Forks ; and that they arrived in 
front of the works on the line of the White Oak road between 12 and 1 
p. m., having met a heavy line of the enemy's skirmishers all the way up. 

These quotations could be increased from the testimony of other wit- 
nesses; but they are sufficient to show that there was a continued 
firing and skirmishing and pressing back, by the cavalry divisions, of 
the enemy, uutil he was finally put into his works, between 12 and 1 
p. m. 

Meanwhile, up to eleven o'clock, General Warren had done nothing 
at the temporary bivouac of Griffin's division by the road side, except 
to get his breakfast (Record, p. 786). 

ifow, that General Sheridan wished to see General Warren, ancf ex- 
pected to see him, is evident from the testimony of Brig. Gen. Cham- 
berlain, of Griffin's division, of the Fifth Corps, who says (Record, p. 279) 
that at seven o'clock on the morning of the 1st of April, he met General 
Sheridan at the Five Forks road running from Dinwiddie Court-House 
up; his brigade had passed J. Boisseau's house going south, but not as 
far down as Brookes's house at the angle. He says he had a conversation 
with General Sheridan in the vicinity of J. Boisseau's, and that he met 
General Sheridan u in his advance" with the cavalry. 

Q. Did lie make any inquiries as to why those divisions had not come down sooner ? — 
A. His first inquiry was where General Warren teas, and I explained to him that he 
was in the rear of the column. He then wanted to know why the division had not 
come down before. 

Q. Where was the enemy's line at the time that the cavalry were pushing them 
hack towards Five Forks ? — A. I cannot tell; there was some little skirmishing in 
that direction. 

Q. Sometimes brisker than at others ? — A. Yes ; what I would call a skirmish in the 
woods. 

Q. Did you mass your brigade, and was your division massed so as to leave the 
roads clear? — A. Yes : we massed so as to leave the roads clear for Crawford. 



49 

Q. Can you recollect any wagons on that road f — A. I cannot. 

Q. Or any obstacles to prevent the march to Gravelly Run Church ? — A. It may 
seem strange, hut I do not recollect that. I know we were moving with the cavalry, 
and tilings were pretty well mixed up there ; but there was no great obstacle. 

Q. Crawford's division was massed just to the north of your own ? — A. Across the 
road, to the north. 

Q. What time did you receive your orders to move towards Gravelly Run Church ! 
# *"* * # * * 

Q. About what time, as near as you can recollect at present ? — A. I cannot recollect 
much more accurately than that ; I should say afternoon, after twelve o'clock, per- 
haps it was one o'clock. * * * 

Q. Do you recollect how long the distance was from where you were massed, up to 
Gravelly Run Church ! — A. I call it a short march ; I should think not more than two 
miles : it might be something over two miles. 

Q. What Time did you get into position to move into action ? — A. Just before four 
o'clock, I should think. 

Q. Ayres did not get into position until after that ? — A. The understanding was, 
that we were to move the moment that he was in position. 

Tims, from the evidence of Ex-Governor Chamberlain, it is apparent 
that General Sheridan was desirous of knowing where the corps com- 
mander was; and, next, that he did not understand why those divisions 
had not come down into a position to be of use at an earlier hour. 

The failure of the Fifth Corps to co-operate by a flank and rear move- 
ment during the night of the 3lst of March, as had originally been 
suggested, even by Warren himself, after the enemy had been lured so 
far from their line of works, and their retreat to the White Oak road out 
of reach of an effective flank and rear attack by the Fifth Corps on the 
morning of April l,had made new combinations and an entire new plan 
of operations necessary. 

Consequently General Sheridan was notable to decide definitely upon 
a plan of battle until he had finally fixed the enemy in their intrench- 
ments on the line of the White Oak road. 

He was not able even to say whether they would remain there or 
whether they would continue to retreat until they had put the more 
defensible position of Hatcher's Eun in front of them, where their left 
flank would have been protected by their own line of works on the 
White Oak and Claiborne roads. 

Consequently, when General Warren did see the necessity of report- 
ing in person to General Sheridan at eleven o'clock, there was no time 
to discuss past failures, but the entire attention of the general com- 
manding in chief had to be given to the new combinations necessary 
under the circumstances. 

Finding that the enemy wa,s disposed to stand fast in his line of 
works along the White Oak road at Five Forks, he was able to deter- 
mine upon a movement, to be made by the Fifth Corps, as daring as it sub- 
sequently proved successful. 

But it was one of those movements which required unusual energy, 
enthusiasm, and rapidity of movement on the part of those who were 
called upon to execute it. 

It was at this juncture that General Warren's lack of appreciation of, 
or capacity for, the emergency became manifest to his commanding 
general. 

He did not, of course, assume to disobey any positive orders that he 
might receive ; but he apparently had no faith in their successful execu- 
tion or in the successful execution of the plan of battle. 

It is quite possible that he did not have confidence in the ability of 
his commanding general to successfully carry out the plan of battle 
which was conceived about the time he reported to General Sheridan, 
between eleven and twelve o'clock in the morning; or that he deemed 

4 GAR 



50 

it too venturesome and requiring too great risk to betaken by the Fiftli 
Corps ; because, as we shall see a little later, he expressed himself appre- 
hensive that they would be put in a "tight place." 

At about ten minutes of one o'clock, if not a little before, he received 
orders for his divisions, then massed by the roadside, to move up to the 
vicinity of Gravelly Run Church. 

The concurrent weight of evidence is that they were not formed in 
line near the church and ready to move into action until half past four 
o'clock. 

The furthest division, much the smallest division, General Ayres', did 
not have quite three miles to march ; and they were ready to move when 
they received their orders to come up. Nevertheless, and the fact is 
patent and undeniable, it took 3£ hours to move on that road, and get 
into position 12,592 men. 

Some witnesses have said, w'ho were called on behalf of the applicant, 
that they thought they moved up as rapidly as possible. 

Bvt. Maj. Gen. E. B. Ayres, Colonel Second United States Artillery 7 
whose division was furthest from the vicinity of Gravelly Run Church, 
has expressed the opinion (Record, p. 253) that on that road, with all 
the possible difficulties that had been urged relative to possible obstruc- 
tions as to marching up and forming — 

"It strikes me the thing could probably have been done in a couple of hours." 

Now, who was responsible for this delay? 

It was the duty of the commanding general of the whole operations 
to hold the corps commander responsible; and if from any cause the 
corps was not in a proper condition of discipline and efficiency, he was 
the one to suffer the consequences, provided he had been long in com- 
mand of it. 

General Sheridan charges that General Warren did not exert himself 
to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done. 

The sun set upon the 1st day of April at twenty-one minutes past six 
o'clock (Record, p. 806). 

General Sheridan was forced to the necessity of fighting that battle 
inside of an hour and a half, because after dark in the woods it was im- 
possible to move. 

At the same time the White Oak road, broad and unobstructed, ran 
from the point where Gravelly Run Church road met it, eastwardly to the 
main line of the Confederate works (from whence General R. E. Lee 
had issued the day before), a distance of but three miles away. 

At any moment General Lee might have sent re-enforcements down 
the line of that White Oak road to Pickett, the Confederate Major- 
General commanding the enemy at Five Forks, and they would have 
required the employment of a, portion of the Fifth Corps in order to 
retard them sufficiently long to enable a movement to be made against 
Pickett. 

It was, as I have said, a daring proceeding on the part of General 
Sheridan, and a masterly movement, showing all the genius of the true 
soldier, because General Lee appreciated fully and keenly the effect of 
an onslaught upon Pickett, as testified to by the Confederate Major- 
General Eppa Hunton (Record, p. 626), and did actually send re-enforce- 
ments; but in consequence of the vigorous charge which Mackenzie had 
made up the Crump road to the White Oak road, and so towards the 
main line of the works on the Claiborne road, the judgment of General 
Lee was so imposed upon as to make him believe that an assault would 
be possibly made on the works there. 



51 

Consequently such re-enibrceinents as were sent, were sent north- 
wardly inside of their own works, under Hunton, and then westwardly 
to Hatcher's Run ; but, in consequence of the five miles detour they had 
to make, they did not arrive until too late to be of service (Record, p. 
627). 

The quick determination of General Sheridan to fight a battle that 
afternoon at Five Forks, and the interposition of the Fifth Corps between 
the rebel works there and the main line of works at the junction of the 
White Oak and Claiborne roads, so that the Fifth Corps would fight 
with their backs to General Lee's main forces, appears to have been a 
too rapid conception in its generalization for the formality of General 
Warren's mind. 

He seated himself at Gravelly Run Church and involved himself in a 
mass of details. 

He made a diagram, like a draughtsman, of the position his corps 
was to take, and wrote underneath the instructions (Record, p. 1222). 

He duplicated this, and triplicated it and quintuplicated it for his 
division and brigade commanders, so that they might have copies of a 
movement than which nothing could be much simpler. 

This seeming peculiarity of mind is further shown in the evidence of 
Maj. E. B. Cope, aide-de-camp on his staff, who says, in reference to the 
closing skirmish, at dusk, in the " Gilliam field," of that day's battle, 
that he was not there ; and then explained his movements as follows 
(Record, p. 331) : . 

"I think I was part of my time on the Ford road, north. I had a man taking sketches 
an assistant taking in what he could; and I was making some observations myself." 

In other words, immediately after the enemy had been driven from a 
particular piece of ground, the principal confidential staff officer of the 
applicant was, with the assistance of a draughtsman, making sketches 
of the country. 

This, of course, he never would have done without instructions from 
his commanding officer, who, it would seem, subsequently suddenly be- 
thought himself of the necessity of endeavoring to reinstate himself in 
the eyes of his commanding general by personal risks at the last moment 
of daylight in the " Gilliam field." 

The bald fact that the three divisions of the Fifth Corps were not 
formed in line of battle until at least half past four o'clock, after having 
received their orders by one o'clock, is sufficient to show, from the dis- 
tance they had to march, and the absence of any obstruction, that there 
was great and unexplained delay. 

General Warren thinks that it was sufficient if he sent his staff offi- 
cers to hurry up the divisions. 

The mere fact that he did send his staff officers to hasten up the 
divisions is an evidence that there was delay. 

Meanwhile he sat making sketches in matters of detail, instead of 
going himself, if possible, to hasten their march. 

I submit, under the imperative urgency of the occasion, that it was the 
duty of General Warren to have gone in person, and have endeavored 
to hasten by his personal encouragement the march of the troops. 

At this time Bvt. Brig. Gen. J. W. Forsyth, IT. 8. A., says (Record, p. 
196) that General Sheridan was impatient " about the delay in getting in 
position, and the loss of time, and the blood that was flowing, before 
they could be brought up to relieve the cavalry." 

Col. R. M. Brinton, aide-de-camp to General Griffin, says (p. 311), "I 



52 

cannot recollect any obstructions;" and, as to wagons, "I did not see 
anything of the sort." 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. H. C. Bankhead, IT. S. A., says (p. 339) he found 
Generals Sheridan and Warren sitting on a bench before the advance 
began : 

u About that time General Sheridan seemed to be annoyed at the apparent delays, 
as he supposed ; he said it would probably he night, after dark, before we could get 
into action ; I forget exactly the remark." 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Bichard Coulter, commanding Third Brigade of Craw- 
ford's division (Becord, p. 349), says he recollects some cavalry horses on 
the road, but did not have to halt on that account. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. W. T. Chester, aide-de-camp to General Crawford, 
says (Becord, p. 382) : 

"My recollection is, it was rather a slow march ; there was some impediment in the 
road, of one kind or an other." 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. J. P. Meade, aide-de-camp to Crawford, says (Becord, 
p. 329) he didn't know how quickly the two divisions came on; and (on 
page 395) he supposes Crawford's division was at Gravelly Bun Church 
an hour or more. 

Bvt. Maj. G. McLaughlin, captain One hundred and fifty-fifth Penn- 
sylvania Volunteers, on Griffin's staff, says, at page 544, that he thinks 
it was perhaps more than two hours that they were at the church be- 
fore they were formed. Says he : 

I recollect distinctly we rested a long time, and I think we laid down and went to 
sleep. 

The Bev. M. Porter Snell, first lieutenant Thirty-ninth United States 
Colored Troops, aide-de-camp on Crawford's staff, also thinks, on page 
549, that it was an hour or two that they were at Gravelly Bun Church 
before they were formed, and says, " I know I went to sleep." 

Capt. James W. Wads worth, aide-de-camp to General Warren, now 
comptroller of the State of New York, says, at page 184, that he was 
sent down from near the J. Boisseau house to General Ayres with orders 
for him to come up about midday, between twelve and one o'clock. 

Maj. E. B. Cope, aide-de-camp to General Warren, in an official report 
which he made at Warren's request, when with him at Petersburg, 
April 13, 1865, after describing accurately where and how the divisions 
were massed, says, "About twelve o'clock the corps was ordered to move 
in the direction of Five Forks, the first division leading," &c. 

From this minute report, which Cope made within a few days of the 
action, while with General Warren, I assume that the latter is mistaken 
when he says it was about one o'clock that General Sheridan gave him 
orders to move up, and that the order to move up must have been given 
a considerable time before. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. H. C. Bankhead, already referred to, says, at page 
338, that he went with General Warren at about eleven o'clock (which 
coincides with General Warren's statement) to see General Sheridan. 
They talked some time together, and General Sheridan left General 
Warren. About fifteen minutes afterwards a cavalry staff officer brought 
a message, some instructions, for General Warren, and he "immediately 
told me to go and bring up the divisions." 

He speaks of led horses on the road, and that he spoke to Col. James 
W. Forsyth, he thinks, about it. 

He says, at page 338, " The roads were very muddy and blocked up 
with a good many led cavalry horses, and that might have caused some 



53 

delay, but they moved out as fast as possible"; aud on page 343 he fur- 
ther" said there was no difficulty in moving the led horses off the road. 

The learned counsel for the applicant (Mr. Stickney), at page 344 
says he does "not attach any importance to that." 

General Bankhead thought there was a little delay when he was 
coming up with the head of Crawford's column, but would not say ; 
General Warren (Record, p. 344) sent him back to hurry them up. 

General Warren says he told General Sheridan at Gravelly Run 
Church that it would take until four o'clock to get the troops up (Record, 
p. 746). 

Meanwhile the cavalry were holding the enemy in their line of works 
by a continual skirmish lire, and were expending all their ammunition. 

Bvt. Capt. William Marks, first lieutenant Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
Fitzhugh's brigade, was sent back with twenty-five mounted men to 
bring up ammunition on horseback, and met the Fifth Corps coming 
up, marching easilv, and thought they were taking their time (Record, 
p. 080). 

Capt. A. C. Houghton, Second Ohio Cavalry, aide-de-camp to Pen- 
nington, of Pennington's brigade, says (Record, p. 986) their ammunition 
became exhausted and they had to send for more. 

Maj. W. H. H. Benyaurd, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., then tem- 
porarily engineer officer on General Warren's staff, was asked these 
questions, he having been sent down to hurry up Ayres (Record, p. 175) : 

You say it was 2f$ miles between J. Boisseau's and Gravelly Run Church ? — A. Yes- 
Q. You saw the infantry march over that road. You know about how fast infantry 
move over ^uch roads. How long do you suppose it took them to march over that dis- 
tance, from that point of view ? — A. Ordinarily, taking the ordinary march of troops, 
they should have marched up probably in an hour. 

Q. From what you saw, you suppose that was about it ? — A. Yes. 

No satisfactory explanation appears to have been given for the delay 
of the divisions of the Fifth Corps in moving up to take position at 
Gravelly Eun Church. 

Maj. Charles F. Gillies, of the Twenty-first Pennsylvannia Volunteer 
Cavalry, who was acting provost marshal to the cavalry corps, on his 
return from General Meade's headquarters, says (Record, p. 1134), as to 
the Fifth Corps moving up into position after the order sent them by 
General Sheridan — 

I saw the Fifth Corps passing up the road before I got there [meaning to Gravelly 
Run Church]. 

Q. Did you notice how they marched — the rate ? — A. They marched like tired 
troops— leisure] y . 

GENERAL WARRENS MANNER. 

General Sheridan says, in the portion of his report of the battle which 
is complained of, that General Warren's manner gave him the impression 
that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack 
could be completed. 

General Sheridan further says that he finally decided to move in 
with the Fifth Corps into action, instead of going with the Cavalry 
Corps, because of the necessity that he thought existed for a more en- 
ergetic leadership. 

Bvt. Maj. Gen. E. B. Ayres, one of the Fifth Corps division com- 
manders, says : 

As soon as I formed my division, I went forward and reported to General Warren 
that my division was ready. General Sheridan was sitting there with General 
Warren * * * near Gravelly Run Church. 



54 

Q. Do you recollect any incident or remark made by any one at the time ?— A. Gen- 
eral Sheridan says : "I will ride with you." 

Q. Was that the end of the remark ? — A. Just that ; he says, " I will ride with you.'; 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. James W. Forsyth, lieutenant colonel First Cavalry, 
U. S. A., has also described this : 

Q. Did you hear, later in the day, or see any manifestations of General Sheridan's 
impatience at General Warren, or at the Fifth Corps? — A. Well, he was impatient 
about the delay in getting into position and the loss of time and the blood that was 
flowing before they could be brought up to relieve the cavalry. 

Q. Anything else ? — A. That was prior to their getting into position. He then 
moved out and placed himself in front of General Ayres, with his headquarters staff. 
He said, "I intend to fight and go with the Fifth Corps; I will go out here; and prob- 
ably, if we move out and place ourselves in this position, it may hurry matters up." 

Q. That was his purpose, as he expressed it ? — A. Yes (Record, p. 196). 

General Sheridan has testified as follows : 

Q. Did you see General Warren draw any diagrams or draw up his instructions to 
his division commanders for that movement ? — A. I cannot say whether I saw him 
make a drawing ; I think I saw the drawing. 

Q. Before it was sent out to the division commanders ? — A. I only saw it in this 
way : I think when I saw it it was in the hands of General Warren, and he was sit- 
ting at the base of a tree near by ; that is my remembrance. 

Q. Did you say anything to General Warren at that time about the delay of his 
troops in getting up ? A. — Yes. 

Q. Do you recollect what it was ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Can you give us the general purport of it ? — A. I complained that they were 
slow in coming up ; and my directions to the cavalry had been to hold the enemy in 
the works. My object was to surprise them, if possible, by the Fifth Corps ; hold 
them in the works by a vigorous fire in front, and threatening the right flank. I was 
afraid they (my cavalry) would exhaust their ammunition, and I knew it was an im- 
portant point, and 1 was x>retty anxious about commencing that battle ; I didn't have 
much time to fight it in, and didn't know exactly how long it was going to take ; and 
I knew the enemy held the White Oak road, about three miles to my right and rear. 
And I had all that anxiety on my mind, and I expressed a great deal of that anxiety to 
General Warren during the time the troops were coming up. 

Q. Was not General Warren somewhat impatient, too? — A. Not to the best of my 
recollection at present (Record, p. 57). 

Bvt. Maj. Yanderbilt Allen, late United States Corps of Engineers, 
during the battle of Five Forks on the staff of General Sheridan as 
engineer officer, testified as to the manner of General Warren while at 
Gravelly Bun Church, as follows : 

Q. Was your attention in any way attracted towards General Warren at that time I 
—A. Yes. 

Q. What was it that especially attracted your attention ? — A. General Sheridan 
appeared to be very impatient in regard to the delay by the troops coming up. Gen- 
eral Warren, I thought, appeared to be — did not show the energy that we had been in 
the habit of seeing with other corps commanders in getting his troops up. That was 
only in his manner — that was all I judged from (Record, p. 836). 

Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, Colonel Fifth United States Cavalry, com- 
manding the cavalry divisions on that day, says, at page 845 : 

Q. Do you recollect seeing General Warren and General Sheridan together? — A. 
Yes ; on the field. 

Q. Where was that ? — A. I am in doubt as to the particular location. 

Q. Was it before or after the formation of the Fifth Corps, on that day, April 1 ? — 
A. It was very probably, or possibly, while the formation was going on. We had 
met for the purpose of receiving final instructions, and although I do not know 
times, to my own knowledge, when the Fifth Corps was formed, yet it was, perhaps, 
auy time from one to three o'clock when the formation was going on; though I cannot 
be positive as to that. 

Q. You saw General Sheridan and General Warren together ? — A. Yes. 

Q. At that time was your attention in any way directed towards General Warren ? — 
A. Yes; my attention was attracted towards "General Warren by his manner, Gen- 
eral Sheridan's manner, and possibly by conversation, though I cannot, at this time, 



55 

although there are recollections in regard to it — I could not he willing to swear posi- 
tively to any conversation ahout it, except as to the general directions in regard to 
the hattle. 

Q. Descrihe General Sheridan's manner. — A. He was impatient, restless, apparently 
anxious. 

Q. General Warren's. — A. General Warren's manner impressed me. It may not 
have heen his manner alone; it may have heen something that he said, hut I have a 
firm recollection that he was reluctant, quiet, and uninterested in what was ahout to 
go on ; did not seem impressed with what might possihly he the results of the day. 

Brig. Gen. Francis T. Sherman, United States Volunteers^ then 
inspector-general of the Middle Military Division, on Sheridan's staff, 
testifies as follows (Kecord, p. 856): 

Q. Did you see General Warren during that day ; if so, at what time did you first 
see him ? — A. I saw General Warren during the day, ahout four o'clock in the evening. 

Q. State the circumstances under which you saw him. — A. General Sheridan, ahout 
hetween 3 and 4 p. m. of April 1, directed me to proceed to General Warren with a 
message, the purport of which was that he should put his corps in position and attacK 
at once. I found General Warren ahout four o'clock — it must have heen, when I came 
up to where General Warren was — found General Warren dismounted and sitting at 
the foot of a tree, with a memorandum or field hook in his hand. I rode up, dis 
mounted, saluted General Warren, and delivered the message. General Warren toou 
no notice of my salute nor of the message which I gave him. Thinking he might 
possihly not have heard, I repeated it. General Warren then failed to recognize me 
as a staff officer, or the message I hore him. I thought this was very surprising and 
very singular, and waiting a few moments, I rode up to what was known as Gravelly 
Run Church, with some officer, either of his staff or some of the division staff ; I do 
not recollect which. From Gravelly Run Church we could see across an open ground, 
and there was evidently a rehel vidette or picket, mounted. 

Q. Could you point on Cotton map, No. 3, ahout where you saw, as you were at 
Gravelly Run Church, the rebel vidette or picket ? — A. Somewhere up there [indicates 
northwest of Bass's house, close to the White Oak road]. There was a house down 
here somewhere [pointing a little west hy north of Bass's house]. 

Q. Then what transpired while you were noticing this vidette or picket? — A. The 
picket fired his carbine and the party of us, three or four, immediately returned. I 
went back and found General Warren still in the position that I had left him. Seeing 
no indication on his part or the troops which he commanded, the Fifth Corps, of any 
movement, and feeling that the message which I had delivered would not receive that 
consideration which it demanded, I returned and met General Sheridan on his way 
towards the Fifth Corps and reported the circumstances of my interview with Gen- 
eral Warren. General Sheridan moved rapidly forward. I fell into my position in 
the staff, and followed General Sheridan, who moved rapidly forward, and found Gen- 
eral Warren in the position where I had left him. General Sheridan, I think, dis- 
mounted — that is my recollection — and approached General Warren. What took 
place between General Warren and General Sheridan I have no knowledge of. 

Q. What was the next movement that took place ; what did General Sheridan 
do ? — A. The next movement I saw — after five or ten minutes' conversation with Gen- 
eral Warren — General Sheridan remounted and put the Fifth Army Corps in motion. 
If my recollection serves me, General Warren was still in the position where I first 
found him. The Fifth Corps, at all events, was immediately put in motion ; the 
skirmish-line was thrown forward, 

Q. Go on and describe the movement as you witnessed it. — A. The skirmish-line 
moved forward and broke through a fringe of timber which covered them in their 
formation near Gravelly Run Church, into the open ground, and had probably moved 
fifty or a hundred yards into that ground when the rebels, evidently surprised that 
there were any infantry in that position, pushed out a line of skirmishers, prolonging 
the line of their works and meeting our front nearly, of the skirmishers, and opened 
a scattering fire. 

Q. You saw those skirmishers coming out ? — A. I saw them pushed out myself; saw 
them moving out there on a double quick — the enemy's skirmishers. 

Q. Then, what transpired when the enemy's skirmishers opened fire ? — A. Our skir- 
mish-line, to my surprise, immediately took to the ground — lay down. General 
Sheridan and his staff at about that time rode in between the first line of battle and 
the skirmishers, and rallied them and pushed them forward again ; and from that on, 
until we got nearly two-thirds of the way across the field, we met with no opposition, 
or scarcely any fire, with the exception of what might be received from the skirmish- 
line that was thrown out. Afterwards, as we approached the timber showing the 
"refusal" of that line, the rebels opened out a somewhat sharp musketry fire ; but the 
Fifth Corps were then in full career and moved on there. About this time General 



56 

Sheridan gave me another order, to return to General Griffin, who, I understood sub- 
sequently, was commanding the division in reserve, with direction to General Griffin 
to make a left wheel and move his division directly down the White Oak road, form- 
ing the left rear of the first division, which immediately preceded him, which I under- 
stood was General Ayres's. 

Q. What did you then do ? — A. I proceeded to find General Griffin. I moved back, 
supposing I would find him somewhere near upon the line of the White Oak road, hut 
I subsequently found that he had followed the division that was immediately upon 
the right of General Ayres, which, I believe, was commanded by General Crawford,, 
and that he had deflected from the line to the right, and that I had missed the entire 
division. Finding my mistake, I proceeded to find General Griffin. General Ayres's- 
division moved up and across the road and moved in here. General Crawford was to 
the right and deflected here [indicating on map]. 

Q. Which of those lines would you take as being the line of direction which he took ; 
about where do you recall that you met General Griffin ? — A. I did not meet General 
Griffin personally until the next day. But I met some of his troops up here and I also 
found some cavalry up in here [indicating on map], which, upon inquiry, I found was 
of General Mackenzie's command. General Griffin had moved to the right; kept 
gaining ground to the right and following Crawford's division, until he had gotten 
off the line I had been ordered to direct him on, at least half a mile. 

Maj. and Bvt. Lieut. Col. George L. Gillespie, United States Engineers? 
(Eecord, p. 934), says that he left General Warren in the fie d, just south 
of Gravelly Run Church, sitting down, writing in his note-book ; that he 
went away, and upon returning, after a long interval, he found General 
Warren in almost identically the same position in which he had last 
previously seen him. 

Maj. Chas. F. Gillies, Twenty-first Pennsylvania Cavalry, acting 
provost-marshal, Cavalry Corps, saw General Warren and Sheridan at 
Gravelly Run Church ; he noticed General Warren's manner at that 
time, and says, at page 1134 of the Record, " I thought the general 
looked moody and oppressed." 

Lieut. Col. F. C. Newhall, formerly of General Sheridan's staff, says 
that General Warren, in his judgment at that time, seemed passive and 
indifferent (Record, p. 146). 

General Warren denies this ; he also denies that he said anything^ 
which would give such an impression. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. James W. Forsyth (Record, p. 1049) testifies as fol- 
lows : 

Was your attention at that time, or at anytime while those troops wereformiug, in 
any manner directed towards General Warren ? — A. Yes, it was. 

Q. What was his manner at the time ? * * * 

Q. (Repeated.) — A. Gloomy and despondent; seemed to have a lack of confidence 
in the results which General Sheridan told him he was sure would come if the corps 
got up rapidly, and he could make the movement as he described it. 

Q. Do you recall anything that was said by General Warren in your hearing, to 
General Sheridan, indicative of, or relative to, this movement' that was then about 
being made ? — A. General Sheridan had a number of conversations with General 
Warren, in all which he tried to enthuse him with his, Sheridan's, spirit. 

Mr. Stickney, counsel for the applicant. If we are to have conversations, may I ask 
that the witness may give the words without describing General Sheridan's efforts, 
and that those words be stricken out of this answer ? 

A. He told him that he had forced, with his cavalry, the rebel forces inside their line 
of works ; that he held them there, and if he could get this infantry up and make this 
movement it would crush them out — there was no hope for them — and General War- 
ren replied that he had "seen things look that way before, and Bobby Lee generally got us 
in the end." 

General Warren says he does not believe that he made such a state- 
ment (Record, p. 790). But by reference to the testimony of General 
Sheridan, we find that this evidence of General Forsyth is corroborated. 

Relative to his conversation with General Warren, this question was 
asked of General Sheridan (Record, p. 114) : 

Q. What were you talking about?— A. We had a conversation. In the first place, he 
seemed to be somewhat relnctan*, I thought ; and just before the battle he commenced talking 



57 

in my presence, and there were a good many officers around (I don't know whether they heard 
him or not), after the plan of the battle had been fixed, that " Bobby Lee" teas always yet- 
ting people into difficulties — meaning General Lee, of the Confederate army — that he was 
getting people into difficulties, and tailed in rather a gloomy kind of a way. I recollect 1 
thought it was very strange that a man would talk that way when he knew he had to fight. I 
thought he ought to talk the other way and encourage those who were about Mm and not depress 
me. It was then I made up my mind to accompany the Fifth Corps. I then accompanied 
the Fifth Corps generally ; then afterwards I accompanied Ayres's division, on account of the 
conditions. 

From these evidences it is quite manifest that General Warren entered 
upon that day's action either under great apprehensions for the safety 
of the Fifth Corps, from the position in which he was placed, and want 
of confidence in the commanding general successfully to carry out his 
plan of operations, or else from a reluctance to assist a general from 
another army in winning a great and conclusive victory, or from a want 
of comprehension of the true military situation, or because of bewilder- 
ment and physical depression. 

His entire conduct during that action, as will be seen when I refer a 
little more in detail to the evidence, was that of a man who was uncer- 
tain as to exactly what he should do — first moving towards Ayres, then 
rushing off after Crawford, then coming back to the open south of 
the White Oak road, then rushing after Crawford again, and return- 
ing again to the road, and then following him up through the woods and 
finally meeting him by the Ford road, in the Young-Boisseau field, send- 
ing his staff hither and thither, and actually taking no part in the serious 
action of the day, while the battle was raging and before it had been 
won. 

That so many different persons should at the same time have had their 
attention attracted to General Warren's manner is, I submit, highly sig- 
nificant. 

HOW THE " RETURN" OF THE ENEMY'S WORKS WAS TO BE ASSAULTED. 

One of the most singular circumstances to be found in the case of this 
applicant is the effort he has made to put the responsibility for the dis- 
persion of his divisions during the movements of the action upon Gen- 
eral Sheridan himself. 

It bears the impress largely of the handiwork and afterthought of the 
learned counsel for the applicant, rather than of the soldier on the field. 

General Warren now endeavors to make the point that the reason 
why his divisions became dispersed was because he expected, and that 
his diagram so shows, that General Ayres's division would strike the 
enemy directly in front near the angle, and that the other two divis- 
ions would swing around and assault the " return" westwardly. 

That when they moved forward it was found that the enemy's work, 
with this " return," was further to the west than was expected on the 
line of the White Oak road, and that consequently General Ayres' divi- 
sion had to assault the "return" itself, and not the front of the works, 
and that the fire from the "return" upon General Ayres' division as he 
advanced compelled him to take a new direction rapidly, and thus broke 
the connection with the other two divisions ; in consequence of which 
they, moving to the front northwardly, expecting to find the u return " 
nearer to them, thus got out of position. 

General Warren, or rather his learned counsel, now points triumph- 
antly to his diagram (Eecord, p. 96) to show that the line of the enemy's 
works was indicated as approaching almost to the Gravelly Bun Church 
road where it intersected the White Oak road, and that consequently 



58 

Ayres' division would have struck the front of the works instead of at 
the return. 

This is a kind of plea that might do for an ignorant jury in a very 
doubtful case. 

It must not, however, be overlooked that Brigadier-General Cham- 
berlain, in describing the formation of the Fifth Corps upon Cotton 
Map No. 3, which Major Benyaurd says accords with his own recollection, 
has given the position of that corps correctly in reference to the man- 
ner in which it moved to assault the angle of the return. 

The diagram had under it these words : 

The line will move forward as formed till it reaches the White Oak road, when it 
will swing round to the left, perpendicular to the White Oak road. General Merritt's 
and General Custer's cavalry will charge the enemy's line as soon as the infantry get 
engaged. The cavalry is on the left of the infantry, except Mackenzie's, which is 
moving up the White Oak road from the right. 

From those instructions it is plain that the line could not swing 
around to the left perpendicular to the White Oak road if it had been 
intended by General feheridan that Ayres' division should assault the 
face of the works, which were on the line of the White Oak road. 

General James W r . Forsyth, chief of staff to General Sheridan, says 
that when the diagram and instructions were submitted by General 
Warren to General Sheridan he expressed to General Sheridan the object 
of it (Record, p. 1053) : 

Q. Will you please repeat what he said was the object? — A. He said it was his habit 
to make sketches of that kind, submitting this one showing the positions of the 
divisions of his corps, so that the division commanders would know exactly where 
they had to go, and that there would be no trouble about it hereafter, or during that 
time; that it was a guard that he used as between himself and his division com- 
manders, or words to that effect. It was simply for the corps formation, nothing more, 
nothing less ; had no reference to anything else. And General Sheridan said all right, he 
had no objection to it. 

It is a little singular that General W r arren should at this late day 
endeavor to shift the responsibility for the failure of his right division 
to connect with Ayres in the wheel to the left from his own shoulders 
to that of the general, Sheridan, commanding the entire force. 

It will be seen from his own language, as given by his own witnesses 
here, as to the movements of that day at that time, that this idea of 
shifting responsibility is an afterthought. 

General Warren himself says that he went through the little fringe 
of timber just north of Gravelly Bun Church, which screened the for- 
mation of his corps, where he could look out into the open. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. James W. Forsyth, on this subject, testifies as follows 
(Becord, p. 744) : 

Q. Do you recollect the circumstance of General Sheridan's meeting General War- 
ren? — A. Yes. 

Q. Where was that? — A. The first meeting was when we were in the rear of the 
cavalry; the second meeting was after he had gone to the ground in the vicinity of 
the Gravelly Run Church, with Colonel Gillespie, to locate the position of his, General 
Warren's, corps. 

Q. During the time that corps was forming, and before the final advance was made, 
do you recall whether you made any examination of the ground yourself? — A. No par- 
ticular examination by myself. 

Q. While they were there, did you ride forward at all upon that road — Gravelly Eun 
Church road ? — A. I think we could see over the open ground to the White Oak road. 
We mounted, after we got to General Warren, and moved around in that vicinity. 

Q. (By Mr. Stickney, counsel for the applicant.) You mean you could see across 
from the south side ? — A. Yes. The south side of the clearing, in front of Gravelly 
Run Church. 

Q. What indications, if any, of an enemy, or their works, did you see there? — A. 
None. 



59 

Q. While General Sheridan was with General Warren, do yon recollect any conver- 
sation — did you hear any conversation between them on the part of General Sheridan, 
as to the movement that was to he made? — A. Yes, I did. 

Q. Please state what you heard General Sheridan say to General Warren, as to the 
contemplated movement. — A. He stated to General Warren that the cavalry had 
driven the enemy inside of their line of works and held them there; and that they 
would hold them there, and that he was to form his corps, and it would he used as the 
turning- column, to move up, strike the White Oak road, wheel at once to the left, 
and fall upon the enemy's left and rear and crush them. And that the movement of 
this corps would he indicated hy its tiring; and as soon as this firing occurred on the 
part of the infantry of the Fifth Corps, caused hy their meeting the enemy, that the 
cavalry would charge the enemy's works and carry them. It was a comhined move- 
ment. 

Q. Did General Sheridan say anything to General Warren, at that time, as to exactly 
where the cavalry were with relation to the enemy's works ? — A. He stated to him that 
the cavalry inclosed the enemy inside of their works; that they were closed in there. 

Q. Where did General Sheridan indicate, if at all, that the right of the cavalry 
rested ? — A. I do not recollect of his positively pointing out the right, hut it was to 
the left of a north and south line from where we were to the left of the Fifth Corps. 

Q. In relation to the enemy's works, did he indicate at all where the right of the 
cavalry was in relation to the left of the enemy's works ? — A. That they were on their 
right, encircling them in their works. There was nothing in our front. 

General Warren must have seen, when lie went through that fringe 
of timber and looked out into the open that extended to the north of 
the White Oak road, that there were no works there. 

Our own cavalry held that field ; in fact, the headquarters of Gibbs' 
brigade were at Bass's house in that open field. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. Archer 1ST. Martin, formerly of General Sheridan's 
staff, testifies that while they were waiting near Gravelly Bun Church 
for the Fifth Corps to form, he was sent about four o'clock by General 
Sheridan with orders to General Mackenzie, and rode off northeast to- 
wards the White Oak road, and found Mackenzie off on the right and 
told him — 

" To move on the right of the infantry ; and that as the infantry attacked he was to 
move still further forward, so as to capture any prisoners or men who might be driven 
out of the works (Record, p. 1056)." 

He returned the same way, and of course if there had been any ene- 
my's " return " near to the Gravelly Bun Church road, he would not only 
have known it, but been unable to go that way to Mackenzie. 

Nevertheless it is a little interesting to see just what the evidence is 
upon the subject as produced by the applicant. 

General Ayres says (Becord, p. 267) bethought one-half of his division 
would strike the works in front. 

It is here to be remarked that General Warren's present contention is 
that the whole of this division would have struck it in front. 

General Chamberlain says (Becord, p. 273) that he understood dis- 
tinctly that Ayres was to strike the works in front. 

Col. W. W. Swan, Ayres' acting adjutant general, says (Becord, p. 
293) that he expected to strike the enemy in front. 

Col. B. M. Brinton, United States Volunteers, formerly aide-de-camp to 
Griffin, says, however (Becord, p. 306), that he saw General Sheridan 
mark on the ground at Gravelly Bun Church the enemy's position, and 
adds, " I was rather astonished at the time that he knew so much about 
the enemy's position." 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. J. P. Mead, aide-de-camp to Crawford, says (Becord, 
p. 391) that his understanding was that " every man to move with the sun 
over his left shoulder until we struck the road and then go due west." 

He saw General Sheridan make a diagram in the sand and give the 
position of the enemy and of the roads and of the cavalry, and where 



60 

the Fifth Corps was to form, u and was to make a grand left wheel and 
change direction on the White Oak road" (Eecord, p. 396). 

Of course the Ffth Corps could not have made a grand left wheel and 
changed direction on the White Oak road if Ay res 7 division was to have 
struck the enemy on the face of the works. 

Brig, and Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. J. Bartlett, called by the respondent, says 
(p. 1,168) that while lying by the roadside near the junction of the 
Gravelly Bun Church road with the Five Forks road, and before moving 
up into position, General Sheridan, daring the morning, gave them the 
projected plan of battle. 

Q. What was the plan of battle you received from him ? — A. General Sheridan 
called us around him in the road — his plan was very short ; lie drew his sabre in the 
dust and says: "There is the White Oak road; the enemy are entrenched behind 
that ; they have refused their left somewhere near an old church ; whether it is within 
their lines or not I do not know." He said: "I will attack their entire front ; I will 
deploy my cavalry, dismounted, and engage their entire front, and with the strong arm 
I will strike this salient and wheel onto their left and rear." And, as I understood it, 
the formation of the corps, en echelon, by divisions was with that object. 

Q. What were your orders as to moving forward ?— A. At the moment Ayres become 
engaged everything wheeled to the left. 

I will read in this connection the following extract from the report of 
Brev. Maj. Gen. Charles Griffin, to be found on page 1186 of the Eecord. 
and dated 29th April, 1865 : 

The 1st division being on the right flank, formed in three lines, with one (1) brigade 
on its right in echelon ; the 3rd division, B'v't Major-General Crawford, in the centre, 
and the 2nd division, Bvt. Major-General Ayres, on the left. Immediately after, the 
order to advance against the enemy was given (who was supposed to be entrenched at 
Five Forks), with instructions to the division that after it had crossed the road it was 
to change direction to the left, so as to strike the enemy in flank or rear. 

After advancing about a mile, and finding nothing in front save a few cavalry 
videttes, and there being heavy volleys of musketry to the left and rear, the division 
was halted, and upon a personal examination it was found that the enemy was mov- 
ing up the White Oak road. Immediately the division was faced by the left flank, 
and marched some four or five hundred (4 or 500) yards, when its direction as to the 
line of battle was changed perpendicularly to the left, and moved down at a "double 
quick" upon the enemy, who was visible some three-quarters of a mile distant, moving 
up the White Oak road. The enemy's rifle-pits were taken, together with about 
*■ ■ "* * * * * * fifteen hundred (1,500) prisoners and several bat- 
tle-flags. Here a little confusion resulted from the troops exchanging shots with the 
cavalry, who were coming up in front of the enemy's works. After a few minutes' 
delay, the line of battle was again changed perpendicularly to the White Oak road 
'and the enemy's works. This change brought the 1st division on the left of the 3rd. 
The command was then pushed forward aloug the rifle-pits, capturing prisoners and 
driving the enemy before it until it advanced to the Five Forks, where the cavalry 
and the infantry met, capturing five (5) guns, several caissons, and the 3rd brigade, 
1st division, taking on the Ford road a train of wagons and ambulances belonging to 
Pickett's division. About this point Major-General Sheridan, in person, directed me to 
take command of the 5th corps, and push the enemy down the White Oak road. I immedi- 
ately directed General Ayres and the other commanders to push forward with all 
possible dispatch, and the pursuit was kept up until after dark, when the command 
was halted, the cavalry having pushed to the front, out of sight and hearing of the 
infantry. • 

The concurrent testimony of the cavalry witnesses is that General 
Sheridan was along the line a number of times before the advance was 
finally begun. 

The evidence of Brig. Gen. Horace Porter, U. S. A., colonel and aide- 
de-camp on the staff of the General-in-Chief, Grant, on this subject, is 
as follows (Becord, p. 911) : 

Q. Prior to the advance of the Fifth Corps from the position indicated on Cotton 
map No. 3, had you any conversation with General Sheridan as to the movements 
that were to be made? If so, substantially, what were they? — A. General Sheridan 
explained his plan of battle during the afternoon : That it was to deploy the cavalry in 



61 

front of the enemy's main line and to engage their attention, and to use the Fifth Corps — to 
siring the Fifth Corps around, wheel it to the left and attack this " return" or crotchet and 
break that and attack the enemy on his left Jlank. He became exceedingly impatient in 
regard to time in the afternoon — manifested very many signs of impatience, and used 
the expression once or twice — certainly more than once — that his great fear was that 
the sun would go down before the battle could be fought, and the next day might 
change all the circumstances. 

( t t. Was anything said upon the subject of the movements of the Fifth Corps, rela- 
tive to getting into position; do you recollect now? — A. He expressed repeatedly 
anxiety and annoyance at the delays in the formation. 

Q. Yon saw the Fifth Corps form. Did you see them move as they went forward 
to go into action ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Please describe exactly what you witnessed. — A. I was with General Sheridan 
during most of the time of that attack upon the angle, and consequently with Ayres' 
command. In moving forward over this open ground there was a line of skirmishers 
thrown out consisting of the Bucktails, from Pennsylvania — I happen to recollect that 
as a Pennsylvania regiment — and they moved down over this open ground and at the 
edge of the woods they met with a very heavy hre ; that is, I judge it was a fire of a 
skirmish-line — heavy skirmish-line. The line of skirmishers was staggered by this 
nre and halted ; a number of them were shot down. Some lay down on the ground, 
as skirmishers will. General Sheridan manifested some impatience at this, seized his 
battle-flag, and rushed forward with most of his staff, and by shouting and gesticu- 
lating he encouraged the men. The movement was taken up again and the division 
advanced very handsomely down to the woods. They then went on to make their 
attack upon the works and met with a very heavy fire from there, which compelled 
Ayres' division to halt, and they fell back some distance. General Sheridan was then 
giving his personal supervision and was right with the troops, and he rushed forward 
again, and by shouting and encouraging the men and directing the officers and mak- 
ing himself very conspicuous there, they moved forward to a second attack and went 
in very gallantly and carried the works. When the works were captured, anda great 
many prisoners, at the same time, General Sheridan turned to me and asked me if I had 
seen General Warren. I told him I had not seen him since he had seen him with his staff on 
a little rising ground some distance from us. lefore the attack commenced. He asked me if I 
saw General Warren to request him to report to him, General Sheridan, in person. I then 
moved off to the right, not feeling myself charged especially with hunting General 
Warren, but in looking over the operations and in looking out for General Warren 
so as to deliver this message if I came across him, I moved on to the right and through 
some swampy ground in this direction [indicating due north], and fell in with Gen- 
eral Crawford's division. 

At pages 913 and 914 : 

Q. Was anything said, that you recall, upon the subject of the position of the 
main body of Lee's army during these movements of the 1st of April, in the afternoon, 
by General Sheridan or General Warren ? — A. I heard General Sheridan express the 
apprehension that Lee would send a force across in a westerly direction to attack his 
forces ; that he knew that Pickett's command was detached at some distance from Lee's 
army, and there would, very probably, be some movement made by Lee for its sup- 
port. He expressed that apprehension. 

Incidentally, General Porter also testified as follows (Eecord, p. 918) : 

Q. You have spoken of General Sheridan's impatience at the delay. Can you recall 
anything that he said or did ? — A. I can remember his general actions at the time. I 
recollect his being dismounted, and striking one hand against the palm of the other in 
a very impatient manner, stating that he was afraid the sun would go down before 
this battle would be fought. 

Again, p. 922 of the Eecord: 

Q. In General Sheridan's conversation with General Warren you heard Mm express 
apprehension that General Lee might send a force to attack him? — A. Yes. 

Capt. O.Mason Kinney, assistant adjutant- general to the First Cavalry 
Division, Devins (Eecord, p. 975), knew where the left of the enemy's ivories 
were ; he rode into the open field where Bass's house was, and could see 
in the direction of the enemy's works, and saw no works north of the 
field 5 he understood that the infantry were to siving to the left, and the cav- 
alry were to assault in front (Eecord, p. 972). 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. E. E. La Motte, division inspector to Ayres's division, 



62 

says (p. 378), that his understanding at the time was that Ayres's divis- 
ion teas not expected to attach the enemy's ivories in front, hut that the orders 
were for the division to "move forward until we struck the White Oak road, 
and then swing around to the left "; he also says that all three brigades 
finally went over the return, and that a few cavalrymen galloped past 
them from the rear while they were re-forming. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. W. T. Chester, aide-de-camp to General Crawford, 
says: 

" Our orders were to keep connection to the left with General Ayres, and to still make 
a left wheel, as I understand it" (Record, p. 386). 

Maj. W. H. H. Benyaurd, engineer officer on General Warren's staff,, 
says, as to the orders for the divisions (Record, p. 1134), " that they 
were to move forward until they struck the White Oak road, and then 
to wheel and move to the westward." 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Hollon Richardson says (Record, p. 315), that by the 
original order he understood they " were to move along the line of the 
road past the church until we struck the White Oak road, and then 
there would be a general wheel," and that the general intent of the pro- 
gramme, as he understood it, was to keep connection with Ayres's 
division (p. 3L7). 

Lieut. Col. F. C. Newhall says (p. 151), that the only unlooked-for 
thing, so far as he knew, was that the other two divisions did not keep 
to the left with Ayres, and that it was intended that Ayres should strike 
the angle fairly himself. 

The evidence of Capt. Henry E. Alvord, late Sixth United States 
Cavalry and acting Aide-de-Camp to Brig. Gen. Alfred Gibbs, who 
commanded the regular cavalry brigade, is peculiarly interesting and 
important in showing that General Sheridan and all the cavalry officers 
on the right of the cavalry line knew exactly where the angle of the enemy's 
"return" was (p. 817), which tvas on the cavalry front. As it will be 
hereafter cited, when discussing the cavalry operations, it is only neces- 
sary to say that, for a time, Gibbs' headquarters were at Bass' House, 
in the open field to the right of the cavalry line, and they could see a 
considerable distance to the north of the White Oak road, which was 
open and unobstructed. 

The infantry of the Fifth Corps could not have been used at all in 
attacking any portion of the front of the enemy's works without first 
displacing and withdrawing a portion of the dismounted cavalry. The 
very fact that Captain Alvord was charged with the duty of maintain- 
ing the connection between the cavalry right and infantry line when it 
made its wheel shows that this controlling suggestion in the learned 
counsel's argument is wholly an afterthought. 

The cavalry right extended even beyond the enemy's left — into the 
open at Bass' House. 

In his closing cross-examination, the applicant here made an important 
admission, which, of itself, would be a complete answer to the theory 
sought to be raised that General Ayres' division was to strike the enemy 
on the front of the works. 

Q. While your movements were going on, the going up to the White Oak road and 
crossing, you understood at the time, did you not, that the cavalry would engage the enemy 
along his whole front, which was facing south 1 — A. Yes. 

Q. But the cavalry were to occupy the entire front of the enemy and engage them. — A. Yes 
(Record, p. 1237). 

Time when the battle of Five Forks began. 

It was not until after half -past '4 o'clock in the afternoon that the Fifth 
Corps were in a position to move. 



03 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. T. W. Beau, of the Seventeenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
says (Record, p. 926) that the return was struck about 5 p. m. 

Maj. George L. Gillespie, United States Corps of Engineers, says 
(Record, p. 935) that it was struck after 4 p. m. 

Capt. A. C. Houghton, Second Ohio Cavalry, aide-de-camp Penning- 
ton's brigade, says (Record, p. 904) that the first regular assault was 
about 5 p. m. 

Lieut. Col. George G. Briggs, Seventh Michigan Cavalry, Stagg's 
brigade, says (Record, p. 991) that he saw General Sheridan in advance 
of the infantry and first inside the works, and that it was about five 
o'clock when the assault began. 

But we have a more definite piece of evidence as to the time when the 
first firing began in the statement of Maj. A. E. Dana, the assistant 
adjutant- general of the First Cavalry division, from a letter he wrote on 
the night following (Record, p. 1013); he says the battle began with 
infantry firing at 5:15 p. m., and that he looked at his watch and noted 
the time (Record, p. 1016.) 

As the sun set on that day, according to the statement of the learned 
counsel for the applicant (Record, p. 679), at sixteen minutes after six 
o'clock, or according to the calculations of Prof. P. S. Michie, United 
States Military Academy, at 6:21 mean time, there was but an hour 
in which to fight the battle after it had once begun. 

The enemtfs strength. 

Before we proceed to discuss the action itself it might be well to con- 
sider the number of troops that the enemy that day had on the field. 

The last authentic information to be found from the rebel archives in 
the War Department at Washington is the field return dated at Peters- 
burg, February 20, 1865, one month and ten days before this action. 

That was about the close of the winter season, before active military 
operations had begun, when many were presumably absent on furlough 
or absent sick. 

From that time to the 1st of April no special movement is known in 
which the forces which were at Five Forks were engaged. 

Consequently it is reasonable to presume that the numbers they had 
there were greater even than those that were effective for duty on the 
20th of February, 1865. 

Now, per the field return (p. 1076, Record) of the rebel Army of North- 
ern Virginia of that date, there were for duty as follows (exclusive of 
Rosser, whose cavalry did not take part in this action, but were north 
of Hatcher's Run) : 



Organization. 


Officers. 


Men. 




304 

431 

185 

96 


4,761 
6,505 






3,935 
1,825 


In Fitzhugh Lee's division 



Making a total of 18,042 ; in addition to which there were present sick, 
of officers and enlisted men, 1,209, and an aggregate present, including 
sick, in arrest, and extra-duty men, 22,050 on the 20th of February, 1865. 

Besides this aggregate present of 22,050 in those divisions, there were 
14,813 officers and men noted as absent, but within the Confederate 



64 

lines, of which it is to be presumed that a large number returned before 
the spring campaign opened. 

At any rate, eliminating the 14,813 men who were actually absent 
from those divisions on the date of the field return of February 20, 1865, 
and subtracting from the 22,050 who were actually present, Eppa Hun- 
ton's brigade, which did not take part in the battle of Five Forks, there 
would remain, in round numbers, fully 20,000 men within the Confed- 
erate lines at Five Forks on the day of the battle. 

Thus, in consideration of the great number absent forty days before 
(14,813) from the ranks, it is reasonable to assume that the estimate of 
20,000 present on the field of Five Forks on the 1st of April is, if any- 
thing, less than the number actually there under the rebel colors. 

Hardly had the advance begun when the divergence of the several 
divisions of the Fifth Corps commenced. Of course the applicant ap- 
preciates the fact that this was both unfortunate and reprehensible, 
and he has therefore tried to shift the responsibility from himself to his 
commanding general. 

The confusion in Ayres J s division. — Sow mid by ivhom rallied. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. James W. Forsyth says (Becord, p. 192), relative to 
the advance : 

Our headquarters flag took position in front of General Warren's line of battle, "be- 
tween the skirmish line, my recollection is-, aad his line of battle. We took our posi- 
tion there prior to moving out from the church. We then moved out and pushed on 
up with the command, and the skirmish line, when they got into the opening close on 
to the road, fired in the air. Many of the men dropped down on the ground. We 
then pushed on from there up to the works and over the works and through them. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. George A. Forsyth, Lieutenant-colonel and Aide-de- 
Camp, U. S. A., says (p. 202) : 

I saw the troops stagger, and thought for a moment they might break. I rushed 
out, without waiting for orders, and cheered them a little ; I thought the men wanted 
encouragement. 

Lieut. Col. M. V. Sheridan says he saw the skirmish-line of the Fifth 
Corps begin to shoot in the air (Becord, p. 215), and " lie down * * * 
I confess I was much astonished" ; no enemy was to be seen. He was 
then sent by General Sheridan to General Merritt to withhold his attack. 

At page 216 he says : 

I went around through the woods to where General Merritt was, probably near the 
Dinwiddie and Five Forks road ; I think his headquarters were somewhere in that 
neighborhood. I directed him to withhold his attack, as the Fifth Corps were not 
behaving well, and withhold his attack until the attack was renewed close in on his 
right. 

And at page 217 that when he reached Merritt he was attacking, and 
he stopped the attack. Merritt was right close in on the works. 

General Ayres, who commanded the division in which this confusion 
took place, says that General Sheridan rode right in where the brigade 
was unsteady, with his hat in his hand (Becord, p. 2G4). 

In his official report, same page, he says, " Portions were very unsteady, 
but subsequently moved irp and bore their part in a handsome manner." 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. C. E. La Motte, division inspector of Ayres's division 
(Record, p. 373), admits seeing "a little confusion upon our right as we 
were changing direction"; he saw them begin "to shake, and rode over 
with others to make all straight again." 

This was in Gwinn's Third Brigade. 



65 

He says they got a fire from the north, and he saw General Sheridan 
then ride to Ayres, "waving* his hat in his hand. 7 ' 

After capturing the return, General La Motte says (Record, p. 374), 
" after re-forming, the troops were moved straight out on the White 
Oak road, along their line of works." 

Those works he says he examined, and that they were carefully con- 
structed and revetted on the inside with logs, and had a number of 
traverses. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. Harrison Adreon, Major Fourth Maryland Volunteers, 
Bowerman's brigade (Eecord, p. 4;>1), speaks of the line as "somewhat 
broken," and "Sheridan rode down from the right between our line and 
the enemy just before the charge, causing a great deal of cheering and 
drawing a heavy fire" 5 "he was just riding down with his hat off — the 
idea was to encourage the men, I presume." 

Bvt. Maj. Vanderbilt Allen, late United States Corps of Engineers, 
says (Record, p. 836), as to Geneial Ayres's division: 

A. They moved against the enemy to the left, and as they commenced to advance 
the troops commenced firing — General Ayres's troops — although there was no response 
from the enemy at all, and we were rather doubtful as to whether there was any enemy 
immediately in our front. So General Sheridan, with a number of his staff, rode to 
the front of Ayres's division — to the front of the skirmish line — and we found that 
there were no bullets coming in our direction at all. 

Q. What did General Sheridan do? — A. General Sheridan stopped the firing as well 
as he could. 

Q. Then what transpired after that, so far as this division was concerned ? — A. There 
Avas some little demoralization ; some went to the rear. 

Q. Did the division advance f— A. The division continued to advance, and shortly 
afterwards we met with a very heavy fire. Then the division — some of them — com- 
menced to fall to the rear, a little demoralized. General Sheridan took his headquar- 
ters flag, rode to the head of the division, and took them in. 

Q. Did you go over the " return" of the works there ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Then what were your movements after that ? — A. Then we continued to advance. 
The enemy were in retreat. 

Q. Capturing prisoners ? — A. Yes. 

Lieut. Col. George G. Briggs, Seventh Michigan Cavalry (Eecord, p. 
991), testifies that he saw this confusion in Ayres's division. 

Bvt. Lieut., Colon el A. N". Martin, Additional Aide-de-camp to General 
Sheridan, was sent to General Mackenzie with orders, and describes as 
follows with reference to Avres and Crawford, on his return (Record, p. 
1057) : 

Q. When you returned, did you observe as you returned any movement of our 
troops ? — A. I noticed that the infantry were moving off more to the right, more in the 
direction of where General Mackenzie should have gone, and I rode up to one officer of 
the Fifth Corps — my recollection is c he was quite gray ; I think he was General Greg- 
ory — I am not positive about the name, though — and told him that his troops were 
moving in the wrong direction ; that they should swing in more to the left, and that 
that was the orders, as I understood them, from Genera ]Sheridan. He replied that 
he did not know General Sheridan in the matter at all ; that he took his orders from 
General Warren, and that he did not care to pay any attention to what I said; some- 
thing to that purport. 

Q. At this time was there any action going on ? — A. There was considerable firing 
off to the left, and it was a fact that they were moving away from the firing instead 
of towards it. That particularly impressed me. 

Q. Did you rejoin General Sheridan? — A. Yes. 

Q. Describe what you noticed when you rejoined him. — A. I cannot say whether it 
was immediately upon my rejoining, or some little time afterwards. The Fifth Corps 
or a portion of it — the left portion, belonging to the left of the Fifth Corps— moved 
into the woods towards the works, and there was considerable confusion ; they seemed 
to be rather demoralized ; and the general took the headquarters flag — the guidons 
that we had — Avhich had red at the top and white at the bottom, or vice versa, with 
two stars, and jammed it down in his boot and moved forward some little distance. 
The men were rallied then, and soon after that a charge was made across the works, 
the cavalry charging on the left, and we went up through the works at the angle. 

5 GAR 



66 

Q. When you say the calvary were charging on the left, do you mean that the infan- 
try were on "the front of the works and the cavalry on the front ? — A. There was a sort 
of a "return" there of the works, and the infantry were towards the " return" and 
the cavalry off on the left. 

Q. After you got in the works what did you then do ? — A. We swung around down 
towards the left, following the works down in the rear. 

Q. Did you see any of the cavalry at this time? — A. Yes; I saw them come over 
those works. I recollect one man on a mule jumped over a low place in the works. 

Q. Were those cavalry on a line with you or in front of you ? — A. They were more to 
the left, farther down the works. 

Q. Do you recollect any special resistance of the enemy after you crossed the angle 
of the works ; if so, where ? — A. There was some desultory firing ; hut I do not recol- 
lect any severe resistance after that. We moved a considerable distance down. 

Maj. Charles F. Gillies, Twenty-first Pennsylvania Cavalry, who also 
saw this confusion, testifies as follows : 

Q. Did you see any firing when it began? — A. Yes; I saw the left of the Fifth Corps 
go into action — throw out a line of skirmishers. I saw some skirmishers come out of 
the rebel works and return the fire. 

Q. What did you then observe?— A. I saw, after the first fire, some of the skirmish- 
ers throw themselves on the ground. 

Q. Our skirmishers or the enemy ? — A. Our skirmishers. 

Q. Did you see General Sheridan at that time ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Did you notice what he did, if anything? — A. He rode rapidly in that direction. 

Q. Did you see him with General Warren as they moved forward to go into action ? 
— A. Yes. 

Q. Were you sufficiently close to hear any conversation between them, if there was 
any? — A. I was. 

Q. Did you hear any conversation ? — A. I heard General Sheridan, as the skirmishers 
advanced and opened "fire, say, "There, Warren, I told you I was right. Swing round 
your right and we have got them." 

Q. Did you notice anything else on the part of General Sheridan in giving those in- 
structions ? — A. No ; only that he rode rapidly away in the direction of that fire. Made 
a motion of his hand that way, as he spoke, indicating, I think, the direction the right 
should go. 

Q. Did you see the left portion of the Fifth Corps get into action? — A. I did. 

Q. Did they swing round or go straight ahead ? — A. They moved obliquely to the 
left in the direction of the angle of the rebel works. 

Q. And as to the rest of the corps? — A. The rest of the corps did not move at that 
time. I thought it moved a little afterwards. 

Q. What direction did they take ? — A. Directly across the road; passed an opening 
and went into the timber beyond. 

Q. When General Sheridan gave those instructions, or made this remark that you 
speak of to General Warren, do you know what reply General Warren made, if any? 
— A. No ; I do not recollect any reply. 

Q. Did you have any conversation, then, with General Warren? — A. Yes. The 
general turned round to me and said, "Take that cavalry out of the way, sir." 

Q. Did you notice what direction he went after that ? — A. Yes; he went to the right, 
into the timber across the opening. 

Q. What then transpired, as far as the left of that division was concerned, after 
they moved into action ? — A. After a volley or two was fired, part of the left broke — a 
part of the left of the Fifth Corps broke. 

Q. What did you do at that time ? — A. I threw out a line in rear to stop them, by 
direction of General Forsyth, or Colonel Newhall, I forget which. 

Q. I understood you to say that you threw out a line of your cavalry to stop the 
break? — A. Yes. 

Q. What did they do ? — A. They stopped when they were out of the line of fire. 

Q. Did you see General Sheridan at that time ?— A. No, sir. 

Q. After General Sheridan had had this conversation with General Warren, which 
you speak of, do you know what direction he took ? — A. General Sheridan ? 

Q. Yes. — A. He rode rapidly into the rebel works, into the angle, into the heat of 
the fire. He rode between two fires ; I hardly know how the general escaped. 

Q. Where were you when the angle of the works was taken? — A. I was very near 
them, in an oblique direction — opposite to them. 

Q. What duty were you employed upon then? — A. I was acting as provost-marshal 
of the cavalry corps. The duty I was then doing was stopping the stragglers. 

Q. Did you sse any prisoners come into our lines ?— A. Yes. 

Q. Had you anything to do with them?— A. Yes; I counted all the prisoners that 
came out of the rebel works— the majority of them. Colonel Newhall and I counted 
them together. 



67 

Q. Did you conduct this mass to the rear ? — A. Yes. They were anxious to get to 
the rear, to get out of the line of lire. I conducted them, and he counted them. 

Q. How do you know they were anxious to get to the rear ? — A. Because they called 
to me to get them out of the line of fire ; get them to the rear, because '•' The Confed- 
eracy was gone up," and they wanted to " Get out of the line of fire." Some of the 
officers called out that. 

Q. Do you know how many prisoners you received that afternoon ? — A. Four thou- 
sand and six prisoners. 

Q. Is that the little item, or receipt, for those pri sou ers? [Paper handed to wit- 
ness.] — A. Yes ; that officer (referring to Lieutenant Patten's name in the body of the 
receipt) was under me, Lieut. J. C. Patten. I sent him with au escort. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Middletou took the prisoners to headquarters, under supervision of Lieutenant 
Patten. 

Q. This note on the hack is in your own handwriting? — A. Yes. 

Q. The receipt being as follows [reading] : 

" Headquarters, A. of P., 

'•' April 2, 1865. ' 

" Received of Lieutenant Patten 4,006 prisoners of war. 

(Signed) "C. A. RAND, 

" Lieutenant and A. D. C." 
A true copv. 

LOOMIS L. LANGDON, 
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. Army. 

This is the receipt that you received at that time ? — A. Yes. ' 

Q. By the hand of Lieutenant Patten ? — A. Yes. 

Q. When did you send those prisoners to the headquarters of the Army of the Poto- 
mac ! — A. That evening, after the battle, a little before dark ; they got en route a little 
before dark to Army headquarters. 

Q. Did you receive any prisoners from that battle afterwards ? — A. The following 
day I received prisoners, but I got no receipt for them — 1 turned them over to some 
officer of the Fifth Corps. I do not recollect whom. 

Q. Whom did you receive those prisoners from ? — A. Some cavalry officer. I do not 
know who he was. 

Q. How many were there, according to your best recollection ? — A. I should judge 
there were about two thousand prisoners. 

Q. Those were in addition to those that were sent off by you a little before dark, 
on the afternoon of April 1 ? — A. Yes. 

Q. You say you turned them over — the 2,000 that you received the next day — to the 
Fifth Corps ? — A. Y r es. 

Q. State the reason of that. — A. The reason of that was, that I did not have suffi- 
cient men to guard them. My command was cut up for orderlies and other work. 
They were in the saddle nearly all the time, doing something, and they, the prisoners, 
became a burden upon my command, and I spoke to General Forsyth to have them 
taken away. He told me to turn them over to the Fifth Corps — to some officer in the 
Fifth Corps. I forget who it was. 

Q. Going back a little. You say you saw General Warren go into the timber with 
the right of the Fifth Corps, after they had crossed the open to the north of the White 
Oak road ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Did you see him again that afternoon? — A. I did. I saw him after the battle 
was over. 

Q. Where did you see him ? — A. I saw him come out very near the same place that 
I saw him go in. 

Q. Did you have any conversation with him ? — A. This much : Previous to that 
General Forsyth came to me and asked me if I had seen General Warren. I said no. 
'•' Well, if you see him before I do, give him General Sheridan's compliments and say 
that he wishes to see him." Shortly after that I saw the general coming and he was 
advancing towards me. He asked* me where he could find General Sheridan, and I 
j)ointed in the direction that he was. 

Q. Which way ? — A. Which was in towards the works, or over the works. 

Q. Was this a short time, or a long time after the capture of the angle, or just about 
that time ? — A. It was some time, I think fifteen or twenty minutes, after the capture 
of the angle (Record, pp. 1135, 1136, 1137). 

By the Court: 

Q. When General Warren asked you where General Sheridan was, did you deliver 
to him the message from Colonel Forsyth, that General Sheridan wished to see him ? — 
A. I think the Colonel asked me first where he could find General Sheridan, and I 
pointed in the direction. 

Q. Did vou deliver that message to Mm, that General Sheridan wanted to see him? — A. 
Yes (Record, p. 1143). 



68 

Reference has already been made to the evidence of Brig. Gen. 
Francis T. Sherman, found on page 857, as to this confusion. 

During all this time the inquiry naturally arises, " Where was Gen- 
eral Warren, the corps commander 1 ?" 

Instead of the army commander being under the necessity of going to 
the front in order to encourage that division, at a critical moment, I 
submit that it was the duty of the corps commander to do so. 

General Warren's reply is substantially that he thought they could 
get along without him. 

Napoleon Bonaparte, by going to the front at the Bridge of Lodi, 
acquired a great reputation, and even to-day that act is referred to as a 
brilliant example of an army commander exposing himself in a critical 
emergency in order to encourage his men to victory. 
' But I submit that the act of Napoleon was no more commendable and 
no more brilliant than that of General Sheridan on this occasion, and I 
doubt if there is any historical instance — there certainly is none within 
my present recollection — of an army commander thus leading his troops 
in an assault, between the date of Napoleon's action at Lodi in 1796 and 
Sheridan's action at Five Forks in 1865. 

Lieut. Col. Fredk. 0. Newhall, then on Lieutenant- General Sheri- 
dan's staff, graphically depicts the conduct of the commanding general 
and of the applicant in his direct examination by the applicant's counsel 
(Eecord, p. 146) : 

Q. Then come along to the time when the advance began. Will you give me your 
personal movements up to the time that the angle of the works was carried? — A. 
When the Fifth Corps moved forward from Gravelly Run Church I accompanied Gen- 
eral Sheridan and remained with him up to the time when we got sight of General 
Mackenzie coming up the White Oak road, and I was the officer who was sent to give 
new directions to General Mackenzie. 

Q. They were given through you and not by General Sheridan personally ? — A. I 
was just going on witl^ that. Mackenzie did not seem to be absolutely certain, so I 
suggested that he should go with me to the general. We rode over together. During 
that time the corps had advanced some little distance, in fact was almost on the 
White Oak road. There was some firing. General Sheridan was riding between War- 
ren's skirmish line and our line of battle when Mackenzie and I reached him. As soon 
as we crossed the White Oak road the tiring became heavy. I was sent by General 
Sheridan to General Winthrop on the left of Ayres's division. 

Q. He was Ayres's reserve, was he not ? — A. I do not know ; perhaps he was ; at 
any rate he was on the left of Ayres's Division. I took orders to him from General 
Sheridan to be very careful not to lire on our own cavalry. Then I rode back and 
rejoined General Sheridan, who was then on the right of Ayres's division, which was 
in quite serious confusion. I did what I could in helping the general and the other 
officers to restore order there, and while this was going on I was sent by General Sheri- 
dan to General Warren to notify him that the divisions on the right were becoming 
disjointed and separated from the battle. I found General Warren on the south side 
of the White Oak road, within perhaps 100 yards of it, in an open field, rather behind 
Ayres's Division, I should say. I gave him the message I had from General Sheridan, 
and then I rode back to General Sheridan again, and moved on with Ayres's Division. 
While that movement was still in progress I was sent to General Warren again to 
notify him that the troops of Crawford, and Griffin were going entirely oat of the bat- 
tle, and "ruining the whole thing," as I recollect the words. I found General War- 
ren at that time at these broken buildings that I believe are now called " The Chim- 
neys," and which I suppose to be those, although I have not any way of locating 
them except my recollection. [The witness indicates a point a little north of Louis 
Sidney's house, the point being designated upon the large official map as " Founda- 
tion of house."] They were behind the enemy's left in an open field. I see that it is 
now called "The Chimneys," and I suppose that is the place. 

Q. How far apart were those two occasions when you went to General Warren? — A. 
It would be pure guess-work ; I should say fifteen minutes. 

(Record, page 148. ) 

Q. What was your message to General Warren the second time when you found him 
there by The Chimneys ? — A. The message I gave him ? 



69 

Q. Yes. — A. I cannot recollect the exact words in which I received the message; I 
think I can tell yon what I told him. 

Q; Yes. — A. ltold him that General Sheridan was cxiremehj anxious ahoiil the movement 
of these two divisions. General Warren was sitting on his horse at The Chimneys, facing 
the White Oak road. I pointed out to him myself that the troops were passing to his left 
and rear from the White Oak road, as he xva* facing the White Oak road, toward Hatcher's 
Ixiin, and that there was a very large interval between them and Ayres. 

Q. Yon mean Crawford and Griffin?— A. No, sir; I mean between them and Ayres ; 
and I urged him as strongly as I thought was proper, in the name of General Sheridan, 
to get those troops to Ayres' support. 

Q. Do you recollect what he said at all ? — A. Yes; he said it had been attended to. 

Q. Have yon given us all the orders and instructions that yon took from General 
Sheridan to General Warren at any time during the engagement ? — A. All I can 
recollect. 

Q. Have you given us the only times that you saw General Warren, as far as you 
recall? — A. Yes. 

Q. Have you given us all of General Sheridan's personal movements, as far as you 
recall them, during the engagement ? — A. I placed him as well as I could ; I have not 
attempted to give you his movements. 

Q. t)id you notice at different times during the afternoon exhibitions of decided 
anger and impatience on the part of General Sheridan during the engagement ? — A. 
On the two occasions when he sent me to General Warren, I did. 

Q. Was he angry? — A. Yes ; on the second occasion, I think, he was very angry. 

Q. Did he show in his words or manner anger at General Warren particularly ? — A. 
No, sir ; I don't think he did. 

Q. Give us your recollection. — A. I speak of what I thought at the time. I thought 
his indignation was in regard to the movement of these troops. How far he referred 
it to General Warren, or how far he referred it to the troops, I have no means of 
forming an opinion. 

Q. Can you give us his words? As accurately as you can; of course you cannot 
give them with utter accuracy. — A. I cannot recollect anything in regard to the words, 
except that they were of an urgency which belonged to the whole message ; I cannot 
recall any phrase. 

Q. Give the whole of it as accurately as you can. — A. General Sheridan told me in 
a very emphatic manner to find General Warren at once and tell him that those two 
divisions were entirely disjointed from the main line, and were ruining the whole 
thing. I gave General Warren that message in words of my own, and pointed out to 
him how wide a gap there was where these troops were moving, on his left as he faced 
the White Oak road, which I thought was the intention of the message (Record, p. 
150). 

******* 

Q. Wasn't the enemy on Ayres's left instead of on his front ; and didn't he have to 
flank his men to the left and change direction entirely in order to bring the enemy 
in his front? — A. No, sir; I don't think there was the slightest confusion resulting 
from that. 

Q. Wasn't that change of front necessary ? — A. I don't think there was any change 
of front ; I am not conscious of any having been made. 

Q. Y^ou do say here, and I suppose you recollect it, that General Ayres " employed a 
tactical movement which put him in advance of Crawford and opened the gap between 
them." Do you recollect that? — A. Yes; I recollect that; it is all qualified. The 
character of the question would lead to the inference, and I think also my replies as 
given now, that there was a sudden movement made by Ayres's Division which was not 
in the nature of things as expected ; I don't recollect anything of that sort. Ayres's 
Division kept to the left. The only unexpected or unlooked for thing that occurred 
so far as I know was that the other divisions did not, and that the opening gap be- 
tween Ayres and Crawford at the time it was originally opened, occurred, so far as I 
understand it and understood it then, not from any peculiar movement on Ayres's 
part, but from the fact that the other troops didn't wheel and Ayres's troops went into 
action as nearly as possible on the front, as they had been ordered. The whole of 
Ayres's Division, or rather the right part of Ayres's Division, had somewhat yielded to 
the right when the fire broke them ; and as they were rallied and brought into condi- 
tion again they naturally moved a little more to the left than they otherwise would 
have done ; but if Ayres'g Division had kept straight on in the line where it was formed, 
it woukl have struck that angle fair, I think. 

(Record, page 153.) 

Q. I understand you to say that when Ayres's Division became unsteady, you moved 
in with the Lieutenant-General and his staff, and, with the assistance of General 
Ayres and his officers, restored confidence, and moved forward with him ? — A. Yes. 



70 

Q. At the time what sort of firing was there from the enemy upon that division? — 
A. There Avas a pretty heavy fire, mostly on the right of the division. 

Q. When you were sent up for the second time and met General Warren near the 
11 Chimneys," do you recollect his saying anything to you in response ? — A. Nothing, 
except what I have already recited. 

Q. Was there any fire from the enemy in that direction at that time, that you re- 
call ? — A. Yes ; there was a slight fire across that field over which I rode to get to 
what I call the "Chimneys." There was no enemy in sight. 

• Q. Where was Crawford's Division at that time ? — A. I could not distinguish be- 
tween the divisions. Both those divisions — Griffin's and Crawford's — were moving in 
one body past the "Chimneys" towards Hatcher's Run, to the east of the position 
where I found General Warren. 

• Q. How much of those divisions had passed at that time? — A. The bulk of them. 

Q. Where was the left of that column so far as General Warren's situation is con- 
cerned ? — A. Just within the woods. 

Q. And the remainder were beyond in the woods ? — A. Yes ; I should say they were 
going north. 

Q. How long did you remain there with General Warren ? — A. Only a moment. 

Q. Did you notice that those divisions had been halted before you returned? — A, 
No, sir; they were moving. 

General Sheridan, in his evidence, sums up these matters as follows 
in his direct examination by the applicant's counsel (Becord, p. 99) : 

Q. Am I correct in understanding your testimony and your statement now, to the 
effect that the point of complaint that you make against General Warren as to the 
battle — the actual battle of Five Forks — was that Crawford and Griffin got too far 
out to the right, and that he didn't do anything towards getting them back or con- 
trolling their movements?— A. The general confusion, mismanagement, and risk that 
resulted from the bad management of his corps. 

Q. That is rather vague. I would like you to specify what the bad management 
was. — A. In the first place, troops were confused by the fire of the enemy's pickets. 
There was great confusion and timidity on the part of the men ; in fact, I began to 
have some doubts as to whether I was going to be successful or not. Our skirmish 
line lay down, and the fire of the enemy was very slight ; the line became confused 
and commenced firing straight in the air. The poor fellows had been fighting behind 
breastworks for a long period, and when they got out to attack breastworks they 
seemed to have been a little timid. I began to get alarmed.- I had accompanied 
General Warren up to that period ; then I rode out in front of the line of battle and 
helped to remedy the confusion. While I was out in front of the line of battle I saw 
General Warren in the rear a little distance, about where I left him, I think. I suc- 
ceeded, with General Ayres and other officers, in remedying this confusion, and it seemed 
to me that if I had been General Warren I would not have allowed my superior officer 
to ride out in front of the line of battle of my men in order to remedy serious confusion 
without making some exertion myself of the same kind. 

Q. Do you recollect what my question was — to specify all the points that you made 
against General Warren as to his conduct during the whole battle. Have you done 
it ?— A. No, sir. 

Q. Go on then, please, and finish. — A. My orders were very particular to have 
Crawford's Division keep close to the left of Ayres's, so that I could take the enemy's 
line along the White Oak road, after the reverse portion was captured, in rear. The 
battle was over, I considered, as soon as we had captured that angle. The first thing 
I knew I saw Crawford obliquing, instead of making the left wheel as I had expected; 
and it was not a full left wheel — only a partial one ; he was obliquing to the right ; 
he was going away from the objective point and was going in the direction of Hatch- 
er's Run, and leaving Ayres's flank exposed entirely— his right flank. I think I sent 
for him or sent for Warren. I know I sent for Crawford and tried to get him back ; 
and I sent, I think, to General Warren. I could not find him ; I don't know, but to 
the best of my recollection I sent several times to try and repair this trouble. Griffin, 
I knew, had to follow Crawford, and it seemed to me they were both marching 
towards Hatcher's Run, not towards the objective point. I then sent for them, as I 
say, and they did not come. About that time there was not much left to fight that 
battle, except Ayres's Division, and they substantially did fight the battle there, ac- 
cording to the best of my judgment. 

Q. Is that all ? — A. That is, substantially. 

Q. Now, then, as far as I understand your answer to my question, it principally 
singles out General Crawford or General Griffin. Where do you claim that Warren's 
fault was in relation to that point? — A. General Warren was in command of the 
corps, with that responsibility on him. He was responsible to me. It was not my 
business. 

Q. And what do you claim was W'arren's sin of omission or commission in relation 



71 

to that going off to the right? — A. If there was anybody in the wide world that 
should have made an effort to prevent that, General Warren was the man. 

Q. Undoubtedly. Now do yon know whether he made any effort or not ? — A. I 
don't know. I did not realize any. 

Q. Did yon ask him what he had done ? — A. I conld not find him. 

Q. Did yon ask him afterwards when you did find him ?— A. No, sir. 

Q. Did you ask any one at the time you relieved him ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Did you try to get any information of any one at the time you relieved him ? — 
A. No, sir; I had all I wanted. 

Q. Have you learned, as a matter of fact, that Warren himself went out there after 
sending his aids and brought Crawford back ? — A. Out where ? 

Q. Out to the right, where he, CraAvford, was ! — A. What part of the right? 

Q. Where Crawford was between the line of the enemy's works and Hatcher's Run. 
(The original question repeated.) — A. He went there, but so far as the battle of Five 
Forks was concerned, the battle was over. 

Q. No ; don't go beyond the question. — A. You ask me, and I tell you candidly my 
belief, the battle was over. 

Q. Then you did not see anything of what he had done at the time, or what he was 
doing? — A. No, sir. 

Q. You say you did not see him after you parted with him in the rear of Ayres's 
division, just after the advance began ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. So, of course, you had no personal knowledge of what he did ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. You have already said that you made no inquiry of him, or anyone else, as to 
what he had done ? — A. No, sir ; I may have made inquiry at that time. 

Q. You don't recollect that you did so? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Then you don't hold him or claim him responsible for Crawford and Griffin going 
away, and for his not getting them back ; is that it ? — A. I hold him responsible for 
their going away. I hold him responsible for the whole condition of things. 

Q. You think that is a fair judgment on your part of the conduct of a subordinate; 
a fair manner of holding your subordinate to his official responsibility ; is that it ? — 
A. I will say, yes, as a direct answer ; and now I will make my explanation. In the 
first place, I have stated in my narrative that I was governed by the conditions that 
I was xdaced in at the battle of Five Forks. There was no time to swap jackknives. 
I had to meet this new emergency at once. The new emergency was that I had my 
back to the enemy as soon as I had gained the battle of Five Forks, and that was not 
a very agreeable situation to be in ; so I had to make a new disposition by wliich I 
could get my face to him. And I got to thinking about the occurrences of the battle 
of Five Forks, and whether in this new emergency I could hold on to General Warren, 
who had disappointed me. And if that condition had not existed I probably would 
not have relieved General Warren. I hate to punish a man as much as anybody in 
the world. I did not relieve him to punish him. I relieved him in order to meet the 
new emergency. 

Q. That is the explanation of your answer? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. After Ayres's Division got engaged at the angle of the Confederate works there, 
what were your own personal movements ? — A. I accompanied Ayres's Division. 

Q. You ordered them to halt, did you not, at some stage of the engagement there ? — 
A. Not until after the works were taken. 

Q. At some stage of the engagement you ordered them to halt, did you not? — A. I 
am not clear, but to the best of my recollection, after Ave had captured the works 
thrown to the rear, I directed a halt for a few moments because the cavalry were com- 
ing 0A r er the works on the White Oak road, and I was afraid Ayres's men would kill 
the cavalry — they had come across the works on the W T hite Oak road — and I think I 
halted Ayres for a very short time in order to prevent his firing upon the cavalry, 
because they had gotten across the works and were on his front. I think I halted 
them ; that is my belief. 

Q. Can you give us any idea when you halted Ayres's Division — how long after 
the engagement began ? — A. It was substantially after the engagement was over, in 
my belief. 

Q. Was it not just after his troops had captured the return? — A. Yes, it was after 
that ; I cannot say whether it was just after or not, but a very short time afterwards. 

Q. And that is what you mean by the "time the engagement was over" ? — A. The 
battle was won, in my opinion, when the angle Avas taken. 

Q. What you mean is that the key to the position was won, as you looked at it ; 
isn't that what you mean ? — A. You may put it that way. 

Q. Don't you put it that way ? — A. That Avas the key of the position. 

Q. Isn't that all there was to it ; these earthworks, you have already stated, were 
OA"er a mile long ?— A. About a mile long. 

Q. They were well manned Avith Confederates ? — A. So far as I knoAv. 

Q. What has been the estimate that you put upon the number of Confederate forces 



72 

there ? — A. I think there were over 10,000 or 12,000 men, cavalry and infantry, includ- 
ing those in the breastworks. 

Q. There were 8,000 or 10,000 men left at the west of that " return" ?— A. Yes. 

Q. How was it after Ayres had captured that " return " ; do you call the battle won 
when there were 8,000 or 10,000 of the enemy in possession of the breastworks ?— A. 
If I have several thousand men right behind their backs, I consider myself pretty 
well off. 

Q. Would you call the battle over? — A. It was essentially over. 

Q. Wasn't there an hour or two lighting after that ? — A. Principally in catching up 

those who were trying to get away. 

* '* * * * * * 

(Record, page 104.) 

Q. About what hour, as nearly as you can tell, did you have possession of the wdiole 
line of their works ? — A. It was before dark. We were in pursuit of the enemy after 
dark. 

Q. Do you recollect seeing the flash of guns at all ; did it get dark enough for that? 
— A. No, sir — yes, I think 1 was in pursuit. 

Q. You mean near by ? — A. I mean not in the works, but in the pursuit of the enemy. 

Q. You did not go beyond the line of works yourself, did you I — A. Yes. 

Q. How far ? — A. I went beyond the Ford road. 

Q. Well, the works go beyond the Ford road? — A. I went out on that road (the 
road being from the extreme right of the enemy's intrenchments over to the crossing 
of Hatcher's Run on the Ford road, northeast, as put down on Gillespie's map). I 

recollect that, because I met cavalry there. 

***** * * 

(Record, page 105.) 

Q. As I understand you, the only points as to the afternoon that you claim General 
Warren to have been deficient in were these : In the first place, that he failed to get 
his troops up to Gravelly Run Church — there prior to the engagement — with sufficient 
speed ? — A. Yes. 

Q. In the second place, that Ayres's Division, as I understand you, broke just after? 
— A. Confusion occurred. 

Q. Put it that way; that confusion occurred just about the time of the assault on 
the Confederate left, and that Warren did not exert himself sufficiently to encourage 
the troops ? — A. No, sir. There was confusion twice, to the best of my recollection. 
The first was created by the skirmish line, and then afterwards confusion created by 
the Confederate line when we got nearer to it. 

Q. Put the point that you make against General Warren. You have seen a great 
many occasions on the battle-field when men broke or when there was confusion ? — 
A. Yes. 

Q. But you do not always hold the commanding officer responsible for anything of 
that sort ? — A. It depends upon circumstances. 

Q. You do not always ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Pat the particular point on record here for which you hold General Warren re- 
sponsible at this particular time ; I suppose your own troops at times have broken ? — 
A. I say I was not holding him responsible as a punishment ; I didn't relieve him for 
a punishment ; I relieved him from other reasons, but those things made an impres- 
sion upon my mind. 

Q. What do you hold was his fault there with relation to that matter of the confu- 
sion of our forces ? — A. I think he didn't exert himself sufficiently at that time to re - 
store confidence ; he allowed my line of battle to be broken ; he destroyed the tactics 
that I intended to make in the battle, because I intended that column which was put 
behind Crawford to be a close- turning column on the left of the enemy so I could crush 
them in their works, and I wanted to hold them close in and not let them get out of 
their works ; and he had to be diverted to another purpose. 

Q. Now, will you specify, as I asked you to do, the point as to that confusion in 
which you held him to be remiss ? — A. I think that he ought to have made an effort 
to restore confidence when the confusion occurred ; and I judge that effort by what I 
did myself. 

Q. then that is all?— A. Yes. 

******* 

(Record, page 106.) 

Q. You say that General Warren destroyed the tactics on which you intended the 
battle to be fought? — A. Well, I beg your pardon. I don't think I said it that way 
exactly ; if I did I recall it. I meant to say that he allowed them to be destroyed. 



73 

By the r resident of the Court: 
Q. I presume you refer to this wandering off of Crawford's mil Griffin's divisions 
when you say your plan was interfered with f — A. Yes, sir. 

(Record, page 114.), 

Q. What is your estimate of the time uecessary for them to march up there and de- 
ploy ? — A. I think iu about an hour. It would probably have taken a little morethau 
an hour to march up and deploy. 

Q. Taking- the situation of things ? — A. Yes ; taking the condition of things. 

Q. You think, then, an hour is a liberal allowance ? — A. "Well, a little more than an 
hour, I said. 

(Record, Page 115.) 

Q. Ordiuarily who would have to make those dispositions and attend to those mat- 
ters, simply bringing up a division and putting it in line of battle, the division com- 

mander ? — A. The corps commander is responsible for those things. 

* * * * * * • 

(Record, page 118.) 

Q. Ho.v much of the corps was within eyesight at the time you speak of, when 
Ayres's men became confused? — A. I think I only saw the left of Crawford's Division, 

and it was obliquing to the right. 

# * # # # # a 

Q. Did they do very much towards winning the battle? — A. Who ? 

Q. The Fifth Corps. — A. Ayres's Division, as I testified heretofore, and the cavalry, 
I think, won the battle ; the others didn't get in in time ; they got in to get a little 
chance, but virtually, I think, the battle was over. 

Q. They didn't do anything until the battle was over? — A. No, sir ; I didn't say so ; 
I say, substantially, when I got behind the enemy's works the battle was ended. We 
had righting afterwards,* you can have a good deal of fighting after a battle is sub- 
stantially won. 

Q. Now, will you come to the break between Crawford's Division and Ayres's? — A. 
Yes. 

Q. How did that happen, as you understood it at the time? — A. I suppose I will 
have to commence again on this very thing that I have been talking of. You want me 
to answer the question, do you? 

Q. Yes, exactly.— A. I don't know whether I am right or not, but I thought the 
firing from the enemy made them act that way a little. 

(Record, page 125 ) 

* * * It will be seen that if there were plenty of the enemy up in the direction 
that General Warren went that it would have been a bad thing to attack them any 
way ; it would have been an error, from the direction that he advanced. Had he kept 
on the right of Ayres, and they had both pushed on, and they had reached the Ford 
road, he would have been in the rear of those who were facing him and fighting him, 
as you say, all day. And that is about the best way of taking works that I know 
of— taking them in the rear. Now, then, suppose Ayres had been defeated, Crawford 
would have been captured. The battle would have been lost. Can you see that ? 
There is a good deal of strategy about that. 

Q. What I asked you about was the report, and not the battle. — A. Now, there is 
the battle of Five Forks ; I have explained it to you now, and it is pretty hard to get 
over. I don't know whether there was anything there or not, but he had no business 
to attack. In any case, if he had obeyed his orders or had not broken my line of 
battle, and it had gone on as it should have gone on, we would have reached the Ford 
road long before the enemy got out of the main works, and if there was no holding the 
front we would have had them in the rear ; but if we had been defeated, then salt 
could not have saved the men who went around on the Ford road or in that direction. 

Q. The points I asked you about were these, whether you knew of Warren's bringing 
the men back. — A. I presume I did at the time. I don't recollect now. You see how 
hard it is to understand a man ; what I say and what I did is founded upon certain 
things which you never saw before. 

Q. You say that Warren broke your line of battle? — A. Well, allowed it to be 
broken ; that is, he was responsible for it. 

Q. You say so? — A. He was in command of the Fifth Corps. 

Q. Did he order Griffin's and Crawford's Divisions, as far as you know, to go off to 



74 

the right where they did ? — A. Well, that is none of my business. The line of battle 
was broken, and the battle was put in jeopardy. 

Q. (Question repeated.) — A. No; he did not, so far as I know. 

# * * * # # * 

(Record, page 133.) 

Q. What would have been the effect in consequence of the movement of Crawford's 
Division off round by the " Chimneys" and Young's house, if Ayres had been defeated 
in that movement ? — A. The battle would have been lost, and the Division would have 
gone to Libby. 

Q. Now, as to General Ayres's Division being— some of it, at least — a little timid at 
first; they afterwards moved up well? — A. Yes. 

Q. Gallantly? — A. I did not want any better troops. They were good troops, 
anyway. 

Q. And that corps in tli3 concluding day's battles, after that, was under your com- 
mand, was it not ? — A. Yes ; there was no hesitation in reference to that corps after- 
wards; not only that, but I marched them 35 miles in one day afterwards, to get out 
to Jettersville and get ahead of Lee's army. 

Q. They fully came up to your expectations? — A. Yes. 

Q. In every respect ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Could you characterize the conduct of General Ayres's Division after they finally 
moved in against that angle of the works as very gallant and courageous ? — A. Yes. 

Q. And the subsequent conduct of the corps on subsequent days up to the surrender 
at Appomattox? — A. Could not be better. 

General Ayres says (Becord, p. 225) that lie took 2,100 prisoners and 
nine battle flags at the " return 7 ' within fifteen minutes after changing 
front, which itself only took live minutes. 

This was the glorious result of the gallant assault of the Second Divis- 
ion, then but a trifle over 2,600 strong, when inspired with the energy 
and enthusiasm of General Sheridan and led by him over the works. 

The attempt made here by the learned counsel for the applicant to 
make General Sheridan personally responsible for the applicant's failures 
at Five Forks because he offered no objection to the diagram when 
shown him, cannot be commented upon too severely. 

The "instructions" in it are those conveyed by General Sheridan, but 
the moment the applicant slides away from the instructions to the line 
which he designated as the " enemy, " he shows what a dazed condition of 
mind he must have been in, if he actually thought at the time that 
the line thus indicated as the " enemy" really meant a line of substantial 
works and not simply men. 

Taking the acute present assumption of the learned counsel for the 
applicant that the Second (Ayres's) Division was to strike the works on 
the front, and the Third (Crawford's) on the "return," Griffin being in 
reserve with his (First) Division behind Crawford, as being the correct 
assumption entertained at the time of the battle by the applicant, one 
thing is perfectly plain, and that is that the instructions as given by 
General Sheridan were rendered entirely nugatory by the position of 
the enemy's works as now assumed. 

In other words, the line of the Fifth Corps would almost entirely have 
struck the face of the works and that too on the south side of the White 
Oak road, so that the instructions could not in any possible way have 
been complied with, viz, that the line should "move forward as formed 
till it reaches the White Oak road, when it will string round to the left, 
perpendicular to the White Oak road." 

The evidence, therefore, of Bvt. Brig. Gen. Jas. W. Forsyth, IT. S. A. 
(chief of staff), already quoted, that the applicant submitted his diagram 
merely to show the formation of the corps, is the only reasonable one. 

The "enemy" was found exactly where the applicant indicated, but it 
was merely a prolongation of his line eastward from the return, by 
means of skirmishers. 



75 

The Court will please notice that the White Oak road, from the junc- 
tion of the Gravelly Bun Church road, in the direction of the "return,' 7 
runs, for a short distance, northwesterly, so that the right of the Fifth 
Corps, as formed, in its oblique northwesterly march, would have reached 
the White Oak road much sooner in relation to the left of the infantry 
line than if that road at that point had run due west. 

Therefore, the movement to be accomplished, as directed by General 
Sheridan, viz, a change of direction to the left in the nature of a left- 
half wheel by each brigade, beginning with the right brigade of the 
right division the moment it reached the White Oak road, would have 
been practically accomplished as to all the rest of the corps by the time the 
left brigade of Ayres J s Division had reached the White Oak road. 

General McKenzie then, with his 1,800 cavalry, whom General War- 
ren had seen on the White Oak road as he, himself, moved forward 
with his corps (pp. 749, 790), would have been able, without the 
slightest difficulty, to have dispersed or captured the much inferior 
rebel cavalry force of Munford's, which, dismounted as skirmishers, 
was fitfully trying to annoy the infantry advance. 

The divergence from the "Return" of the First and Third Divisions, Fifth 

Corps. 

The deilection of Crawford's Division (Third), which was necessarily 
followed by that of Griffin's (First), is so intimately associated with the 
question as to what the orders were relative to the assault of the " return " 
of the enemy's works that one necessarily runs into the other. 

The applicant has endeavored to show here how particular he was to 
explain to all his general officers the movement to be executed. 

In fact he involved himself in a mass of details from which, with a 
seeming constitutional peculiarity of mind which prevented generaliza- 
tion, he could not extricate himself, and it is therefore to be doubted if, 
even to-day, with so simple a movement for his corps to perform as that 
ordered by General Sheridan, he comprehends the irresolute and inef- 
ficient situation in which he put himself, when the most prompt, vigor- 
ous, and comprehensive co-operative action was required. 

His efforts to go into unnecessary details of explanation only tended 
to confuse instead of enlighten, and as a consequence, the simple move- 
ment which General Sheridan ordered, filtered through the applicant's 
diffuse explanations to his own division and brigade commanders, finds 
here, before this court, contradictory interpretations. 

Thus, Bvt. Brig. Gen. Bichard Coulter,commanding Third Brigade of 
Crawford's Division, says the corps was formed obliquely to the White 
Oak road and directed to move to that road : 

"When we should make a change of front by turning perpendicularly to the road j 
then we were to move west, keeping as nearly as we could to the line of the White Oak 
road, the intention being that Crawford's division should occupy the north of the 
White Oak road and Ayres the south, and move to the west after we had changed our 
direction. 

The direction was tQ make a half wheel. I suppose it was more a change of front. 

It was by no means a perfect wheel (Eecord, p. 349)." 

Now General Coulter was one of the brigade commanders to whom 
the applicant undertook to describe the details of the movement, and 
it is very plain that he did not expect to find the " return " to the ene- 
my's works at the junction of the White Oak and Gravelly Run Church 
roads, or anywhere else than where it actually was. 

The oblique formation, as ordered by General Sheridan, was such that 
the moment the right or marching ilank of Crawford's Division had 



76 

struck the White Oak road, it should have begun to swing around to 
the left in the nature of a left half wheel, and have nearly completed 
the change of direction before the right of Ayres's Division, on Craw- 
ford's left, had reached the road. 

But as the marching flank of the line did not wheel but kept straight 
to the front, and even deflected away to the right, breaking connection, 
Ayres's Division was left to bear the whole brunt of the fire from the 
angle and face of the " return," and to assault alone. 

Bvt. Maj. Eichard Esmond, assistant adjutant- general of Coulter's 
brigade, saw the diagram, and says (Record, p. 360) : 

" I understood that our guide was left." 

Col. Ellis Speer, Twentieth Maine Volunteer Infantry (Bartlett's 
brigade of Crawford's division), says the orders were — 

"to keep to the left and to wheel to the left, and, of course, to keep the connection 
to the left" (Record, p. 402). 

First Lieutenant E. G. Sherley, Ninety-first New York Volunteer In- 
fantry, aide-de-camp to Kellogg (First), brigade of Crawford's Division, 

says (p. 417): 

"I understood as soon as we got to the White Oak road that we were to wheel to 
the left, with the division on the left as the pivot. * * * 

We immediately got into the woods when we crossed the field [i. e., the field on the 
further or northerly side of the White Oak road]. 

I do not know from what cause, but we lost our connection with the other division 
(Ayres's)." 

Capt. Holman S. Melcher, Twentieth Maine Volunteer Infantry, on 
Warren's staff, called by the applicant, says (Record, p. 458): 

"I had seen General Crawford disappear with General Griffin iu the woods, with 
Griffin on the right [pointing east]. 

•* * * As Ayres became engaged on our left, General Warren rode with his staff 
in that direction and was overlooking that movement when he turned to me and directed 
me to go to General Crawford with orders. * * * 

My orders were simply to tell General Crawford to push forward." 

This witness says he " found him well over to the right of our lines. 

Brig. Gen. Saml. W. Crawford, U. S. A. (Retired), admits receiving 
such an order (Record, p. 593), and the applicant admits having sent it, 
but says it was a later order (Record, p. 1223). This piece of evidence 
is peculiarly important from the position General Warren then was in. 

He was overlooking General Ayres's movement, and saw the confu- 
sion and imminent possibility of a disastrous repulse, which the extreme 
lateness of the day would have given no time to rectify. 

He suffered his army commander to put himself in extreme peril of 
life to rally the line, restore order out of confusion, and lead Ayres's 
Division to an assault which had become one of critical urgency and 
problematical certainty in consequence of the division having to make it 
unsupported, while at the same time Crawford's Division, followed by 
Griffin's, was marching to the north of the White Oak road and away 
from the point of contact, even diverging somewhat to the right. 

Nevertheless, the applicant here, evidently bewildered, sends Crawford 
an order to push forward, which, if promptly complied with, will only 
make the divergence still more fatal and disastrous in case Ayres fails 
to carry the "return." 

At the same time the applicant, although near Ayres, does nothing 
to assist General Sheridan in rallying the line. 

It was only in the providence of God that General Sheridan, while 



77 

riding with bis headquarters flag between the enemy's tire and that of 
our own men, was not riddled with bullets. 

Capt. G. Mason Kinne, assistant adjutant- general to Devin's Cavalry 
Division (whose right extended even beyond the " return" of the enemy's 
works in the direction of the Fifth Corps), saw the right and left of 
Ayres's Division driven back, and personally went to find Warren, and 
could not (Record, p. 974). 

Bvt. Col. A. J. McGonnigle, U. S. A., saw this confusion and says that 
General Sheridan "rushed to the front of the line" (Record, p. 987). 

Maj. George L. Gillespie, United States Corps of Engineers, saw this 
confusion (Record, p. 935). 

Ayres' division having wheeled to the left and penetrated the woods 
towards the " return," the witness says : 

"■ It seemed to me but a moment when they came back again. At that time General 
Sheridan and his staff were almost directly iu the road, a little to the right. 

General Sheridan then turned to his color-bearer, seized his battle-flag, and rushed 
close up to the edge of the woods as the men came out. They formed a compact circle 
around him, commenced to cheer. Sheridan expressed himself to the effect that that 
was not what they were there to do — to draw around him. * * * In a very short 
time the line was thrown out again and the troops moved to the front. 

They (Ayres' division) had but a moment passed into the woods when they received 
a voile v hre from the "return." This infantry fire was accompanied by three or four 
shots of artillery; grape and canister was fired a little to our left, and we crowded 
over a little to the right. It was not a very agreeable companion to have." 

As to re-forming the line, he says (Record, p. 936) : 

I do not think we took ten minutes. 

Q. During these movements did you notice where Crawford's and Griffin's Divisions 
were or where General Warren was f — A. Yes; 1 recollect seeing General Warren. 
Just after this line was re-formed I turned my horse to the right to look across the 
field to see what h; d become of the other divisions, to see if they had suffered a like 
experience with ourselves, and I was particularly struck with the wide interval between 
Ayres's Division and the division on the extreme right — Crawford's, * * * and I 
saw, as I presumed, General W T arren — a general officer, with a large staff, behind 
Crawford's Division, going into the woods away off to the right * * * [p. 947]. 
I saw him in an open field immediately to my right. * * * It was close enough 
to recognize w r ho they were. * * * I could see him plainly. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Geo. A. Forsyth, U. S. A., says, as to Crawford's 
Division (Record, p. 203) : 

They seemed to be drifting out of the fight. * * * They could see the fighti ig 
of the other division. * * * 
The skirmishers (of Crawford) were just entering the woods and this copse. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. H. C. Bankhead, II. S. A., Acting Inspector- General 
to the Fifth Corps, says (Record, p. 339) that just after he had crossed 
the White Oak road, and in the edge of the woods north of it, Warren 
told him "to see that Crawford's division kept close up to Ayres' divis- 
ion." 

He says they were then moving in a northerly direction. 

He went twice to Crawford's Division and saw him personally the 
second time, and recollects Bvt. Brig. Gen. George A. Forsyth's efforts 
(under Sheridan's orders) to get them back into supporting distance. 

General Bankhead says he staid with Crawford's Division "until we 
got into the woods away to the right" (Record, p. 340). 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. J. V. Mead, captain Eighty-Eighth Pennsylvania 
Volunteers, aide-de-camp to General Crawford (Record, p. 390), heard 
the instructions which General Warren gave to the brigade command- 
ers of Crawford's Division, and heard him tell General Coulter, of 
Crawford's Division — 

" To keep on until he struck that road [White Oak road], then change to the left ; 
let every man keep the sun on his left shoulder and go westward.'"' 



78 

a We were all given those instructions. Every one so understood it," 
says Colonel Mead. 

Also that when Baxter's Brigade, of Crawford's Division, crossed the 
White Oak road, it kept right on due north from the Gravelly Kun 
Church across the open north of the White Oak road, and kept on up 
into the wood some distance. 

When he discovered it later it was beyond the "Chimneys," in the 
woods to the northeast (Eecord, p. 392) of the Sydnor field (Becord, 
p. 397). 

In that field, and just to the north of the " Chimneys", half-way be- 
tween them and the woods on the east, he found General Warren, who — 

11 Seemed to be excessively annoyed, as I thought, that the troops of Baxter were 
getting too far to the right, and that they must keep more to the left and change 
direction" (Record, p. 39.2). 

The witness says he "did not see anything of Kellogg's Brigade [of 
Crawford's Division] until late at night (Record, p. 397). 

From this it is apparent that there was quite a disintegration of that 
division at the most critical time. 

To this the learned counsel for the applicant answers that Kellogg 
was taken away by Lieut. Col. George A. Forsyth, of General Sheri- 
dan's staff, and that thus, the pivot on which the other two brigadiers 
were to wheel being removed, the connection was necessarily lost. 

The reply to such a suggestion is found in Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel 
Mead's evidence just quoted, viz, that each brigade was, the moment it 
reached the White Oak road, to change direction to the left in the 
nature of a left half- wheel — in other words, to swing around. 

Consequently Baxter's brigade, as admitted by General Crawford, 
should have first taken up the movement, as it first reached the White 
Oak road in the oblique march made towards it, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Forsyth, under Sheridan's orders, merely rectified, as far as possible, 
the nearly fatal error of execution. 

If anything further was needed to negative the present theory set up 
by the applicant that he expected to discover the enemy's works right 
in front, it is to be found in the evidence of his own chief of staff, Bvt. 
Brig. Gen. F. T. Locke, United States volunteers, who, after describing 
the moving out from Gravelly Bun Church and beginning of the action, 
says (Record, pp. 364, 370) : 

"Then we [meaning General Warren and himself] rode off together in a northerly 
direction, crossing the White Oak road. 

And just above that we received a very heavy fire, coming, I should think, from the 
direction of that salient of the enemy's works from our left, as we rode northerly. 

General Warren was very anxious, particularly about Crawford's division, that he 
should take that position to which he was assigned ; that is, closing in on Ayres. 

He had sent most of his staff in that direction, and finally he told me to go and see 
that Crawford went where he told him to go." 

On cross-examination this witness of the applicant said (Record, p. 370) 
that the latter was afraid Crawford had not gone where he told him to; 
that he had got too far to the right. He did not keep closed on Ayres. 

The witness also says : 

"In my tour to him [Crawford] I found I was getting to the right." 

It is quite plain from this evidence that General Warren knew the 
position to which Crawford's Division had been assigned by General 
Sheridan, and that he did not take that position. 

Who, however, is to be held responsible by the Army Commander in 
such a contingency % 



79 

Certainly not the division commander, when his corps commander is 
present on the field within speaking' distance, and actually supervising 
the faulty corps' movement. 

General Warren had commanded the Fifth Corps for some time, and 
was directly responsible for its discipline and efficiency and manner in 
which it executed the orders of superior authority, Avhen those orders 
were conveyed through him and supervised by him. 

At this late day he may desire to escape the responsibility by unload- 
ing it upon General Crawford, but the latter may well plead that when 
he " pushed forward " north from the White Oak road, and thus made 
the divergence from Ayres and the enemy's works still more critical, he 
but obeyed the positive orders (already quoted) sent to him by his corps 
commander. 

It is not a pleasant thing at this late day to be obliged to criticise the 
unfortunate conduct of General Warren on the 31st of March and 1st 
of April, but he has brought it upon himself by this inquirj", and 
although it is painful to a sensitive mind, the criticism must be made in 
the interest of the truth of history. 

He has been trying for sixteen years to invent excuses for a movement 
executed under his own eye which was the exact reverse of General 
Sheridan's instructions, and which came near proving fatal to the lat- 
ter's plan of battle and ruinous in its results to the army. 

Suppose, for a moment, that Ayres had been badly repulsed at the 
u return "when he assaulted and the enemy had followed him out of 
their works, just as 3,500 did the day before in routing 8,000 of the Fifth 
Corps, what would have been the consequences ! 

Crawford's division would have been struck in the left flank when 
partially disintegrated and crowded up, and that portion of the corps 
would have been destroyed. 

Suppose also that the Confederate General E. E. Lee had sent re-en- 
forcements westerly only three miles from his main works down the 
unobstructed White Oak road to Pickett, and caught Crawford's divis- 
ion on the right flank when in the condition described or after it got 
further north ? 

The Fifth Corps would have been irretrievably destroyed. 

General Warren's previous remarks to General Sheridan showed his 
overwhelming apprehensions in this direction; nevertheless, for some 
reason or other, on that particular day he did not have or exert suffi- 
cient energy and military skill to prevent a false move, which, but for 
the almost superhuman exertions of his commanding general, would 
have resulted lamentably. 

There has been an effort here on the part of the applicant to show 
that there was severe firing upon Crawford's and Griffin's divisions as 
they advanced up to and across the White Oak road, so severe that it 
is almost a wonder that Crawford's division ever swung to the left at 
any time. 

To substantiate this theory, the Confederate Brig. Gen. Thomas T. 
Munford, who commanded Fitzhugh Lee's small division of cavalry, 
which was on the left of Pickett's line of works, has been called. 

He has put that portion of his cavalry force which he dismounted and 
used at about 1,200 men (Record, p. 449). 

The Confederate Brig. Gen. M. Ransom commanded inside the ene- 
my's works at the " return," where was an infantry force and McGreg- 
or's battery, and outside and near the eastern angle was posted the 
sharpshooters of that command. 



80 

Munford covered Ransom's left near the return with his right and 
extended it along (Record, p. 442). He says : 

Mine was a picket fire (Record, p. 449). * * * 

We had nothing hnt a sparse skirmish line ; I had no idea of doing more than to 
annoy them, to give time to our infantry (Record, p. 450). 

He also says that he extended his left, and as he did so the Fifth 
Corps " extended their right" (Record, p. 443). 

In wheeling, I could see them all the time endeavoring to turn my left. [Indicates 
towards the northeast.] 

He also says that before the Fifth Corps came out from below Grav- 
elly Run Church, a u small cavalry force came up this road [Gravelly 
Bun Church road] from the church," and that he, from the woods north 
of the White Oak road, could see our troops all through Bass' field 
(Record, p. 442). 

Now, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Banald S. Mackenzie, Colonel Fourth United 
States Cavalry, had in his division, there on the right of the Fifth Corps, 
between 1,200 and 1,800 men (Record, pp. 809, 810) which General Sheri, 
dan had intended to have used as a turning column to close in behind the 
enemy in their works, and to the north of the position of the Fifth Corps 
as it swung around to the west, and thus sweep down everything, and 
at the same time get possession of the fords across Hatcher's Run. 

General Warren knew this, but the faulty movements of Crawford's 
division moving to the north, and extending to the right and east so as 
to get beyond Munford's rebel cavalry left, absolutely forced General 
Mackenzie, with his fine cavalry command, entirely out of the battle, so 
that it was not only wholly useless for the purpose intended, but Avas 
crowded across Hatcher's Run some distance to the east of the Ford 
road. 

Who was responsible for this ? 

The learned counsel for General Warren would presumably say, 
according to the novel theories advanced here, that General Sheridan 
was responsible because he ordered the attack upon the enemy. 

Over 9,900 infantry of the Fifth Corps were deluded and led north and 
away from the enemy's works from half a mile to a mile, by 1,200 dis- 
mounted cavalry skirmishers, leaving about 2,600 in the division under 
Ayres to assault the infantry and artillery in their works at the 
u return." 

General Crawford says that before he received any order of like 
character from General Warren, General Sheridan sent him orders "to 
come to the left and to move forward as rapidly as possible" (Record, 
p. 583). 

We shall see that General Griffin, who commanded the first division 
Fifth Corps, which followed Crawford's (Third) Division, as soon as he 
heard the firing and appreciated Ayres's extremity, broke away before 
orders were received from Warren to that effect, and, with the true 
genius of a soldier, hastened down to the critical point and largely 
contributed to the success of the day. 

A little more of the history of this whole movement will possibly 
show even in deeper colors the inability of the then commander of the 
Fifth Corps on that day, in the open field, to handle and concentrate and 
efficiently control the movements of so large a body of men. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Geo. A. Forsytb, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A., called 
by the applicant, testifies as foilows (pp. 202, 203, &c.) : 

Q. Do you recollect at what point of the engagement you left him first f — A. Yes. 
Q. Where was that ? — A. After our troops, that is the Filth Corps, commenced far 



81 

move in. when tliey got out the skirmish line, and got out pretty well, a pretty sharp 
fire began to develop from the enemy. I think that was before they crossed the White 
Oak road. But when they got in and got across there, for a moment the troops were 
staggered. I did not see any effect on tbe corps hut as yon may have seen happen to 
the best ones. I jnst darted out with the skirmishers, and shouted to the men to come 
on. I had done that thing before. They hesitated a moment, when Captain Allen, 
an aide of General Sheridan, said to me, jnst about the time the tight was getting 
pretty sharp, and the men were kind of recovering themselves, he said, " General 
Sheridan wants you to get over," and he pointed, "to these divisions" . . . "and get 
them into the tight." I looked across, and I could see the other divisions deflecting 
to the right. There were two divisions there. As near as I hnow, I think Crawford's 
division was one of them. I was not intimately acquainted with the officers of the 
division, so I could not say. I turned and rode down over in the direction of those 
Divisions. 

Q. When Captain Allen spoke to yon, where were, you ; were you in tin* front of 
Ayres's Division or just at the rear, or where? — A. I was just on the line of Ayres's 
Division, right in the skirmishers. 

Q. How near the works Avere they then ? — A. I cannot tell, because it was a copse 
in the woods — thick undergrowth. 

Q. How near the edge of the copse were you? — A. Quite close to it. 

Q. Had the heavy firing from the works begun then ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. The troops were advancing then ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Did they become steady again then ? — A. I think for a moment ; they were 
steady then. 

Q. This confusion only lasted for a moment ? — A. So far as I saw. 

Q. You were where you could see the whole of Ayres's line ? — A. So far as I could ; 
but I was paying strict attention to what was directly in front of me. 

Q. You say this confusion was such as you have seen in the best of troops ? — A. Yes. 

Q. How long did it last? — A. I cannot tell. The only way I can express it is, just 
the moment I saw the troops stagger, and thought for a moment they might break, I 
rushed right out without waiting for orders, and cheered them a little. I thought the 
men wanted encouragement. 

Q. Then they recovered themselves ? — A. They seemed to. 

Q. Did you know General Winthrop by sight ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Do you recollect when his brigade came up on the left of Ayres's Division ? — A. 
I just recollect this much, that I was very much pleased with General Winthrop. I 
saw him ride in just as coolly as we are now. 

Q. Then you recollect his brigade moving in ? — A. I could just see them. 

Q. Then, do you recollect that Ayres's men moved to the left and flanked to the left ? 
— A. No, sir; I do not. 

Q. Did you notice a gap between Crawford's Division and Ayres's Division ; do you 
recall being struck with that at all ? — A. Yes ; because I went back to the rear. My 
only idea was to swing that brigade in where the fighting was. 

Q. The division, you mean? — A. Yes, the division. 

Q. Then you went over to Crawford's Division ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Had they changed direction at all then when you got over to them? — A. Not so 
far as I recollect ; they seemed to be drifting out of the fight. 

Q. You cannot recall whether they had changed direction ? — A. No, sir ; I cannot. 

Q. Can you give us any idea of how great an interval there was between the left of 
Crawford's division and the right of Ayres's Division at that time when you went 
there ? — A. Only in this way ; it was not great ; they could see the fighting of the 
other division. 

Q. Had any of Crawford's Division then got into the woods?— No, sir. 

Q. Perhaps you could not be positive that the right of Crawford's Division was not 
in the woods, could you ? — A. The skirmishers were just entering the woods and this 
copse. 

Q. Do you recollect that the front of Crawford's Division was considerably longer 
than that of Ayres's? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Then it is possible that his right may have been in the woods at that time of 
which you are now speaking ? — A. You mean Crawford's right ? 

Q. Yes. — A. That is possible. 

Q. Did they change direction, or begin to change direction, to the left then? — A. 
No, sir ; I think not. 

Q. Did you meet General Crawford himself about that time? — A. No, sir; when I 
got over to the line, naturally the first officer I met was, I think, a lieutenant-colonel, 
and I shouted. I said, "Swing in to the left here; the fighting is here on the left," 
and almost immediately I went forward and met a colonel, I think ; I am not positive 
about this, it may have been a brigadier- general, and he said to me, "What are you 
interfering with my brigade for?" I think these are the words: "Who are you?" I 
said, "I am Colonel Forsyth, 'of General Sheridan's staff, and I want you to swing this 

6 GAR 



82 

brigade in to the left." I am not positive now, looking back at it ; we did not exactly 
agree. He seemed to be very determined to have his own way. He seemed to have 
his orders; he seemed to understand himself. I was a little — well, not a little but a 
great deal — annoyed, but there was one thing certain, he did not know me and I did 
not know him. He said he must take his orders from people he knew. I then turned 
to find General Crawford, whom I knew slightly. I rode over some distance and could 
not see him ; then I came back again. Then I came across another officer who was 
commanding a brigade, and who, I think, was Colonel Kellogg. I struck his left and 
tried to swing them in. The colonel rode up and was very indignant and wanted to 
know what I was doing with his brigade. I told him what I wanted to do was to 
swing that brigade in to the left by order of General Sheridan. He said he had his 
orders from his own authority, General Crawford or General Warren, and said that he 
would take orders from either of them ; that he did not know me. I was very anxious 
to get the brigade in, and he was just as determined to follow out his instructions, 
and there was some conversation. I think the conversation was in italics for a mo- 
ment or two ; then they kept on the road. 1 saw at once he certainly knew what he 
was about as regards his orders, and I was simply very much distressed. I then rode 
again to see if I could not find General Crawford; I could not. As I came back I 
think I saw Colonel Kellogg again ; I will not be so certain about that. Then there 
seemed to be some sort of a change in the troops to the left of him. I kept moving 
pretty rapidly and they kept moving always to the right. I spoke to several mounted 
officers and they seemed to think there was something wrong about it, but that they 
were following instructions. Finally we came down to the road, which I know now 
was the Ford road, but which I did not know at that time. 

Q. Do you mean that you were with them aii the time, with Crawford's troops all the 
time, from where I understood you to place them, just in the dealing, until they got to 
the Ford road ? — A. I had gone twice over to communicate with General Crawford and 
could not find him ; I did not see him at all. When I got to this road it struck me at 
once it was a road that I knew and that I had seen on the map. As we got there there 
began to be a little bit of skirmishing on the left of this line. I rode rapidly over to 
a house there and met a couple of women there, and I said " What is the name of this 
road?" And one of the women was evidently going to answer me when No. 2 promptly 
said "Don't you tell him a word." I said to her, "Is this the road to the ford?" 
And she says, " Don't you tell him a word, not a word ;" I saw I could not get any in- 
formation, and about that time three or four shots came from the woods — the road 
opened out into the w T oods. I knew then at once that we had struck the enemy. I 
saw some of them coming out. I turned around and wheeled, and the officer com- 
manding the brigade — in fact, the men naturally wheeled and faced towards the enemy 
and came up the road. Then the skirmishers came up pretty rapidly. The skirmish- 
ing commenced then and just as we were going into the woods. Our men looked towards 
the woods where the enemy were and they came out (tLeeneniy) and appeared to look out 
upon the road and go back ; they seemed to be surprised at our being there. Just as 
we were about getting in there the fire was becoming reasonably sharp, and General 
Warren rode out of the woods, having evidently come down the road or a little to one 
side of it. I think I was the first officer he met, and he was excited and evidently 
angry. He said to me, "What are these troops doing here; what are you doing here?" 
or "What are you doing with these troops?" I cannot recollect the exact words. I 
jsaid, "General, I have nothing to do with the troops. I have been trying to get this 
left in." Then he turned around, and I think he recognized some officer he knew and 
made the remark, he says, " Where is Crawford ?" He had one or two officers and an 
orderly with him ; of that I am not positive ; I think they were staff officers. He said 
something to this officer. Meantime we were getting into this fight. I said to Gen- 
eral Warren, ' 'We have been moving to the right and moving out of the fight all the time." 
He says, " Where is General Crawford ?" and somebody pointed in the direction they 
supposed he was and said he must be out there. Then somebody else made the remark 
that they had been deflected too much to the right. Then he made the remark either 
" What I expected," or " What might have been expected," and rode off rapidly, evi- 
dently in a direction to find General Crawford, and was followed by the staff officer 
and orderly, as near as I can make it, going this way [indicating on map]. We drifted, 
in my opinion, right out here [pointing to the map]. As nearly as I can judge that must 
have been the house (Boisseau's house, on the Cotton map). You see there is an open- 
ing there. General Warren must have come right in here some place. It is possible 
he went on that back road in there. [Witness points to a spot on the Ford road right 
abreast of Boisseau's house, known as C. Young's house on the Gillespie map and as 
C. Young-Boisseau on the skeleton map.] 

(Record, page 205.) 

Q. You say you went over first to the left of Crawford's division and then you tried 
to find General Crawford ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Then you came back again to the left of his division ? — A. Yes. 



83 

Q. Then did you follow on with those men ? — A. Yes; we went right in. 

Q. Did you continue with them then ? — A. Yes. 

Q. You continued with theoi from a place somewhere near the left of the enemy's 
works ? — A. I cannot tell where we struck their works. I am not positive about that, 
only we got in there at once. We went in and had a pretty sharp fight in two or 
three minutes. They seemed to he surprised to find us there. We seemed to have 
struck their flank and they turned around and faced us. 

Q. General Crawford's men struck the enemy that way ? — A. What I mean to say is, 
the enemy, as near as I could judge, were evidently coming down that road, the Ford 
road, and that they saw us and had to go hack. They were going towards Hatcher's 
Run. 

Q. How much of a force ? — A. I could only see a part of it as it came out there, but 
it was ^substantial force. 

Q. Then the part of our forces that you were with there had a sharp fight for a little 
time upon the Ford road with the Confederates, Who were trying to get away to 
Hatcher's Run?— A. I should judge so. 

Q. Was there any firing upon our troops by their artillery about that time and place ? 
— A. I do not think so, but I do not want to be positive about that. There was some 
artillery in the road, and when we pressed up there I recollect one of the officers 
came up and said, "I want you to bear witness that my regiment captured these guns." 
I recollect some dismounted cavalry getting in on the other side, on the south side. They 
were coming down, and for a moment we had some pretty sharp fighting — four or five 
minutes. The troops for a moment seemed to hesitate. I know that Captain Martin, 
of General Sheridan's staff, met me there. That was after I had gone over to find 
General Crawford. We encouraged the men the best we could, and finally the men 
broke over. I could not tell whether it was an intrenchment or a ditch that they broke 
over, and followed the enemy out, and came out into a large deserted cotton-field. 
The enemy formed a line across that field and opened on us, and we had some pretty 
sharp firing. I know I lost the best horse I ever had there, blown all to pieces. 

Q. What field was that ? — A. They forced them back in here westerly, and just as we 
got in these woods we began to fight. There were two guns in the road captured. 
[Witness indicates on the map south of Young's field.] After we forced the enemy 
through here I saw the cavalry coming dashing down the White Oak road — mounted 
cavalry going west. 

• Q. Whose cavalry? — A. Our cavalry, the First Cavalry. Where my horse was killed 
there was a sort of rail fence, and after we got out into this field the enemy made a 
stand. Our people drove them over a field, over there somewhere. It does not appear 

on the Gillespie map. [Witness indicates southwest of Young's field.] 

* * *■ * •* * # 

(Record, page 206.) 

Q. Where did you strike the White Oak road, on that map, according to your judg- 
ment ? — A. My idea is that we struck them right in here — where we struck the enemy 
first. [Witness indicates near the south edge of Boisseau's field.] My idea is that 
after we fought them they halted in here and we pressed them out here. [Westerly.] 
They seemed to be trying to get to Hatcher's Run. About that time the cavaley came 
down here (I did not see the road), near the intrenchment. I only saw the cavalry 
come down the road. 

* # # *• * * * 

(Record, page 208.) 

Q. You recollect General Kellogg. Do you recollect his calling attention — when 
you were giving that order to him to take his troops in — do you recollect his calling 
your attention to the fact that his was the pivot for Crawford's division to change 
direction on? — A. No, str ; I recollect General Kellogg stating emphatically that his orders 
were to guide on the right; that is my impression now. He seemed to be perfectly clear 
about his orders. 

* * # # * # * 

(Record, page 209.) 

By Maj. Asa Bird Gardner, counsel for respondent : 
Q. When you had this conversation with General Kellogg and he " seemed to be 
clear as to his orders " that he was to guide on the right, what was the effect of the 
movement of his brigade so far as the right of Ayres's Division was concerned ? — A. 
He was going away from it. 



84 

(Record, page 209.) 
By the Court : 

Q. What was the expression that General Warren made to yon when you first met 
him on the left of Crawford's division ? — A. It is a difficult thing to say ; I was much 
surprised at seeing him ; he was evidently very much excited ; he evidently had been 
looking for those troops ; and I think for the moment that he perhaps thought I was 
the officer in command. He said : "What are you doing with those troops ; why are 
they not in here ?" or something of that sort. When he first spoke to me I didn't know 
who he was ; I was paying attention to something else, and he darted out of the woods 
and came at a rapid gait ; he had ridden rapidly. 

Q. What was the expression he used ? He said it was what he " expected," I under- 
stand you to say ? — A. He turned around to one of his staff officers — it w^ some 
officer — and he said something to him ; he evidently knew him, and he said either " it 
is what I might have expected" or " what might have been expected." 

Q. What impression did it leave upon your mind as to what he meant? — A. Well, 
it was very sudden to me ; I didn't know much about the Fifth Corps, and it left the 
impression that it was something he might have looked for — that he should not have 
depended upon somebody ; that was the impression upon my mind. 

Q. As he rode immediately off what impression was left upon your mind as to what 
he was going to do ? — A. That he was going to put these troops into the fight. 

Q. Right there ? — A. That is my impression. 

Q. As you have made a very interesting assertion as to the way these officers of the 
Fifth Corps met you, the court would like to know in addition as to whether, in 
giving these gentlemen orders, you used General Sheridan's authority ? — A. I said : " I 
will give you the order by authority of General Sheridan." I did not know the 
officers and they did not know me. 

(Record, page 210.) 

Q. What time was it at night when you started to go up the road, when you started 
to find Genera] Sheridan, when you ended with the Fifth Corps ?— A. After leaving 
the Fifth Corps I went a little ways with the cavalry, and they went straight towards 
Hatcher's Run. 

Q. Did you hear any firing on the right of the enemy's works, or on the extreme 
left of them (as we were facing the enemy), or on their extreme right westward ; did 
you hear any firing below the works, south of them, on our extreme left in that 
direction while you were with the cavalry at any time ?— A. No, sir. 

Q. Did you go south of the White Oak road when you were with the Fifth Corps 
on that day ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Did you see any infantry in here [referring to the map] of the Fifth Corps ? — A. 
No, sir. 

Q. What time did you leave the Fifth Corps ? — A. I cannot tell the time : I left 
them up here in the timber. [The witness indicates near "C. Young."] There is 
certainly a field in there somewhere ; it began to get dark about the time I went back, 
and the fighting was substantially over. 

By Mr. Stickney, counsel for applicant : 

Q. When you say you were coming up with the caA r alry, the cavalry would appar- 
ently have been moving up from the west end of the enemy's works somewhere in a 
northeasterly direction, when you speak of their moving up and your going up with 
them ? — A. The cavalry came down here and were pressing the enemy towards Hatcher's 
Run. 

Q. They were pressing in a northerly direction toward Hatcher's Run ? — A. Yes ; 
came, apparently, from White Oak road; I should judge from the west end of the 
enemy's works. I had nothing to do with the fighting there ; my fight was entirely 
with that portion of the Fifth Corps that struck them near Young's or Boissean's 
house. 

Q. You were at no time on the south side of the line of works ? — A. No, sir. 

By the Court : 
Q. You were at no time during the fight on the White Oak road ? — A. No, sir. 
Q. How far were you at the time you were nearest to it ? — A. About half a mile, I 
should say. [ Wituess looks at map. ] 

By Mr. Stickney, counsel for applicant : 
Q. From half a mile to three-quarters was the nearest which you got to the White 
Oak road? — A. Until I struck it coming back. 

By the Court : 
Q. Is it not possible that you have mistaken the White Oak road for this road [in- 
dicating], and that the opening was down there? — A. We had our fight Sri ght in 
here. [Witness indicates near the Boisseau or Young clearing.] 



85 

The evidence of this experienced and gallant officer, Bvt. Brig. Gen. 
George A. Forsyth, U. S. A., Major Ninth U. S. Cavalry, shows, among 
other things, that while Crawford's division was still in the Young-Bois- 
seau field, it had a little fight with a surprised detachment of the veteran 
enemy, which was trying to escape by the Ford road and Hatcher's Run. 

Also, that General Custer's cavalry, which had completely turned 
the enemy's right and rear, came charging up from that direction. 

In getting as far as the Ford road with Crawford's division, Bvt. Brig. 
Gen. George A. Forsyth says (Record, p. 207) : 

There was scarcely any skirmishing ; they were going right along. The troops did 
not experience any difficulty, except the natural difficulty of the country. 

Col. John A. Kellogg, who commanded the first brigade of Crawford's 
division, says he received identical orders from his division and corps 
commander (Record, p. 219). 

My instructions were to move to this road [White Oak road], and change my front 
to the left, and then that General Baxter would form on my right ; that he was to guide 
ON my bight, and I expected that I should have troops to guide on my left, but they 
had not then formed; that is, after the change of direction. 

My command was receiving a very light fire. I judged that there might he, per- 
haps, a skirmish line or a picket line of the enemy in there. 

He, meanwhile, had been moving north of the White Oak road, and 
now changed direction to the left, and while doing so General Warren 
came up and reiterated previous instructions. 

Baxter's brigade on his right had not yet changed direction. 

Colonel Kellogg's evidence continues as follows : 

I lost one man wounded ; that I recollect distinctly, hut I had my color line out so 
as to form a skeleton line. 

I ordered my men to lie down to protect them from this fire temporarily until Baxter had 
formed [i e., changed direction to the left]. 

At this time Bvt. Brig. Gen. Geo. A. Forsyth rode up from General 
Sheridan and ordered him u to move into action." 

It is this order which, the applicant would have you believe, destroyed 
the alignment and continuity of Crawford's division. 

No wonder that Kellogg's brigade drifted out of the fight away from 
the support of Ay res, while obeying General Warren's orders to guide 
on the right on Baxter. 

No wonder General Forsyth ordered them into action when he found 
them, as Kellogg says, lying doivn to be protected from a trifling skir- 
mish fire, while Ayres was assaulting the "return" with his small division. 

Now, where did even this order bring them out. 

Kellogg says the left of his brigade passed to the north of the Louis 
Sydnor house (p. 220). 

He heard firiug to his left, where Ayres was, and Bvt. Brig. Gen. G. 
A. Forsyth's order was "to move further to the left and go in imme- 
diately" (p. 227). 

This witness speaks of a fight on the Ford road just where Bvt. Brig. 
Gen. I. Tarbell who commanded the Ninety-first New York Volunteers 
in that brigade and General Forsyth put it (p. 220), and reiterated it, 
and then thought it might be in the Gilliam field when the learned 
counsel pointed to it (p. 221). 

Bvt. Maj. Gen. R. B. Ayres, Colonel Second United States Artillery, 
who commanded the Second Division, Fifth Corps, says he saw Craw- 
ford's and Griffin's divisions going off — "they marched straight on, due 
north." 

Q. Apparently away from the enemy's fire ? — A. Well, they did go right away ; they 
marched on (p. 263\ 



86 

(Page 269.) 
By the Court : 

Question. General Griffin commanded one of your divisions of the Fifth Corps? — 
Answer. Yes. 

Q. He is dead? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. He has been dead since 1867, I think? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. You said that before General Chamberlain's brigade came over to you that Gen- 
eral Griffin came over to you and had a conversation ? — A. Yes. 

Q. I would like to know what that conversation was. — A. One of my staff officers had 
gone over to General Griffin, I think. He came riding through the woods very rapidly, 
and he says, "Ayres, What is up, what is up?" I said, " There is nothing new, Griffin; 
Crawford has taken his division away and left me to fight alone. The same old story." 
That was just after I had changed front and I was preparing to advance on that 
angle — before I had carried the angle. 

Q. What did Griffin do? — A. He immediately disappeared in the woods; went 
directly back into the woods. I suppose the result was the bringing of his division in, 
because it came not long after; General Chamberlain's brigade came first." 

Q. That is all you saw of that division? — A. Yes. 

Q. How many brigades were there that day of that division? — A. I don't know; I 
just saw that one come in just after I bad carried that angle. General Griffin said 
two or three things before he went back; he said, "Yes, I have told General Warren 
if he would let your division and mine go together in these cases these things would 
not happen." 

By Maj. Asa Bird Gardner: 
Q. In your opinion, could that communication have been maintained between Craw- 
ford and yourself when you moved into action there with proper diligence?— A. It 
was natural for me to suppose when I changed my front to engage the enemy, and 
was engaging a heavy force, as the musketry showed, it was natural to suppose that 
General Crawford would bring his division around and come in on my right and engage 
in the battle; that was what I expected at the time. 

By Mr. Stickney: 

Q. That was your supposition from what you saw yourself? — A. Yes. 

Q. And from what you knew, yourself, then of the position? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. I suppose you have no personal knowledge as to what General Crawford's precise 
movements were? — A. Subsequently? 

Q. Yes.— A. No. 

Q. Or as to when he became engaged ? — A. No. 

Q. And those points might materially modify your judgment? — A. No; it is my 
opinion now that he should have come around there and engaged. 

Q. On your understanding of the position ? — A. Yes. 

Q. The conversation with General Griffin was just before you made your assault on 
the angle of the works? — A. Yes, just as I commenced to be heavily engaged. I had 
been engaged some little time; that was the time I had the conversation, when he 
came through himself, with me; I had no other conversation with him until I met 
him somewhere near Five Forks. 

Brig. Gen. J.L. Chamberlain, of Griffin's division, has related how when 
he heard the sharp firing at the "return," he pulled out what he could of 
his brigade from the northerly march and went down diagonally through 
the Sydnor field to the enemy's works (p. 273) and joined Ayres. 

Col. R. M. Brinton, United States Volunteers, who was an aide-de- 
camp to General Griffin, says that after the latter came down and joined 
General Sheridan and Ayres's division inside of the works, he was sent 
up to look after Bartlett's brigade (Griffin's division) and found Gregory's 
brigade of the same in the woods to the northwest of the Sydnor house. 

The troops were considerably disorganized there. * * * It was not from the 
firing, because there was very little firing down in those woods (p. 310). 

The aide-de-camp of General Warren, Maj. E. M. Cope, United States 
Volunteers, says (p. 324): 

That probably twenty minutes after the attack of the Second Division (Ayres's) Gen- 
eral Sheridan came to General Warren and asked him where General Griffin had gone 7 . 
as he had sent three or four staff officers after him. 

General Warren then sent the witness to tell General Griffin "that 
lie was going too far to the right, and also to tell Crawford the same." 



87 
Cope found Griffin almost due north of the "Chimneys," and said: 

That lie was going in the wrong direction altogether, and that he must come by the- 
left flank hack, and take up Ids position in the place thai Crawford was to have gone. 

Cope then gave the direction to General Bartlett and came back and 
rejoined Warren, and found him about where the first attack com- 
menced, at the westerly edge of the open field right by the White Oak 
road. 

In Cope's official report, dated Petersburg, Va., 13th April, 1805 
(Record, p. 326), when, as the learned counsel for the applicant sa3 7 s, 
the matterswere fresh in his recollection (Record, p. 325), he says that 
he was sent to — 

Griffin with an order to bring his division toward the White Oak road by the left 
flank, in order to be in better supporting distance of the Second. Also to inform 
General Crawford that he was going somewhat too far to the right. I found Generals 
Griffin and Crawford to the right of the burned Chimneys and gave them your orders. 
* * * You came where General Griffin ivas, and then returned to the White Oak road, 
where I joined you a few minutes after. 

Cope savs he believes this report to be "accurate and truthful" (p. 
331). 

When he found Griffin the first time the latter " said he didn't know 
what way to go." 

Cope also says that when he came back to where General Warren 
was, just north of the White Oak road — 

Ayres was fighting in front, near the Five Forks, at that time — prolably past the 
Five Forks. 

Thus in his indecision was the applicant here induced to go back to 
the original point of divergence, where he was nearly alone. This was 
the second time he had done so (p. 1229). 

Ayres's Division had gone and was being led by General Sheridan, and 
was rushing like a torrent westwardly down the line of works. The co- 
operating cavalry, pouring over the rocks in every direction, were driv- 
ing out the demoralized enemy, while over 9,900 men in the other two 
divisions of the Fifth Corps were in confusion in the woods and disin- 
tegrating by brigades. 

Griffin, who had been placed in rear to meet any probable attack 
from the Confederate General, R. E. Lee, from the entrenchments to the 
east, had to be employed in the position destined for Crawford. 

Finally, General W^arren again started up through the Sydnor field 
and came up with Crawford after he had reached the Young-Boisseau 
field near thr Ford road. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. W. T. Chester, aide-de-camp to Crawford, says that 
when part of Baxter's brigade came out into the Sydnor field, north of 
the house, " there was a little disorder" (p. 383). 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. H. C. Bankhead, United States A.rmy, says as to 
Crawford's and Griffin's divisions : 

I thought they swung off to the right too much (p. 345). 

Also that they must have been some distance from Ayres before they 
stopped to wheel. 

He was sent a second time to Crawford, who was "away up on the 
right." * * * 

I didn't hear any firing at all when I went up to Crawford except from Ayres's 
division. When I left Crawford's division there was no firing, hut after I left him 
hefore going far I think I heard some light firing (p. 346). 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Bichard Coulter, commanding third brigade of Craw- 



88 

ford's division, says there was only a picket tiring in the woods north of 
the White Oak road — u no heavy firing." 

After passing to the left of the Chimneys he met a severe fire (p. 350). 
He says : 

I received no orders from anybody beyond those tbat I received when I started until 
1 got orders on the Ford road. It was then late. It was getting nightfall. 

From the position of the guns captured up there, about which so 
much is said by Bvt. Lieut. Col. West Funk, major One hundred and 
twenty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers (p. 430), in his brigade, Coulter 
infers and has no doubt that they were trying to get away (pp. 351, 356). 

Col. Ellis Spear, Twentieth Maine Volunteers, aide-de-camp to General 
Bartlett, says he thinks Bartlett's brigade and the other troops with 
him "were borne off to the right in their march somewhat" after Ayres' 
division became engaged. 

The loss was trifling in his brigade (pp. 406, 408). 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. Samuel K. Herr, captain One hundred and ninetieth 
Pennsylvania Volunteers, aide-de-camp to Crawlord, and Bvt. Brig. 
Gen. J. Tarbell, Ninety-first New York Volunteers, both agree in saying 
that the fire, as they went through those woods toward the Ford road 
north of the White Oak road, was a scattering fire, not heavy (pp. 
408, 554), exclusive of the fight the Ninety-first was in. 

Lieut. Col. D. L. Smith, chief commissary of the Fifth Corps, says that 
when General Crawford was met by General Warren at the Ford road, 
the latter said : 

Crawford, you are entirely too far to the right. 1 want you to face to the left 
directly and charge at once. 

Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. J. Bartlett, brigadier-general United States Volun- 
teers, commanding a brigade in General Griffin's division, has testified 
as follows (p. 1168) : 

Q. You say you had the plan of battle from General Sheridan? — A. Yes. 

Q. What was the plan of battle you received from him? — A. General Sheridan 
called us around him in the road — his plan was very short; he drew his sabre in the 
dust and says: "There is the White Oak road ; the enemy are intrenched behind 
that ; they have refused their left somewhere near an old church ; whether it is within 
their lines or not I do not know." He said : "I will attack their entire front ; I will 
deploy my cavalry, dismounted, and engage their entire front, and with the strong arm 
I will strike this salient and wheel on to their left and rear." And, as I understood 
it, the formation of the corps, en echelon, by divisions was with that object. 

(Page 1119.) 

Q. Was this in the morning or afternoon ? — A. This was in the morning. 

Q. What were your orders as to moving forward? — A. At the moment Ay res became 
engaged everything wheeled to the left. 

Q. When you moved out from there what transpired ? State exactly what you 
recollect. — A. After marching, I think, about a mile — it is difficult to determine a 
march in line of battle and in woods as to distance, and I have not measured any 
map — I should think perhaps nearly a mile, or a mile, I heard heavy firing to my left. 
I knew then that Ayres was engaged, and became restless under it, because we w r ere 
taking a direction that was at almost right angles from the firing — perhaps quite. I 
finally rode out to the left, passed the rear of General Crawford's division and saw the 
fighting. I saw two lines of battle moving out of the woods ; I saw that Ayres had 
carried the salient and had moved well up in the fields. Those two lines of battle 
came out of the woods. This is the field [witness points to the Sydnor field]. Ayres 
had carried this and had moved out into the plain [the Sydnor field], and, though his 
command looked straggling, here it was like an advance through the woods. When 
I first saw the enemy they had just come out of the woods on the west side of the 
Sydnor field near the White Oak road, in two lines of battle. We were marching 
about in that direction [a little north by east], and the fight was here [points to the 
lower part of the Sydnor field]. I came here and I had a line of vision, when I looked 



89 

out of the woods, straight to here [from the middle of the northern "boundary of the 
Sydnor held to the southeast corner of the same held], 

Q. Indicate about the point in the woods to the east or north of the Sydnor held 
where you came and looked out. — A. I suppose about there [points to a position at 
the edge of the woods a little east of the center of the northern boundary of the Syd- 
nor field — northeast of the chimneys at the edge of the timber.] 

My formation was in three lines, one regiment of skirmishers, three lines two regi- 
ments each, one regiment in reserve. I caught the last line of two regiments aud my 
reserve regiment, and ran them down — this is a ravine here [points to the position 
between the Sydnor house and the Chimneys] — ran them by tke left flank down this 
ravine, driving them right in front — swuug them up in tbis way [wheeling to the left 
and south through the Sydnor field], and struck the left flank of these two lines of 
battle of the enemy to their rear. 

Q. On the west side of the Sydnor field, near the White Oak road ? — A. They had 
got down here. I swept them into the hands of Ayres — probably about '2,000 in the 
two lines. The moment they saw that I had them in that way, tbey just threw down 
their arms and ran in among Ayres's men and into the cavalry line. I threw them to 
the left and rear of Crawford's whole division — I threw my regiments — and I sent word 
to General Griffin what I had done, and he followed with the whole division. 

Q. Then, in moving up from your position where you formed, what general direc- 
tion did you take, up to the point when you pulled out into the Sydnor field and came 
down, as you have testified ? — A. We were faced, as I understand it, in the direction 
that we were supposed to march. I think no one was quite positive as to where they 
would strike this refused left, but it was understood that when we did strike it Ayres 
would strike it with his divisiou, and that everything then wheeled to the left. 

Q. At the time, from the information you received, how did you understand that the 
salient was to be struck by General Ayres? — A. From the formation entirely. I think 
General Warren directed the formation and the position of the divisions entirely, and 
Ayres would naturally strike it if it was anywhere near where General Sheridan sup- 
posed it was, and he could tell that it must be on the White Oak road, and therefore 
that Ayres must strike it. 

Q. And strike it in what direction did you understand? — A. I understood he was to 
strike it — that was supposed to be the general line of advance [northwest], and he 
would strike it here at the angle. And then the moment he commenced fighting at 
the angle, the other two divisions were to wheel to the left — touch to the left all the 
whi'e. 

Q. Had you any information at that time of what part of the works the cavalry 
were to take charge of? — A. Yes ; General Sheridan said in the morning that he would 
deploy the cavalry along their entire front, and that he would use the strong arm of 
the service in the way I have indicated, and he did so, because when I struck this field 
here the cavalry exchanged some shots with my troops, and General Sheridan .joined 
me here at the Five Forks opening, because, as soon as these prisoners had thrown 
down their arms, I wheeled these regiments and took my others that were coming 
across from here and some little higher up. They all had orders from staff officers to 
follow right on. They came across here and struck in the woods, and the enemy, as 
often as they could, would form a line perpendicular to their works to meet us; but 
the fight from the Sydnor field clear down was just simply a repetition of " busting" 
their flanks when they formed them there ; and from this field, until the fight was 
over, I do not think I saw one of my regiments as a formation. We would get as many 
men as we could, sometimes perhaps not over 60 or 100, and strike this line that the 
enemy were continually attempting to form, and break it, and did that all the way 
down. I met General Sheridan here at the Five Forks opening. 

Q What works, if any, were there of the enemy, on the west side of that Sydnor 
field? — A. Not any; if there had been works there it would be refusing their flank 
twice. They depended upon this [the witness indicates the ' ' return "]. There was no 
use for works here. There was no barrier inside of their works once we were in them. 

Q. How rapidly did you move along? — A. So rapidly that it was not possible to 
keep any formation through the woods. 

Q. When you moved down from the position you have indicated in the northeast 
part of the Sydnor field, bringing your regiment with you, what orders, if any, had 
you to make that movement ? — A. Not any ; on the contrary, I sent word to Griffin 
what I had seen and what I was going to do, and Griffin followed with his entire 
division. 

Q. Then, at that time, when you came out into the northeast edge of the Sydnor 
field, what direction were your troops taking, in relation to the fire ? — A. They were 
going directly away from it. 

Q. In going up through the northeast part of the Sydnor field, what resistance, if 
any, did you meet from the enemy ? — A. Not any. Just a few skirmish shots ; but not 
what you call a skirmish fire — just occasionally, as though they were videttes. 

Q. Was anything upon our right — of our forces ? — A. What do you mean ? 



90 

Q. Any of our forces upon your right as you moved up ? — A. The other two brigades 
of Griffin's division were upon my right. 

Q. In going np there, in what direction were you crowded, if at all ? — A. Crowded 
always to the right ; so much so that I sent a staff officer to see why it was so. 

Q. You sent an officer to ascertain the reason of this ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Do you know whether there were any other forces of the United States upon 
your right than the two brigades you have mentioned of your own division ? — A. No ; 
only later I know that Mackenzie 

Q. (By Mr. Stickney, counsel for the applicant.) No ; at that time, as far as your 
observation went? — A. No. 

Q. Did you, during that day, before you got down to the White Oak road, through 
the Sydnor field, see any other forces than the two brigades of your own division upon: 
your right ? — A. No. 

Q. Do you recollect passing the Five Forks ? — A. Yes. 

Q. In moving westward ? — A. Yes. 

Q. What fighting, if any, do you know of, after passing the Five Forks? — A. The 
fighting was as I have described, from that point, the west side of the Sydnor field. It 
was simply little combats ; little engagements. They never halted there enough to 
make us form a line of battle, because it was easy always to strike their flank ; they 
could not get any great number of men out. Where these guns were taken there was 
no fight. I passed over there without any fight. The cavalry came in immediately 
after, because the men that supported these guns had been taken to make those two 
lines of battle that I described there on the westerly side of the Sydnor field, and they 
had been captured on the north side of the road. All the fighting had been here, and 
was as I have described it, and in fact you could hardly keep up with them — it was 
difficult to get men enough together to make a fight. 

Q. Where did you meet General Sheridan ? — A. In this field, by the Five Forks. 

On cross-examination this witness answered as follows relative to his 
movements before reaching Five Forks : 

Q. Your brigade was entirely independent, for the rest of the operations that day, as 
far as you understood ? — A. Entirely. I did not see any other soldiers. 

Q. Where did you last see Crawford's division ? — A. When I left them there and 
went to their left and rear, and they were continuing to march to the right. 

Q. Had you kept in sight of them all the way up from where you started on the ad- 
vance? — A. Touched to the left all the way. 

Q. Do you mean that during that movement up in the northerly direction Griffin was 
in connection with Crawford and was upon his left ? — A. Griffin was upon Crawford's 
right. I was crowded to the right all the while. 

Q. Were you there in connection with Mackenzie's cavalry ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. See anything of them? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Did you see anything of them or know of their position at that time ? — A. I think 
Colonel Locke mentioned something about it when he rode up When he stated that 
General Warren had placed two regiments there. General Sheridan says, " I have 
covered that road with Mackenzie's cavalry." 

Q. Was that all you knew of the movements or position of Mackenzie's cavalry during 
that day? — A. Yes. The only cavalry I saw were fighting down the road here [indi- 
cating on the map near his own position], when I was moving down the woods in con- 
nection with the cavalry (pp. 1180, 1181) 

Q. You say you sent a staff officer to find out why you were being crowded to the 
right ; who was he ? — A. I sent Major Belcher to General Crawford. 

Q. You did not send him to Griffin ? — A. No, sir ; / sent him to see why I was oeing 
crowded to the right. 

Q. You sent him to Crawford ? — A. Yes ; but without any message to General Craw- 
ford. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. Walter T. Chester, United States Volunteers, then 
aide-de-camp to General Crawford, says that when Baxter's brigade got 
on to the north of the White Oak road they — 

Got the first fire, which was picket firing. * * * The fire amounted to little — 
well, it hit a few men; it was a good, sharp picket fire — not enough to delay the 
march (p. 832). 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Horace Porter, aide-de-camp to General Grant, who 
had been sent to report the movements, says as follows (p. 912) : 

Q. After the capture of the "return," you went at General Sheridan's request to look 
after General Warren ; you say you met portions of Crawford's division? 

Mr. Stickney, counsel for the applicant. He fell in with Crawford's division. 
Those were his words. 



91 

A. Yes. 

Q. In these woods, north or northeast or northwest of the ; ' return " ? — A. It was gen- 
erally a northerly direction. 

Q. Do yon recollect crossing an open field before reachiug that division or not? — A. 
I have no recollection of it. There were openings. The country was densely wooded. 

Q. Then, as you afterwards went west, did Crawford's division keep along with 
you, or did you pass them ? — A. They were moving on in a westerly or northwesterly 
direction — farther north than the road I took. 

Q. Then, I understand you, they were separating more and more from Ayres's 
division and the return ? — A. My distinct impression is simply that they were moving. 

Q. (By Mr. Stickney.) Is it knowledge? — A. My knowledge extends to this fact, 
that they were moving in a northwesterly direction, and I moved on a westerly direc- 
tion — a little south of west, probably, to General Sheridan. 

Q. Then they were moving in a direction away from the return? — A. Yes. 

Q. And away from the line of works on the line of the White Oak road? — A. Yes, 
they were moving from the White Oak road — moving away from it. 

It has been indirectly attempted to be shown that after Ayres's division 
captured the "return", and nearly their own number of prisoners, they 
halted a considerable time, and that it was because there was a so-called 
line of works along the west side of the Sydnor field near the White 
Oak road. 

This is absurd. There was no idea on the part of the enemy that the 
" return " would be assaulted until just when General Sheridan went over. 

General Ayres says the — 

Enemy attempted to form a line to face easterly some distance on * * * [west 
side Sydnor field] (p. 256), but it was a general breaking up ; an effort to get away. 

He says he only waited two or three minutes inside the breastworks,, 
and when General Chamberlin came down he went right on and marched 
a mile beyond Five Forks, until it got towards dusk, and then halted. 

General Chamberlin says there was some firing after he came down ; 
that General Sheridan — 

Was right on the road, and it seemed to me certain that he would be shot ; but he 
did not seem to care much about that; in fact, instead of taking care of himself, he 
dashed right along the White Oak road westerly with his staf (p. 275). 

The reason of this was because our cavalry were assaulting and 
breaking over the works all along down in front of Ayres's column and to 
the w r est. 

This evidence of Ayres and Chamberlain and of Bartlett completely 
upsets the theory sought to be raised of a line of works and enemy in 
good form to the west side of the Sydnor field. 

It would have put them between three fires. Ayres to the east, the 
cavalry to the south, and Bartlett and Chamberlain sweeping down and 
gathering them in from the northeast. 

The only delay was in getting through the prisoners and pushing 
ahead. 

In his pamphlet book published or prepared December 10, 1865, the 
applicant, in trying to explain the serious deflection to the right of Craw- 
ford's division when it crossed the White Oak road, says he afterwards 
learned that the fire which — 

Occasioned some unsteadiness in General Ayres' right, also caused the left of 
General Crawford to oblique to the right so as to keep the protection of the ridge and 
trees (pp. 1224, 1226). (See also Warren's official report.) 

As highly indicative of the dazed and bewildered condition of General 
Warren on the day of this battle of Five Forks, he published a map 
with this pamphlet, in which he attempts to give, and wrongly, the 
locations and directions of the divisions of Crawford and Griffin. 

In it he describes the movements of General Crawford's entire division 
followed by two brigades of Griffin's by the right, as being, substantially.. 



92 

up through the timber, north of the White Oak road, and so on to the 
north of the Chimneys; then west to the Ford road 5 then a little circuit 
nearer to the house in the Young-Boisseau field, and then south on the 
Ford road, meeting a strong line of the enemy south of and near the 
southern side of that field (pp. 1225, 1226). 

He did not know that any portion of his, Crawford's, command had 
become separated or have any report as to whether or not they had been 
fighting until he joined him on the Ford road (p. 754). 

There is a suggestive figure in the losses ascribed to Crawford's 
division, viz, 300. 

Of these, Colonel Kellogg says his brigade lost 75 men and 8 officers, 
killed and wounded, while obeying General Sheridan's orders, as com- 
municated by Bvt. Brig. Gen. George A. Forsyth (p. 221), in trying to 
push down towards the left to restore the connection lost by the diver- 
gence. 

With the losses of the day before deducted, the Fifth Corps had for 
duty April 1, 1865, first division (Griffin's), 5,807, and lost 125; second 
division (Ayres'), 2,645, and lost 208; third division (Crawford's), 4,140, 
and lost 300 (p. 1327). 

At this point in the argument it becomes desirable to consider what 
the co-operating cavalry force did at the battle of "Five Forks." 

CAVALRY OPERATIONS AT FIVE FORKS. 

General Warren has testified that be knew what the cavalry were to do. 

It was hardly to be expected that an inferior force of dismounted cav- 
alry, armed only with carbines and sabres, should assault veteran in- 
fantry in breastworks, armed with muskets and bayonets, yet this is 
exactly what was done as soon as the heavy firing from Ayres's division 
showed he had advanced to the assault of the " return." 

In the disposal of the cavalry of the Army of the Shenandoah, on the 
1st of April, 1865, Maj. Gen. George Crook's division (Second) was 
necessarily left five or six miles to the rear, guarding the trains beyond 
Dinwiddie Court-House. 

The first division, under Brig. Gen. T. O. Devin, and the third divis- 
ion, under Brig. Gen. G. A. Custer, both under Maj. Gen. Wesley 
Merritt, together with Brig. Gen. Banald S. Mackenzie's division, tem- 
porarily detached from the Army of the James, comprised the operating- 
force. 

On the 27th March the effective cavalry force under General Sheridan 
was as follows (p. 19) : 

First and third divisions, under Major-General Merritt 5, 700 

Second division, under Major General Crook 3, 300 

Total 9,000 

This force was somewhat reduced by the casualties of the battle of 
Dinwiddie Court-House, so that at the battle of "Five Forks" the 
cavalry of the first and third divisions, which covered the entire front 
of the enemy's works, could not have exceeded 5,250 men, from which, 
deducting horse holders from dismounted portions, would leave at the 
front, in the dismounted force and in the mounted brigades, about 4,250 
or 4,500 effectives to cover the entire line of the enem\ 's works, one and 
three quarter miles in length (p. 241), and hold them there by sufficient 
tentative movements. 

As Brigadier-General Mackenzie had from 1,200 to 1,800 mounted 
cavalry in his division to the right of the Fifth Corps we can determine 



93 

with reasonable certainty exactly how many of that description of force 
was on the field. 

This statement will show how largely General Sheridan relied on the 
Fifth Corps, whose subsequent distinguished services under his imme- 
diate command after this day he has never ceased to extol. 

In the formation from right to left, came Stagg's brigade, somewhat 
refused, then Gibbs', Fitzhugh's, and Pennington's, and on the west of 
the Gilliam field Wells and Capehart's mounted brigades under Custer 
in person, threatening the enemy's right flank. 

A portion of Custer's command, Pennington and Capehart's, having 
moved out obliquely and northwesterly from Dinwiddie Court-House in 
the morning, struck the enemy's advanced right in the Gilliam field 
about noon, and after a sharp affair, in which artillery was used against 
them, our people retired slightly, and Pennington moved to the right 
to connect with Devins' division, and placed his right regiment, the 
First Connecticut Cavalry, so that its right rested on the road running 
south from Five Forks. 

It is a curious fact that the cessation of this cavalry affair induced 
Pickett, the Confederate commanding general, to conclude that nothing 
further would be attempted (p. 477). 

He accordingly went to the north of Hatcher's Eun, and with him 
the second in command, Fitzhugh Lee. 

Here they were rudely awakened from their dream of security, late 
in the day, by the assault then made. 

Fitzhugh Lee describes how Pickett got across Hatcher's Eun. They 
did not know of the firing or hear it until they got there at the Ford on 
their journey back from a conference with the Confederate Brigadier- 
General Eosser (p. 472). 

It is therefore not possible, except approximately, to determine how 
long the assault had continued before they knew of it. 

Pickett got through to the right of his line by putting spurs to his 
horse and throwing himself down on his neck (p. 471), but the infantry 
of the Fifth Corps interposed before Fitzhugh Lee could follow, so that 
he had to turn back. 

This Confederate officer has put their cavalry force under his com- 
mand on the field at 3,200 sabres, viz: 

Brigadier-General Munford 1, 300 

Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee 1,000 

Brigadier-General Rosser (who did not get into action) 900 

Eeturning to the cavalry in front of the enemy's works, it becomes 
necessary to discuss what they did in consideration of the extraordinary 
claim set up by the applicant that Crawford's division, finally led by 
himself, drove the enemy out of their works at Five Forks proper, and 
practically won the victory. 

Had this applicant shown the same degree of temerity at the critical 
time of the assault on the " return" of the enemy's works, General Sheri- 
dan might not have felt constrained to relieve him near the close of the 
pursuit. 

That a considerable mounted United States cavalry force came up the 
Ford road to where the applicant was he/ore he came down to the White 
Oak road, as admitted by him, is of itself a conclusive answer to this 
theory. 

Col. L. H. Hastings, Fifth Michigan Cavalry (Stagg's brigade), says 
that in going up from Dinwiddie they had skirmishing, and charged 



94 

temporary breastworks, and arrived in front of the works abont 1 or 2 
p. m. (p. 1065). 

Maj. A. E. Dana, assistant adjutant- general first cavalry division, 
says, there was in going up more or less skirmishing (p. 1014), and that 
at about four o'clock General Sheridan came to General Wesley Merritt 
and — 

Repeated Ms instructions about holding the position which we held, at all hazards ; 
not under any circumstances to give way, but attack with all force as soon as the 
infantry had made their attack, to be indicated by the volleys. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. Theodore W. Bean, United States Volunteers, Seven- 
teenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and acting provost-marshal first cavalry 
division, says on the same subject (p. 925) : 

Q. Were you informed at the time of the object of this order, to have the men fire 
continuously ? — A. Yes. General Merritt, in giving me that order, also stated that a 
movement was in progress on our right flank, and that we might expect a junction 
upon our right at any moment. The situation of the division was regarded by myself 
and other officers that I communicated with as critical. 

Q. For what reason? — A. Because we feared we could not successfully resist an 
attack if made upon us by the enemy, as we were situated, and that our only hope of 
maintaining the line was in keeping up a constant fire. 

Q. How was the division armed ? — A. With carbines, sabre, and pistol ; no bayo- 
nets. 

He saw General Sheridan move to the assault in front of Ayres's divis- 
ion, with his flag and staff. 

Capt. Henry E. Alvord, late Sixth United States Cavalry, who was 
acting aide-de-camp to Brig. Gen. Alfred Gibbs, commanding the regu- 
lar cavalry brigade at Five Forks, gives the following important evi- 
dence, which graphically depicts the way in which the Fifth Corps 
moved into action, and shows that General Sheridan and others on that 
line knew exactly where the enemy's " return" was : 

(Page 817.) 

Q. What time did you set out that morning from Dinwiddie Court-House ? — A. Our 
brigade had been in advance the day before — March the 31st ; had been up as far as 
Five Forks that day. It had been pretty badly used up towards night on March the 
31st, and we had been sent back to the rear to reorganize somewhat, and we moved 
from the rear of General Sheridan's command, near Dinwiddie Court-House, so that 
we were in the rear as we moved forward from Dinwiddie Court-House. We passed 
General Sheridan's headquarters a mile or so out from Dinwiddie, and then left the 
main road to Five Forks ; crossing through the woods, and dismounted soon after we 
left the Five Forks road, left our horses and moved forward. It was then about the 
middle of the day. Devin's division was direct in our front as we came up, and the 
line was pressing the enemy back at the time, between twelve and one o'clock — about 
twelve o'clock, because by one o'clock we were in line on the right of Devin's division. 
Colonel Stagg, I think, of the Michigan brigade, was in command at that time; was 
still mounted and on our right. We left our horses in the woods and moved forward 
through heavy timber fronting the White Oak road, formed in sight of the enemy's 
works — their outer line of works — before one o'clock. 

Q. How near were you to the left of the enemy's works I — A. We were practically in 
front of the left of the enemy's works. Stagg, as I say, was understood to hold the right of 
the line, but he was mounted and kept in the rear somewhat. No mounted troops could 
move where we were. We were really on the right of the dismounted line of cavalry fac- 
ing the left of the enemy's works — that is the position of my brigade. I was mounted 
all day and my company remained mounted most of the time. I was moving between 
headquarters of the brigade and General Sheridan's headquarters. We reported that 
day, all day, directly to General Sheridan's headquarters. 

Q. How near did your brigade get to the enemy's works about the time you have 
indicated? — A. At one o'clock we were in sight of the enemy's works. The cavalry 
line was holding the enemy's line. We had at different times possession of the outer 
line or a temporary line of the enemy's works. It was disputed — the outer line was — 
during the middle of the day ; firing going on all the time, losing men constantly, and 
heavy fighting from eleven o'clock that morning. 



95 

Q. How were you oft' for ammunition ? — A. I recollect, now that you speak of it, 
that one of the causes of the reserve brigade going so far to the rear on the night of 
March 31 was to get a new supply of ammunition. The train of our brigade had pot- 
ten off the road. I know we lost our headquarters baggage hack near Reams' Station 
somewhere, and never saw it afterwards, and we had received a partial supply of 
ammunition that night of March 31 from some other forces. We did not get to our 
wagons. We moved forward the 1st of April short of both ammunition and rations, 
particularly short of rations. 

Q. How long did your brigade continue there before it made any movement on the 
enemy's main works? — A. Two or three hours. I should say from one o'clock there 
was a lull in the active work — from one o'elock until the neighborhood of four o'clock. 
During that time I was moving back and forth to General Sheridan's headquarters. 
The infantry were coming up — the infantry of the Fifth Corps. I saw the infantry 
of the Fifth Corps first as we moved, in the middle of the day, at the junction of the 
road coming into the road from Dinwiddie to Five Forks, a mile or so from Dinwiddie 
Court House. I had been over all that country two days previously, and we left and 
moved over. Part of the time brigade headquarters was at Bass's hous>'; that, but 
for the woods, would have been in sight of the enemy's angle, where the enemy's left 
retired; and the duty which General Sheridan assigned me to that day particularly 
was, watching the enemy's left, and preventing the enemy from swinging around the 
left and turning our cavalry right before the infantry got up into place. I was mov- 
ing constantly hack and forth from our own line to General Sheridan's headquarters. 
General Gibbs was sick, and we took our orders directly from General Sheridan. 

Q. Where were General Sheridan's headquarters located at the time? — A. In differ- 
ent places from noon until afternoon, all the way from the junction of the road run- 
ning up towards Hatcher's Eun, running towards Petersburg from Five Forks road 
out beyond Dinwiddie Court-House. 

Q. That would be about J. Boisseau's? — A. Yes. From that place out towards 
Gravelly Run church : and I recollect there were woods around that church. But out 
in the neighborhood of Bass's house there was a large open tobacco field, with some 
buildings and tobacco barns. 

Q. [Cotton map No. 3 explained to the witness.] — A. General Sheridan came down 
to Bass's at one time. That represents but a single building, and there were a num- 
ber of scattered buildings there. We were at Bass's the day before. Colonel Drum- 
mond was killed there. The last road before arriving at Five Forks was the road on 
which my brigade turned off to take its position along the woods [indicates a wood, 
south of the return of the enemy's works, on Cotton map No. 3], and then the reserve 
brigade was on the west of this [road, between that and Five Forks, the right resting 
in the neighborhood of this road. Stagg's brigade passed up this road in advance of 
us, and was massed upon the right of the road, mounted. We passed it, leaving our 
horses on either side of the road here in the woods, and there was a lane, as I recollect, 
to the Bass house, because I know that Stagg moved over in this direction, at times 
eastward, towards Bass's house. And there were, just west' of Bass's house, in the 
edge of the woods, some large log tobacco-drying houses, and it was at one of these 
that we established cavalry reserve brigade headquarters. Then I moved out past 
Bass's house, and back and forth several times, to reach General Sheridan. He came 
down with his staff to Bass' house once or twice. 

Q. When did you first receive information that the infantry were ordered up ? — A. 
I knew at ten or eleven o'clock in the morning. We must have been at Dinwiddie 
Court- House by ten o'clock in the morning. We got up earlier than that, and held in 
rear to move forward. We knew that the infantry were coming in, and we simply 
awaited the arrival of the infantry to take our position. 

Q. Do you know where the infantry were at the time you took position in front of 
the enemy's works? — A. Yes; they were pretty well south of Gravelly Run church, 
because at one time General Sheridan sent me down, his own staff being scattered 
about. I went down for him to the infantry. I went down to Ayres's division to ask 
that they move as rapidly as possible, get up into position ; that the cavalry were in 
position, and were awaiting the arrival of the infantry; and as he moved up, it was 
pretty late in the afternoon, I went again, sent by General Sheridan to Ayres — it must 
have been Ayres's headquarters — to ask that an officer be sent to General Sheridan's 
headquarters who would be acquainted with the infantry upon the left of the line, as 
it would form and swing around to the left ; and to two of us was intrusted the duty 
of keeping the connection between the infantry left and the cavalry right. That 
officer, who I thought was not an officer of Ayres's division, but a staff officer of the 
Fifth Corps — Colonel Bankhead, I think was the man — my impression is he was lieu- 
tenant-colonel and assistant inspector-general of the corps. At any rate, he was with 
me the latter part of the afternoon. I made several trips, and was present when 
others made trips, from General Sheridan to the infantry. 

Q. Were you present when he gave any orders ? — A. Yes. 

Q. What were they ? — A. His orders were repeated directions to hurry up the 



96 

infantry ; it was the sum and substance of all the orders, and I should say of a dozen 
different messages, during three or four hours during the day. The cavalry were car- 
rying a pretty heavy load all through the day and waiting for the infantry to get in 
place in order to carry out the attack. All through the cavalry line it was understood 
that we covered the entire enemy's front and that our place was to keep the enemy in 
its line, hold them there until the infantry should arrive on the ground on the left 
flank. 

Q. About what time do you recall that the infantry got into position to move into- 
action ? — A. It must have been after four o'clock in the afternoon ; between four and 
five, I should say. 

Q. When did you receive or hear the first order given for the infantry to hurry 
up f — A. Not later than one o'clock, I should say; before one, in the middle of the 
day. If I am not mistaken, I went across myself that day from the cavalry, before 
the brigade got into position, to see how the infantry were coming up. I think we 
were held back a little while, before drawing the enemy's fire. The enemy's left made 
two or three attempts to swing around and turn our right .flank. That was where 
Stagg came into action, where my regiment lost quite heavily, where my company 
was once dismounted to go to the relief of the right of the line. We had a tough 
time to hold that in position before the infantry made their junction with us and with 
our troops. The infantry being well to the south, a little to the east, we had to keep 
somebody moving back and forth to be certain that the ground was open between us 
in order that thej unction might be made. 

Q. Did you see any of the Fifth Corps coming up ? — A. I saw the left of the Fifth 
Corps repeatedly during the day as it came up. 

Q. Do you recall at what time they got up in position ? — A. Not before four o'clock, 
I should say ; perhaps nearer five. 

Q. Did you observe the manner in which they came up, that is as to the rate of 
speed — marching? — A. General Ayres's division, as it came onto the ground, came at 
an ordinary marching rate. 

Q. Did you see General Warren during that time ? — A. I saw him once with General 
Sheridan ; I should say it must have been in that opening to the southeast of Bass's ; 
I don't think it was at Gravelly Run church. It was in open ground I know, because 
Bankhead and myself were talking at the time, and we were not far from where two 
general officers were together. 

Q. Were you near enough to hear any conversation ? — A. Yes ; I was. 

Q. Will you be good enough to state what you heard? — A. I heard General Sheri- 
dan express great displeasure at the length of time it was taking to get the infantry 
into action, and speak in a more than emphatic way of the length of time that 
his cavalry had been obliged to wait for it, and the rapidity with which the day was 
passing, and unless greater haste could be made by the Fifth Corps that the plan of 
the day would be lost, and that he had been waiting all day for the infantry. That 
was the substance. Aud if not in General Warren's presence, certainly in the presence 
of some of General Warren's officers, because I know it was the subject of conversation 
between General Bankhead and myself. General Sheridan was somewhat profane on 
the subject. 

Q. You saw the advance of the Fifth Corps? — A. I saw the left of it. It was a very 
woody country there. The only opportunity to see the infantry come into position 
was on the Bass plantation, and that was practically occupied by Ayres's division 
as it made the left wheel. 

Q. Had you previously reconnoitered the enemy's works at the ''return " ? — A. I had. 
That was my personal duty that day to watch that very point. And I used myself 
and my lieutenant and my company for that purpose from twelve o'clock all through 
the afternoon. 

Q. Go on and describe the rest of the movements after the Fifth Corps began to 
advance as you saw them. — A. I think it was between four and five o'clock that Ayres's 
division of the Fifth Corps struck the White Oak road, then formed perpendicularly — 
formed, if I recollect, on the edge of the woods in a line perpendicular to the White 
Oak road, facing the "return" of the enemy's line, and while formed there, and before 
moving forward, the enemy made a last effort by mounted men to push in between 
our dismounted cavalry right and the infantry left, which had not then made connec- 
tion. There was a piece of the White Oak road east of the return which was practically 
open to them. They pushed south across the White Oak road, and did at one time 
get in behind us. I recollect a little personal difficulty in getting across from our 
right toward the Bass house. I had to make a detour to get rid of them. Colonel Stagg 
was called in there, mounted, and made his way, as best he could, through the woods, 
and drove them back. After Ayres's division came on the ground I was at the junc- 
tion of the two when Ayres's men extended their left, and the left of my own regiment 
under my direction, part of it, extended themselves to the right in order to make the 
connection as a pivot for Ayres to wheel upon. There w r e remained until Ayres got 
around and made the attack. It was pretty nearly five o'clock before the general 



97 

attack of Ayres's division occurred. I should say between hal f-past four and half-past 
five o'clock. It must have been in the neighborhood of live o'clock, because it was 
not very light during the latter part of the attack. Ayres moved right along against 
tbe "return'" and carried it, and as he advanced on the north of the White Oak road 
westward toward Five Forks — there was, of course, a heavy action going on to the 
west of it — toward Five Forks — as he came out into an open field, which was a little 
west of the enemy's line which he had carried, my own brigade broke from cover, 
carried the enemy's works, and attacked Ayres's left, and there was quite a confusion 
at that time. There had been a similar occurrence, though not so serious, at the time 
Ayres first took position around there and began facing the enemy's works. Some of 
us were over on the left. I think Captain Kinne, of the First Cavalry, acting assist- 
ant adjutant-general, and myself rode in between my men, who broke irregularly 
through the enemy's works there, to let them know who they were. The infantry got 
a little ahead of the cavalry line as they passed down the north side of the White Oak 
road; the infantry and cavalry were all mixed; the cavalry, of crmrsi, dis nounted. 

Q. In that movement, you say, just before, there had been a little occurrence of the 
same kind, of firing at each other ? — A. Yes ; when Ayres first came into position, they 
drew quite a heavy fire from the enemy. I recollect there was a temporary line of 
works near the edge of the woods, on the Bass plantation, at right angles with the White 
Oak road ; and as Ayres wheeled into position to take his place, at right angles to the 
White Oak road, he met the fire of the enemy at the edge of the woods, on the west of 
the Bass plantation, north of the White Oak road, and somewhat south of it, because 
Ayres covered the White Oak road, both sides. He must have had a brigade south of 
the White Oak road as he formed. At that point Ayres's men broke at one time. 
There was a good deal of confusion there, and it was during that confusion that the 
most serious movement of the enemy was made to get in be'rween us, and General 
Sheridan came on the field in person, I recollect. In fact, I saw General Sheridan and 
some of his escort come down the road in advance of Ayres's division. We had to get 
him off the road there just before the final attack was made, when he was getting 
Ayres's division re-formed. There was a bad break in Ayres's division upon the right 
and left ; both flauks doubled in badly when he first took position ; but it did not last 
long ; General Sheridan came up across the Bass plantation and assisted him personally ; 
in fact, he went in front of Ayres's division and moved down the line in front of the 
division. I was there with him at the time we met him. 

Q. In going down along the line of the enemy's works, after your cavalry went 
over, state what occurred, as near as you can recollect. — A. It w T as a general break of 
the enemy and general confusion on our part. There was a mixture of finding our 
own commands and getting them together, picking up fragments of the enemy and 
some guns as we approached Five Forks. 

Q. Did you keep the line of troops as they swung down the White Oak road ? — A I 
did ; the horses of my brigade, instead of being forward, were carried back to the 
Dinwiddie and Five Forks road, carried down that road by the leaders of my brigade ; 
it did not mount until it reached Five Forks; there it mounted and pushed along the 
general line of the White Oak road. 

Q. Where was the Fifth Corps at that time ? — A. They weie coming on ; I think the 
infantry were at Five Forks when we got our horses ; by that time it was dusk. 

Q. Did you go along to the west of the Gilliam field ? — A. Yes. 

Q. That night ? — A. Yes ; some distance out here (indicating). 

Q. Do you recollect any fight along there, near the westerly side of the Gilliam 
field ?— A. Towards night ? 

Q. Yes. — A. No, sir ; I do not ; Custer was on the west of Five Forks ; his division 
attended to that. 

Q. Did you see General Warren during those movements ? — A. No, sir; I saw him only 
once that day ; that must have been about two o'clock in the afternoon. I recollect 
the time from the fact that the mail came up between two and three o'clock that 
afternoon, and was brought up from Dinwiddie to General Sheridan's headquarters, 
and I received the mail for my brigade myself. I have a letter in my pocket which I 
wrote at that time in reply to a letter which I received from my father; it is written 
on a tiy-leaf of a cavalry reserve order-book, dated three o'clock, on the battle-field, 
April i, near Five Forks. It was about the time that mail was received — whether im- 
mediately before or immediately after I cannot say — that General Sheridan and Gen- 
eral Warren had that interview in my presence. 

Q. Did you see General Sheridan as he moved down the White Oak road ? — A. Yes ; 
General Sheridan moved along with the advance and the infantry, with his headquar- 
ters flag and escort. 

Q. Did you see Crawford's division anywhere during that afternoon ? — A. No, sir ; 
not that I know of. I kept as near to the left of the infantry as I could. 

Q. Did you see any troops, infantry or cavalry, come down from the north of the 
White Oak road and join or meet our people; if so, where? — A. No, sir; I think I 
knew the troops coming in ; of course I knew where General Mackenzie was ; I was 

7 GAR 



98 

present at Sheridan's headquarters when reports came in from Mackenzie; so I had 
knowledge of his general location, hut I do not recollect seeing any troops join ; my 
recollection is that the troops from the north must have come in. 

In reference to the operations of the cavalry directly along the front 
of the line of the enemy's works Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt says (p. 
602): 

The enemy commenced giving way after the attack was made. I mounted my horse 
at once and rode over, and the enemy were then scarcely out of the works. 

Lieut. Col. D. L. Smith, chief commissary Fifth Army Corps, who was 
with General Warren, says (p. 605) that after General Coulter's brig- 
ade, in going south on the Ford road, passed over the two guus that 
were captured, those two which were trying to get away, between 500 
and 600 mounted cavalry came between the rear of Coulter and the 
front of General Warren, who was following him. General Warren 
stopped the cavalry officer and spoke to him : " They came from the front 
left, passed from the left to our front and the right. That would be 
from the line of the enemy's works." They moved to the right of Coulter. 

He further says that this cavalry came on at a full gallop out of the 
woods from the left in front, aud prevented General Warren following 
up Coulter's brigade ; " and we had to wait until they passed by ; they 
passed on to our right We were facing south." 

At page 609 : 

"When General Coulter's brigade went over the guns, the enemy had already 
retreated. 

The applicant also admitted on cross-examination that quite a con- 
siderable mounted cavalry force, which he at first stated was a brigade, 
came up on the " Ford " road and met him before he got down to the 
" White Oak" road, and that he was "informed by General Sheridan, 
before the movement began, that a brigade would be kept mounted, 
when the enemy broke, to pursue them" (p. 1227). 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. E. W. Whit taker, First Connecticut Cavalry, acting 
assistant adjutant general to General Custer, was with Pennington's 
brigade 5 it made two charges on the front of the works, and on the third 
went over the works midway between Five Forks and the Gilliam field j 
Ihe saw no infantry ; the sun was up high enough to be quite bright, 
(pp. €35-638) ; he then mounted, and as there was a body of the enemy 
at 'the westerly side of the Gilliam field, he made a circuit to the south 
and west to avoid their fire. General Custer had previously told him 
(p. 637) that he was going around, mounted, with two brigades, to swing- 
in at the proper time; when Whittaker reached General Custer, he 
found he had come in on the right of the enemy with his mounted brig- 
ades; they had previously been out of his (Whittaker's) sight (p. 634). 

Bvt. Col. A. C. M. Pennington, Captain Second United States Artillery, 
• colonel commanding the Third New Jersey Cavalry, and brigade com- 
mander of Custer's Third cavalry division, commanding First Brigade, 
says (p. 659) that General Custer was not on his part ofthe line at any time ; 
he never saw him after he went off to the left with his mounted brigades. 

Colonel Pennington testifies to going over the works at the Forks 
where the, guns were, and that he captured over 500 prisoners. 

(Q. Had not Crawford's division come down on this Ford road, or in its vicinity, and 
captured those works hefore the cavalry crossed f 

Mr. Stickney, counsel for the applicant. There is nothing of that sort testifie d to 
or claimed. 

A. I never saw them, or heard of tlbern, or knew anything ahout them ; and I don't 
believe that they were there at all — that is, m the works; I am satisfied they were not 
in the works, because I didn't see them (p. 661). 



99 

Bvt. Capt. A. F. Schermerhorn, first lieutenant One hundred and 
eighty-fifth New York Volunteers, aide-de-camp to Griffin (p. 693), 
speaks of the fighting at Five Forks, and of meeting General Fitzhugh 
right at the guns. 

In other words, the column led by General Sheridan in person, that 
had assaulted the " return", had swept down the line of the works from 
the east to the west and arrived at the Five Forks almost simultane- 
ously with the cavalry as they came breaking over the breastworks at 
that point. 

Captain Schermerhorn (p. 694) does not recollect seeing General 
Crawford's division until the evening, although he went to the west of 
the Gilliam field. 

First Lieut. E. E. Wood, Eighth United States Cavalry, then adjutant 
Seventeenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Fitzhugh's brigade, says (p. 831) 
that during the day they exhausted their ammunition. After going 
over the works with his command he saw nothing north of Five Forks, 
but saw General Sheridan riding down the line of the enemy's works in 
advance of our forces from the east. He says he went north of the 
Five Forks through the woods (p. 833), and when he came out at the 
Gilliam field he found infantry there. Of course our forces had passed 
along while he was in the woods. 

Bvt. Col. A. M. Bandol, Captain First United States Artillery, then col- 
onel of the Second New York Volunteer Cavalry, of Pennington's brigade 
(p. 698), did not see our infantry until after the works were captured at 
Five Forks. He then saw General Griffin coming from the right and 
spoke to him (p. 701). He did not see any of Crawford's command there. 

Capt. H. G. Wood, Twenty-Fifth New York Cavalry, on the staff of 
Stagg's brigade, says (p. 828) they were skirmishing all the forenoon, 
and that the left of his brigade went right over in front of the infantry 
at the angle and demoralized the rebels. He saw Sheridan there with 
his flag. 

Bvt. Maj. Vanderbilt Allen, late of the Corps of Engineers (p. 836), told 
General Mackenzie to push around to his right of the infantry. 

Consequently General Mackenzie's command was not on the front at 
any time, and by reason of being crowded out of position by Crawford's 
division never got into action at all. 

Maj. E. M. Baker, Second United States Cavalry (p. 841), testifies as to 
the charge made by the First United States Cavalry, of Gibbs' brigade, 
in going up from Dinwiddie Court- House. He says they arrived in 
front of the works between 12 and 1 p. m., and that there was a heavy 
line of enemy's skirmishers all the way up 

Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, Colonel Fifth United States Cavalry, who 
commanded the cavalry divisions on the enemy's front, testified as 
follows (Record, p. 846): 

Page 84P. 

Q. What were the final instructions you received from General Sheridan ? — A. My 
instructions were, my command being in the position that it was, that so soon as I 
heard the infantry well engaged to charge along the entire line. 

Q. Did you hear the infantry engaged? — A. I did ; and very hotly engaged, as I 
thought. 

Q. Was that continuous ? — A. It was — the tiring was. 

Q. Then did you make a final charge? — A. I made the attack at that time, accord- 
ing to the direction, and in the midst of it received orders from General Sheridan to 
suspend it for the time, as the infantry was not coming up to its work. 

Q. Who brought those instructions to you at the time ? — A. Colonel Sheridan. 

Q. Then when did you move again? — A. He repeated the instructions that I had 
received before. He said they were going to lead the infantry in ; that the general 
had sent for officers, to give them directions as to what they must do, and again that 



100 

when I heard firing the cavalry would charge along the line — make an attack, in fact, 
in front. 

Q. Meanwhile had there heen a lull in the infantry fire or was it continuous? — A. 
At the time he was with me the firing had ceased. 

Q. About how long after that was it that you heard the infantry fire with any degree 
of force? — A. I could not be positive as to the time ; taking into consideration what 
possibly occurred, it must have been ten to twenty minutes, possibly longer. 

Q. Then you moved forward over the enemy's works ? — A. Yes. 

Q. In turning to the left and sweeping down the works, or as you went over or at 
any time during those movements, what force of infantry, if any, of our side did you 
see to the north of those works ? — A. When we went over the works (I went over per- 
sonally about the Forks) there were two guns there in position that were captured by 
part of the cavalry command. We saw infantry at time coming in from the right to 
the east of the Forks, and that was the only infantry that I saw during the entire 
engagement. I do not know how far it was out to the northward ; in may have been 
a considerable distance. I understand they had a line over to the north and east of 
Five Forks, but I saw no body of troops coming in from the north. I presume that is 
what you desire information about. 

Q. In passing along to the westward of Five Forks what indications, if any, were 
there of our infantry on the right and north other than the infantry that came in 
with General Sheridan from the right ? — A. I cannot recall that I ever saw any infantry 
coming in from the north. 

<^. In going up to the west, as you have testified, after taking the works at Five 
Forks, did you meet with any special resistance from the enemy ? — A. None that has 
impressed itself upon me. There was desultory fighting all the way in this direction 
westward along the White Oak road, but the enemy were getting away as fast as they 
possibly could. We gathered prisoners, more behind the works than were taken here 
afterwards, though there were perhaps a few prisoners taken afterwards. Those men 
who took poiition behind any defence and fired for a while gave themselves up when 
they found they were going to be overpowered. 

Q. How long did those guns of the enemy at Five Forks fire before you captured 
them ? — A. They fired in the morning when we first went up there. 

Q. Up to the moment of time when they were captured, when was the last dis- 
charge ? — A. Up to the time they were taken, as the troops went in over the works, 
and they had been firing during the day. I was impressed with the fact that the 
heavy force of the enemy was in the front of the cavalry at that time. A reconnois- 
sance to our left had shown that they expected to be attacked rather from their right 
flank than from the left — rather than that a force should attack with its back towards 
the enemy in position. 

Bvt. Brig. Geu. Charles L. Fitzhugli, late United States Army, then 
commanding a brigade in Devin's division (p. 875), saw the Fifth Corps 
sweep down the line of the works from the right and east and the 
enemy waver and break. 

His brigade charged over the works and took about 1,000 prisoners. 

This, he says, was not more than fifteen or twenty minutes after he 
heard the first infantry fire on the right before he saw them sweeping 
down the Hue of the works. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Braytou Ives, Colonel of the First Connecticut Cav- 
alry, Pennington's brigade, says (p. 880) that his brigade made three 
charges against the works ; that in the third charge the enemy's lire 
did not slacken " until we were close to the breastworks ; they kept 
firing until the last moment." Two guns were taken therf. He went, 
he says, about half a mile north of the works, constantly capturing pris- 
oners. 

Private Charles L. Sherman, Company B, First Connecticut Cavalry, 
corroborates General Ives (Record, p. 883), and says the guns " were fired 
upon us immediately before going over" — meaning the cannon. 

He thinks he went beyond the breastworks, perhaps half or three- 
quarters of a mile, with others, and that some went further. He saw no 
infantry after the cavalry had gone over the breastworks j he saw the 
mounted cavalry, as he supposed, and as he thinks, with General Cus- 
ter at the head coming from our left, from west to east, inside the en- 
emy's works ; he knew Custer, and says that he had his staff with him 
and his flag, and a mounted force was following him. 



101 

This, Private Sherman says, was an hour before sundown. 

Lieut. Col. N. B. Birdseye, of the Second New York Cavalry, Penning- 
ton's brigade, says (p. 889) that the enemy were in their works up to the 
time he went there. 

The First Connecticut was on the right of his regiment, and the two 
guns that fired upon them at Five Forks were on his right ; " a good 
many prisoners were gathered in." 

The enemy, he says, ran back, and there was a scattering fire. He 
saw General Sheridan to the right, coming with the head of the column 
sweeping down the line of the works. 

Colonel Birdseye himself moved north to the Young-Boisseau field, 
driving 30 or 4-0 rebels before him. He says he had about 125 to 140 of 
his own regiment with him, and met a command of infantry and a gen- 
eral officer moving by the flank westerly, and had a discussion with the 
officer. 

He came back himself through the woods, striking the breastworks 
west of where he had gone over; before reaching them, some distance 
north (p. 893) he met General Caster at the head of a mounted com- 
mand, coming to the east from the west. 

He recollects in that command there was the First Vermont Cavalry. 

He saw no infantry, except near the Young-Boisseau field, and that 
was when he first went up. 

Maj. W. E. Mattison, ot the same regiment (Second New York, Pen- 
nington's brigade, p. 896), says that as he went over the works he saw 
General Sheridan coming up from the right with the infantry ; he says 
he himself went up to the Young-Boisseau field, and found the infantry 
there firing in a northwesterly direction. 

Subsequently, however, this witness thought he must have gone into 
a field west of the Y r oung-Boisseau field ; and, on examination by the 
•court (Becord, p. 900) fixes it definitely as the Yoang-Boisseau field. 

He also says he saw Caster's mounted brigade charge in an open 
field north of the Gilliam field, about half a mile from his own position, 
and charge from the west to the east. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. Wm. Thompson, Major Seventeenth Pennsylvania 
Cavalry, Fitzhugh's brigade, says (Record, p. 904) that the enemy kept 
firing until they went over ; that 1,000 prisoners came in ; he saw General 
Sheridan with his corps flag coining from the right in advance of the 
infantry ; and says he pursued the enemy in a northwesterly direction 
through the woods, and got a few prisoners ; he saw no other infantry 
except that which was with General Sheridan. 

Lieut. Col. C. Durland, Seventeenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Fitzhugh's 
brigade, says (p. 956) that it was Lieutenaut Bonebrake, of his regiment, 
who got the flag that was flying over the two guns that were captured 
in the breastworks which General Fitzhugh in his evidence has described 
as the one he tried himself to get, and that another was too quick for 
him. 

Colonel Durland says (p. 956) that the enemy fired upon his command 
up to the moment of going over the works. 

He says that after going over he halted a short time, and saw infantry 
to the right ; he got his horse and then went northwest, and perhaps in 
half an hour he saw General Custer on the left front with some troops. 
This officer has marked with the letter D, northeast of Y, Map No. 2, 
where General Custer was discovered. It was then quite close to sun- 
down. 

Capt. A. 0. Houghton, Second Ohio Cavalry, aide-de-camp to Pen- 



102 

nington, says (p. 985) that the fire continued from those cannon until 
the works were carried. 

He was wounded after he got inside the works, at the northerly side 
of the opening of the Five Forks, in trying 1 to get the enemy to surrender. 

Bvt. Col. Albert Barnitz, Captain U. S. A. (retired), then command- 
ing Second Ohio Cavalry (p. 986), says he saw no infantry until after 
the cavalry had captured the works there ; he then saw General Sheri- 
dan advancing from the east, with his flag, at the head of the column 
of infantry. 

Col. S. H. Hastings, commanding Fifth Michigan Cavalry, in Gen- 
eral Stagg's brigade, went over the works and then pursued the 
enemy mounted through a timber, instead of along the White Oak road 
(p. 1065). 

The cavalry halted and formed a column soon after passing the Ford 
road ; and in fifteen or twenty minutes he says the infantry came in 
sight on his right, coming from the Ford road (p. 1067). 

From this evidence it is plain that the cavalry of the First and Third 
Divisions, which held the front of the enemy's works, assaulted, and 
went over as soon as the assault was made by Ayres's division upon the 
return. 

In order to give importance to a trifling occurrence at the close of the 
day, in which General Warren participated, when it was so near dusk 
that the flash of the muskets could be seen distinctly, the learned coun- 
sel for the defence has thought it necessary to ignore as much as pos- 
sible the movement by General Custer with two mounted brigades 
around the right and rear of the enemy's works. 

His first attempt here was to put General Custer's cavalry operations 
wholly to the south of the White Oak road and in the Gilliam field as a 
part of this little movement, in which General Warren participated. 

Overwhelming evidence brought to show that General Custer actually 
went around the entire right of the enemy's works, compelled a change 
of base in the line of evidence here, and an effort was then sought to be 
made to show that Crawford's division actually got to the very right 
extremity of the enemy's works, and thus bore a principal part in the 
acts of the day before General Custer had gotten absolutely to the rear 
of the enemy. 

It is therefore necessary to discuss a little further General Custer's 
movements. 

Custer turning the enemy 1 s right flank. » 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. George A. Forsyth, when he was with Kellogg's bri- 
gade of Crawford's Division, on the Ford road (p. ?10), says that the 
cavalry came apparently from the White Oak road, and he judged from 
the west end of the enemy's works, pressing the enemy towards Hatch- 
er's Run. 

He says that he went a little way with the cavalry and that they 
went straight towards Hatcher's Run. 

This will be found to correspond identically with General Capehart's 
evidence, who indicated precisely the same route of the mounted brigade 
of Custer that he commanded, and which was evidently pursuing the 
fleeing force of veteran rebel infantry which was trying to escape by wa|r 
of Hatcher's Run. It was this force of the enemy which, after it had 
been pushed out of its works, encountered Crawford's division, and 
caused such losses as he met with after they had been pushed out of 
their w r orks. 

Bvt. Maj. Gen. Henry Capehart, who commanded one of the mounted 



103 

brigades of General Custer's division (p. 959) has testified how they 
charged around the right tiank of the enemy, and around to the rear of 
their breastworks in the afternoon, as soon as they found that the in- 
fantry were assaulting the " return", and so drove the enemy and came 
out up to the Young-Boisseau field, where they found the infantry pre- 
cisely as narrated by General Forsyth, and then off towards Hatcher's 
Eun. 

Oapt. W. W. Blackmar, at present judge-advocate-general of the 
State of Massachusetts, then first lieutenant on General Ouster's staff 
(p. 1023) corroborates him in this evidence fully, and says the sun was 
an hour high when they drove the enemy and turned their works. 

Bvt. Maj. Gen. William Wells, formerly commanding second cavalry 
brigade of Ouster's division, which was one of the two mounted brig- 
ades that went with Ouster around the enemy's works, confirms General 
Oapehart, and says (p. 1008) : 

We moved around in rear of the enemy's works [witness points to the letter V on 
Cotton Map No. 2] I should judge somewhere iD this vicinity, and faced east, I should 
judge, or southeast, perhaps, and in this vicinity [witness indicates north of the north- 
west corner of the Gilliam held] we met the enemy's cavalry mounted in quite strong- 
force. We drove them hack some distance, and they rallied and drove us hack ; and 
this regiment, the First Vermont, I kept in reserve until I thought they were going to 
repulse us and drive us hack. Then the First Vermont was ordered to charge, and 
Capehart's brigade and the balance of my brigade rallied on the First Vermont, when 
the First Vermont charged. Finally they drove the enemy and we followed them for 
some time. 

Q. After you had driven the enemy and followed them for some time, do you recall 
whether you met any other troops or not ? — A. It seems to me that after going some 
distance Ave met some infantry — I am sure we saw some infantry — coming in a clearing. 

Q. What regiments composed your brigade ? — A. The Eighth and Fifteenth New 
York and First Vermont Cavalry. 

This corroborates what has already been testified to by Lieut. Ool. 
Birdseye as to where he met the First Vermont Cavalry. 

Bvt. Maj. Gen. WelJs, United States Volunteers, also testified as 
follows : 

Q. Then you say, in j our last charge you did not meet any resistance until you got 
around upon their flank or to their rear ? — A. We did not meet any serious resistance 
until we got pretty well around upon iheir flank. I am speaking of the last charge. 

Q. You say the resistance was entirely from their mounted cavalry? — A. The resist- 
ance to the two regiments of my brigade was entirely from mounted cavalry. The 
one regiment that charged directly at the front drew the fire from the Avorks. 

Q. Which regiment was that ? — A. It was either the Eighth or Fifteenth New York ; 
I do not recollect which. I think it was the Eighth. The Fifteenth was in advance 
when we made the first- charge ; and I think the Eighth was in advance when we 
made the second charge (Record, p. 1071). 

On page 1072 of the Record he said as follows : 

Q. Then, you met some infantry in the clearing. I suppose you mean our own infan- 
try ? — A. I supposed they were infantry. Dismounted men came through. 

Q. You are not certain whether they were or not? — A. We met infantry afterwards. 
But after our charging and countercharging and so forth, as we were repulsing the en cmy, 
some force came through the woods ; and whether it was infantry or dismounted cavalry 
I could not tell. But afterwards in going on further we met infantry going north. 
* * *• # * *■ * 

By Maj. Asa Bird Gardner, counsel for the respondent: 

Q. Do you think that you can locate upon the map about where you met the infan- 
try in the clearing after making that final charge and driving the enemy's cavalry ? — 
A. Do you mean where we first met the dismounted men? 

Q. Yes ; and also where you met, finally, the infantry. Look at Cotton map No. 3, 
and see if you can point it out. — A. I should judge we saw dismounted men in this 
direction [witness indicates north of the centre of the Gilliam field, in the woods] 
And we met infantry farther north in the clearing. 

Q. In about what direction? — A. I do not know exactly which way we went. I 
think we must have met infantry in the clearing ; it occurs to me it must have been 
hat clearing [Young-Boisseau field] (Record, p. 1073). 



104 

General Custer, in Lis official report dated Headquarters Third Cav- 
alry division, April 15, 1865, says as follows : 

An examination of the ground in front and the enemy's right seemed to favor a move- 
ment by a mounted force against the enemy's right and rear. With this object in view, 
I deployed the 1st Brigade, dismounted, Col. Pennington com'd'g, along the entire line 
held by my division. The 2d and 3d Brigades, commanded respectively by Colonels 
Young and Capehart, were mounted, and moved opposite the extreme' right of the 
enemy, and waited the opening of the general assault before advancing to turn the 
enemy's right flank. As soon as the firing on the line held by the 5th Corps indicated 
the inauguration of the attack, the 2d and 3d Brigades were moved at a gallop against 
the right of the enemy's line of battle. To cover the movement and to draw the fire of 
the enemy's batteries in front, Lieut. Colonel Bliss, of the 8th New York Cavalry, was 
directed to charge with his regiment upon the enemy's batteries, without a hope of 
successfully carrying the enemy's position. Lieut. Colonel Bliss gallantly led his regi- 
ment up to the very muzzles of the enemy's guns, at the same moment exposed to a 
terrible cross-fire from the enemy's infantry posted in rifle pits and behind barricades, 
within easy range. Although suffering a heavy loss in men and horses and compelled 
to retire, the object of the charge was accomplished. 

Before the enemy could shift the position of his batteries, my columns had pushed 
past the extreme right of his line and were moving rapidly to place themselves di- 
rectly in rear of his position. Although this movement was almost entirely under the 
view of the enemy, it was so rapid he was unable to prevent it. W. H. F. Lee's divis- 
ion of cavalry was discovered to be moving upon us. Portions of each command 
moved simultaneously to the attack, and for some time success was varied and uncer- 
ta : n. My line was then facing in the same direction towards which that of the enmey 
had faced two (2) hours before, the enemy being between my command and the line 
of battle of the 5th Corps and the 1st Cavalry division. The gradual nearing of the 
firing indicated that the enemy's left was being forced back. This fact had its influ- 
ence on the position of the enemy with whom we were engaged, and aided us in effect- 
ing a total rout of the entire force of the enemy. 

General Warren him self, on his cross-examination (Eecord, p. 1228), says 
that what he saw of the cavalr3 T on his left in the Gilliam field, when he got 
into that field in person, "was not very strong," and that he did not 
know where General Custer's mounted brigades were ; he says that he 
afterwards met General Custer himself to the north of the White Oak 
road, in a field. 

Sergeant Henry S. Parmelee, First Connecticut Cavalry, Company B 
(p. 992), says that after getting in the works he went up the Ford road, 
following the enemy, and saw mounted cavalry coming chargiug from 
the left, and thought they were Custer's brigades, and soon afterwards 
he ran across the infantry division on his flank, coming from his right, 
in the Young-Boisseau field. 

Two or three witnesses of the Mnety- first New York were brought in 
rebuttal in an effort to contradict General Custer's official report, and 
also to contradict the evidence that he was not in the Gilliam field, but 
was with his mounted brigades in rear of the right of the enemy's 
works, as testified to positively by Generals Capehart and Wells, Ser- 
geant Palmerlee, Brevet General Whittaker, Private Charles, L. Sher- 
man, Lieutenant Colonel Birdseye, Major Mattison, Lieutenant Colonel 
Durland, Captain Blackinar, and Bvt. Brig. Gen. George A. Forsyth. 
One of these rebutting witnesses, Capt. E. G. Shirley, although he had 
never seen Custer before (p. 1109), was satisfied that the cavalry officer 
who came from the south of Gilliam field must have been he. 

Shirley says he was thirty or for:y feet away when that cavalry 
officer came up and said, "How are you, General Warren V J and that 
Major Benyaurd, of the United States Corps of Engineers, was with 
Warren at that time. 

Shirley says (p. 1113) that he heard Custer's appearance described 
shortly after in Washington, and saw a photograph of him, and it struck 
him that it was the same man, but he would not be positive. He also 
admitted that it was so dark that he could see the flashes of the muskets. 



105 

Major Benyaurdj United States Corps of Engineers, however, swears 
(p. 1148) that he knew General Ouster "very well," and (p. 1131) did 
not see him that afternoon or evening. 

Private William J. Norwood, Company G, Ninety-first New York, 
also called in rebuttal, testifies to a cavalry officer being pointed out to 
him by another soldier as General Custer, and says : " He was in front 
of us, riding to my right." 

This witness pointed to the northern instead of the southern side of 
the Gilliam field (p. 1118), and says it was then "rather dusk." He did 
not know Custer ; had never seen him ; never saw him afterwards, and 
only saw a photograph some eleven or twelve years after the event (p. 
1119) in a gallery in Albany, N. Y. 

He was not then familiar even with the field officers of his division. 

Bvt. Col. W. J. Denslow, Captain Ninety-first New York Volunteers, 
the next witness in rebuttal (p. 1120), says he saw a general officer in 
command of cavalry, who he supposed was General Sheridan, but he 
says he afterwards learned it was General Custer, coming in near the 
Gilliam house. 

On cross-examination he said it was getting dusk at the time, and he 
did not see the officer with sufficient distinctness to say positively that it 
was Custer; he did not know whether it might have been Lieutenant 
Colonel Bliss, of the Eighth New York Cavalry, or Colonel Pennington, 
commanding brigade. He thought he saw the cavalry corps flag, but 
was not positive — only an impression formed at the time ; did not rec- 
ollect its color, and it was too far away to designate its number. 

This is the kind of testimony brought in rebuttal. 

In order to make the skirmish in the Gilliam field the closing act of 
the battle, and, as it were, a final driving of the enemy from the field, 
and in order to convey the impression that the battle had not been won 
until that took place, it was of course necessary to show that the enemy 
had not been shaken in their intrench ments at that point, and that our 
own forces had not been able to overcome the resistance there, such as 
it was 

But it is shown by the testimony of so many witnesses that General 
Ouster had, with two mounted brigades, actually turned the enemy's 
works and driven them out of the line of breastworks and penetrated, 
pushing them in front of him, as far as the Young-Boisseau field, where 
Crawford's division had this fight with them, that their retreat destroys 
the theory attempted to be established as to this last act in the Gilliam 
iield of General Warren. 

WHEN AND HOW GENERAL WARREN WAS RELIEVED. 

The next point to be considered, although not of special importance, 
is as to when and how the applicant was relieved of the command of the 
Filth Corps. 

A good deal of importance seems to have been by him attached to 
this, as to whether he was relieved before the little affair in the Gilliam 
field, yet to be discussed, or after it. 

Enough has already been stated to show that on that day, as well as 
on the day before, he had not shown himself, in the field of action, capa- 
ble of handling efficiently and with promptness so considerable a com- 
mand as the Fifth Army Corps. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. O. E. Babcock, of the Corps of Engineers, has testi- 
fied (p. 901) that about ten o'clock in the morning, at Army headquarters, 



106 

lie received a message from General Grant, general in-chief, a verbal 
message, to carry to General Sheridan, substantially as follows : 

Tell General Sheridan that if, in his judgment, the Fifth Corps would do better 
under one of the division commanders, he is authorized to relieve General Warren, and 
order him to report to me. 

General Babcock thinks he delivered this message to General Sheri- 
dan between eleven and twelve o'clock — a little before noon 5 he found 
him on the line — at least in rear of his line — and he was going along the 
line passing from the left to the right, giving instructions to his com- 
mand. 

General U. S. Grant has stated, in course of his examination, why he 
sent this unsolicited order to General Sheridan. 

The learned counsel for the applicant admits (p. 36) that this authority 
of General Grant to General Sheridan was sent without the latter's 
solicitation. 

General Grant has said (p. 1030) : 

I know it was not in consequence of any information at all brought to me or received,,, 
or opinion in regard to any of General Warren's movements at that time, that I sent 
this. It was simply my reflection as to General Warren, in this critical position, which 
I then expected to make the last battle of the war, that he would probably fail him, 
and I wanted to warn General Sheridan of the danger he was in. The authority was 
not sent to General Sheridan in consequence of any report that was brought to me ; 
it was simply that I knew General Warren's defects * * * what I considered his 
defects. And his was the only corps I could send promptly; that corps would not 
have been sent if I could have gotten another one as conveniently; and I was just 
thinking of the consequences of a failure there, and wanted to put General Sheridan 
upon his guard, and I sent him that authority, so that he might feel no hesitation 
in removing an officer if it was necessary to his success. 

It is pertinent here to remark that in the application of General War- 
ren to the Secretary of War, of November 18, 1879 (Record, p. 13), for this, 
court of inquiry, he stated that he — 

Proceeded at once to General Grant, ten miles distant, reaching thereabout 10 p.m 
He told me that he had given General Sheridan authority to remove me, if necessary * 
he gave no reason for its use on this occasion. 

Nevertheless, he has admitted here (Record, p. 1233) that General 
Grant did give him certain grounds which General Warren told him 
he did not think could be sustained, and that they were retrospective 
and not at all relating to the battle of Five Forks. 

He has denied here (p. 1235) deliberately that General Grant in- 
formed him or that he himself knew, when at General Grant's head- 
quarters, that General Grant had given General Sheridan authority to 
relieve him, and denies that General Grant told him while he was at 
General Grant's headquarters that General Grant had given authority 
to relieve him. 

He noiv says that that allegation in his application for this court, which 
states that General Grant told him that he had given General Sheridan 
authority to relieve him if he thought necessary, is a " mistake.' 1 

Colonel R. M. Brinton, aide-de-camp to General Griffin, has testified 
that after General Sheridan had gotten inside of the enemy's works and 
the "return" had been successfully assaulted, and they were re-forming 
and pushing along, and Griffin had come down, he asked where Gen- 
eral Warren was (p. 308) ; there were a number of general officers, and 
others standing there — General Chamberlain, General Griffin, and Gen- 
eral Ayres — of the Fifth Corps, and no one could say. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. H. C. Bankhead (pp. 340, 346) heard this inquiry 
and thinks that General Griffin replied that he did not know. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Horce Porter has testified also how, after the "return' 5 



107 

was captured, General Sheridan asked hirnif he had seen General War- 
ren, and if he did see him to request him to report to him (p. 912). 

Maj. Charles F. Gillies, Twenty-first Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry, 
then acting provost marshal for the Cavalry Corps, has testified how 
General Forsyth, when he was down by the White Oak road, came to 
him (p. 1137) and. directed him to give General Sheridan's compliments 
to General Warren when he should see him and tell him that General 
Sheridan wished to see him ; and that shortly after General Warren 
came over and asked him where he could find General Sheridan, and 
Major Gillies pointed out the direction in which he was; and then 
(p. 1143) gave General Warren General Sheridan's message. As a matter 
of fact, General Warren did not obey this order, but went up throug 
the Sydnor field, and then west to the Young-Boisseau field, and joined 
Crawford. 

General Chamberlain has testified how General Sheridan directed 
him to gather together the troops of the Fifth Corps on the inside of 
the breastworks, after the "return" had been captured, and bring them 
along. 

The other witnesses havp. testified how General Sheridan, after the 
" return" was captured, directed General Griffin to take command, after 
vainly inquiring where General Warren was; which, of course was emi- 
nently proper, as General Griffin was the ranking officer among the 
Fifth Corps general officers present at the time. 

This was at the southerly side of the Sydnor field. 

We now come to the time when Bvt. Brig. Gen. F. T. Locke, the 
chief of staff to General Warren, came to General Sheridan with a 
remarkable message. 

This witness for the applicant testifies (p. 365) that while on the Ford 
road, near the Young-Boisseau field, he received instructions or orders 
from General Warren — 

To ride to General Sheridan and tell him we had gained the enemy's rear and had 
taken over 1,500 prisoners, and that he was pushing in a division as rapidly as he 
could. 

Locke says he thinks he went south, taking his way through the 
evergreen timber, and passed General Bartlett, who commanded the 
Third Brigade of Griffin's division. 

After he had gone a little further he met Captain Melchor, of War- 
ren's staff, and asked him if he had seen General Sheridan, and he 
thinks that the reply was that he had a little while before. He says he 
thinks he met General Sheridan after he crossed the Ford road and 
passed Five Forks a very short distance. 

He gave the message which General Warren had directed him to 
give, namely, that "we had gained the enemy's rear, and had taken 
over 1,500 prisoners, and that he was pushing in a division as rapidly 
as he could." Of course, no 1,500 prisoners had been taken by Craw- 
ford's Division, and General Sheridan knew it. General Sheridan turned 
around on his horse, raised his hand in a manner illustrated by the wit- 
ness, and replied : 

Tell General Warren, by God, I say he was not at the front. That is all I have got. 
to say to him. 

This was about sunset. 

If this witness met General Bartlett's brigade in going south to the 
White Oak road, it must have been south of Coulter's and Kellogg's 
and Baxter's brigades. 

We know from the evidence of General Bartlett that he had broken 



108 

away with the true instincts of a soldier from the false movement to the 
north of Crawford's division, and came down, as did Griffin himself, to 
the neighborhood of the White Oak road, and moved westwardly 
through the timber. 

In his direct evidence, Locke says that after receiving General Sheri- 
dan's reply, which he noted in his book, he rode "on a little way back 
and saw General Warren coming down the road." 

Therefore, if he rode back he could not be riding forward towards the 
enemy. 

After this, Locke says he rode with General Warren when the latter 
passed General Sheridan, tvho had halted and was facing the Gilliam field 
(p. 367), and that he (Locke) went into the field with Warren. 

For some occult purpose it has seemed desirable on the part of the 
learned counsel to endeavor to make the point that General Warren got 
down the Ford road to Five Forks before General Sheridan and the 
infantry of Ayres and Griffin's divisions arrived there from the east- 
ward. 

General Locke was brought back in rebuttal, in order to contradict 
his former evidence, and this time (p. 1102) he said that he met General 
Sheridan about a quarter of a mile east of Five Forks, and that he then 
rode back westwardly to the Ford road and met General Warren com- 
ing down the Ford road, and then rode west with him on the White Oak 
road to the Gilliam field. 

Still later in his rebutting evidence, forgetting this flat contradiction 
of his previous evidence, he said (p. 1103) that he and Warren, going 
west, passed General Sheridan ivithin a few yards ; he was halted and 
looking into the Gilliam field, with his horse's head turned toivard the west. 

Locke says he does not know when General Warren was relieved. 

Capt. Holman S. Melchor, of Warren's staff, who was with Locke, 
says that when Locke came down from Warren and met him on the 
White Oak road he asked him to go to General Sheridan (p. 459) ; that 
he, himself, was just a little west of the Sydnor field on the White Oak 
road ; that Locke rode with him westward along the White Oak road. 

Says he: 

As I arrived at the Five Forks, I noticed that the battery had been captured, and 
that some of our men had turned the guns and were trying to discharge one of them 
in a westwardly direction. I think it was Colonel Locke who told them not to fire it, 
as it might injure some of our own troops ; and just beyond that x>oint we discovered 
General Sheridan riding in a southwest direction through the woods north of White 
Oak road. We rode to him. Colonel Locke called his attention to the message that 
he had, and delivered it to him, * • * * and he said, as I recollect the words, "All 
I have to say, General Warren was not at the front where he belonged, and you can 
tell him so," or " you may tell him so," I think he added. 

Captain Melchor, subsequently called in rebuttal, reiterated that he 
rode westward with Locke u along the White Oak road " past Five Forks, 
where the guns were, until he came upon General Sheridan, a little east 
of the Gilliam field, to the north of the road (p. J 093). 

He now says that when he and Locke left General Sheridan they rode 
west to meet General Warren, which, of course, is a manifestly incorrect 
statement. 

General Chamberlain says (p. 277) : 

Q. Where were you when you learned of Warren's being relieved ? — A. I cannot 
say that I learned it. There was talk of it. Major lirinton, of General Griffin's staff, 
met me about half way. between the easterly edge of the woods and the Ford road, 
and asked me if I knew that General Griffin "was in command of the corps, and said 
I, " No, sir ; I do not." 

v^. That was when you were moving toward the Ford road? — A. Yes; the troops 
were actively engaged at the time moving westward. 



109 

y. When did you next see General Warren, and where f — A. I saw him on the Ford 
road. 

Q. In which direction was he moving then ? — A. He was coming up the Ford road 
towards the White Oak road, southerly towards the forks. 

Q. In which direction did you see him go then f — A. He advanced westerly on the 
White Oak road. 

General Chamberlain says (p. 278) that General Sheridan had told 
him to take command of all the infantry he could find there, and 
thought likely he had told General Griffin to take command of some of 
the other divisions, and that he understood it that way. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. J. W. Forsyth, U. S. A., chief of staff, states that 
when Locke came to General Sheridan the latter was about two-thirds 
of the distance from Five Forks towards the easterly edge of the Gilliam 
field (p. 1049). 

This, it will be observed, is precisely what Captain Melchor, of War- 
ren's staff, says. 

General Forsyth says that Locke told General Sheridan that Warren 
was 1J miles in the rear. 

Now, Capt. H. S. Melchor, of Warren's staff, answered this question 
(p. 1095): 

Q. Yet you had left General Warren, riding with a good deal of speed yourself,. 
over a mile and a half to the rear before you got to the point where General Sheridan 
was at ? — A. Yes. 

So that the recollection of General Forsyth as to one of the remarks 
made by Locke to General Sheridan exactly corresponds to the fact as 
to the distance that General Warren was away at the time Locke must 
have started, as stated by Captain Melchor. 

General Forsyth says that within two or three minutes after the 
report, General Sheridan, without any other intermediate conversation^ 
ordered him to write the order relieving General Warren (p. 1050); Gen- 
eral Forsyth dismounted and the staff passed him ; he wrote and copied 
a very short order relieving General Warren and rode back and delivered 
it verbally to General Warren and then handed him the written official 
order just about sunset, and immediately rode off; and the place where 
he handed it to him was just west of the Ford road ; he also says that 
Locke previously came from the rear, before sundown, up to the point 
where he met General Sheridan and delivered Warren's message. 

The order was as follows (p. 1291) : 

[Field Orders No. —1 

, (186—.) Printed. 

Cav'ly Headqrs., April 1st, '65. 
Maj. Gen. Warren, com'd'g 5th A. C, is relieved from duty, and will report at once 
for orders to Lt. Genl. Grant, com'd'g armies of the U. States. 
By command of Maj. Genl. Sheridan. 

JAS. W. FORSYTH, 
B. Brig. Genl., Ch'f of Staff. 

The applicant has striven to avoid this direct and positive evidence 
of General Forsyth as to when and where he was relieved, and says it 
was at 7 p. m. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. H. C. Bankhead, IT. S. A., says (p. 341) that he was 
riding in company with Griffin's troops and that Ayres came up in the 
rear : 

And after riding some distance Colonel Locke rode hy and went up to General Sheri- 
dan. He came back and asked me what was the matter between Sheridan and War- 
ren. I told him I didn't know, or something to that effect. 



110 

Very soon after, General Warren came galloping past, just past the line — the column 
of our troops. I don't know where he came in; he came in the rear of where I 
was. * * * 

General Bankhead here corrected himself and said that lie thinks he 
himself was at that time probably with Ayres instead of with Griffin. 

General Sheridan, he says, was u in front" with some of his staff and 
^orderlies ; and as to Warren galloping towards Sheridan westwardly, 
Bankhead says (p. 341), in corroboration of Locke and Melchor : 

I don't think he stopped to speak to him ; in fact I am satisfied he did not. It 
seemed to me he just grazed him. I don't know whether it was a yard or a foot from 
him. That was on the White Oak road, going westerly. 

Q. Do you recollect seeing two or three pieces of artillery of the enemy? — A. I rec- 
ollect passing some place where there was artillery. It was hefore the point that 
General Warren passed near General Sheridan. 

Q. What did you see of Warren's movements after that? — A. I, in the first place, 
supposed he was riding up to speak to General Sheridan. He rode in the open field 
and advanced with some troops which I saw afterwards was a line of mounted 
-cavalry. 

From this evidence of General Bankhead, the applicant's own witness, 
delivered with such particularity, it is perfectly plain that General Sheri- 
dan and the head of the infantry on the line of the works which had 
assaulted the return had passed beyond the junction of the Ford road 
ajid the White Oak road, where the guns were, before General Warren 
came up to General Sheridan. 

This, undoubtedly, is the time as testified to by General Forsyth that 
General Warren was relieved. 

Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. J. Bartlett has also described this matter (p. 1171) : 

Q. When you moved out from there what transpired ? State exactly what you rec- 
ollect. — A. After marching, I think, ahout a mile — it is difficult to determine a march 
in line of battle arid in woods as to distance, and I have not measured any map — I 
should think perhaps nearly a mile, or a mile, I heard heavy firing to my left. I knew 
then that Ayres was engaged, and became restless under it, because we were taking 
a direction that was at almost right angles from the firing — perhaps quite. I finally 
rode out to the left, passed the rear of General Crawford's division, and saw the fight- 
ing. I saw two lines of battle moving out of the woods ; I saw that Ayres had carried 
the salient and had moved well up in the fields. Those two lines of battle came out 
of the woods. This is the field [witness points to the Sydnor field]. Ayres had car- 
ried this and had moved out into the plain (Sydnor field), and, though his command 
looked straggling, here it was like an advance through the woods. When I first saw 
the enemy they had just come out of the woods on the west side of the Sydnor field 
near the White Oak road, in two lines of battle. We were marching about in that 
direction (a little north by east), and the fight was here [points to the lower part of 
the Sydnor field], I came here and I had a line of vision, when I looked out of the 
woods, straight to here [from the middle of the northern boundary of the Sydnor field 
to the southeast corner of the same field]. 

Q. Indicate about the point in the woods to the east or north of the Sydnor field 
where you came and looked out.— A. I suppose about there [points to a position at 
the edge of the woods a little east of the center of the northern boundary of the Syd- 
nor field — northeast of the chimneys, at the edge of the timber]. 

My formation was in three lines, one regiment of skirmishers, three lines two regi- 
ments each, one regiment in reserve. I caught the last line of two regiments and my 
reserve regiment, and ran them down — this is a ravine here [points to the position 
between the Sydnor house and the chimneys] — ran them by the left flank down this 
ravine, driving them right in front — swung them up in this way [wheeling to the left 
and south through the Sydnor field], and struck the left Hank of these two lines of 
battle, of the enemy, to their rear. 

Q. On the west side of the Sydnor field, near the White Oak road ?*— A. They had 
got down here. I swept them into the hands of Ayres — probably about 2,000 in the 
two lines. The moment they saw that I had them in that way, they just threw down 
their arms andran in among Ayres' men and into the cavalry line. I threw them to the 
left and rear of Crawford's whole division — I threw my regiments — and I sent word to 
General Griffin what I had done, and he followed with the whole division. 

Q. Then, in moving up from your position where you formed, what general direc- 
tion did you take, up to the point when you pulled out into the Sydnor field and came 
down, as you have testified ? — A. We were faced, as I understand it, in the direction 



Ill 

that we were supposed to march. I think no one was quite positive as to where they 
would strike this refused left, but it Was understood that when we did strike it Ayres 
would strike it with his division, and that everything then wheeled to the left. 

Q. At the time, from the information you received how did .you understand that the 
salient was to be struck by General Ayres ? — A. From the formation entirely, I think 
General Warren directed the formation and the position of the divisions entirely, and 
Ayres would naturally strike it if it was anywhere near where General Sheridan sup- 
posed it was, and he could tell that it must be on the White Oak road, and therefore 
that Ayres must strike it. 

Q. And strike it in what direction did you understand ? — A. I understood he was to 
strike it — that was supposed to be the general line of advance [northwest], and he 
would strike it here at the angle. And then the moment he commenced fighting at 
the angle the other two divisions were to wheel to the left — touch to the left all the 
while. 

Q. Had you any information at that time of what part of the works the cavalry were 
to take charge? — A. Yes; General Sheridan said, in the morning, that he would 
deploy the cavalry along their entire front, and that he would use the strong arm of 
the service in the way I have indicated, and he did so, because when I struck this field 
here the cavalry exchanged some shots with my troops, and General Sheridan joined 
me here at the Five Forks opening, because, as soon as these prisoners had thrown 
down their arms, I wheeled these regiments and took my others that were coming 
across from here and some little higher up. They all had orders from staff officers to 
follow right on. They came across here and struck in the woods, and the enemy, as 
often as they could, would form a line perpendicular to their works to meet us; but 
the fight from the Sydnor field clear down was just simply a repetition of "busting" 
their flanks when they formed them there ; and from this field, until the fight was 
over, I do not think I saw one of my regiments as a formation. We would get as many 
men as we could, sometimes perhaps not over 60 or 100, and strike this line that the 
enemy were continually /'ttempting to form, and break it, and did that all the way 
down. I met General Sheridan here at the Five Forks opening. 

Q. What works, if any, were there of the enemy, on the west side of that Sydnor 
field ? — A. Not any ; if there had been works there it would be refusing their flank 
twice. They depended upon this [the witness indicates the " return"]. There was 
no use for works here. There was no barrier inside of their works once we were in 
them. 

Q. How rapidly did you move along ? — A. So rapidly that it was not possible to 
keep any formation through the woods. 

Q. When you moved down from the position you have indicated in the northeast 
:part of the Sydnor field, bringing your regiment with you r w r hat orders, if any, had 
you to make that movement ? — 

A. Not any. On the contrary, I sent word to Griffin what I had seen and what I 
was goiug to do, and Griffin followed with his entire division. 

Q. Then, at that time, when you came out into the northeast edge of the Sydnor 
field, what direction were your»troops taking, in relation to the firing ? — A. They were 
going directly away from it. 

Q. In going up through the northeast part of the Sydnor field, what resistance, if 
any, did you meet from the enemy? — A. Not any. Just a few skirmish shots ; but not 
what you call a skirmish fire— just occasionally, as though they were videttes. 

Q. Was anything upon your right — of our forces! — A. What do you mean ? 

Q. Any of our forces upon your right as you moved up ? — A. The other two brigades 
of Griffin's division were upon my right. 

Q. In going up there, in what direction were you crowded, if at all? — A. Crowded 
always to the right ; so much so that I sent a staff officer to see why it was so. 

Q. You sent an officer to ascertain the cause of this? — A. Yes. 

Q. Do you know whether there were any other forces of the United States upon 
your right than the two brigades you have mentioned of your own division ? — A. No ; 
only later I knew that Mackenzie 

Q. (By Mr. Stickxey, counsel for the applicant.) No ; at that time, as far as your 
observation went ? — A. No. 

Q. Did you, during that day, before you got down to the White Oak road, through 
the Sydnor field, see any other forces than the two brigades of your own division upon 
your right ? — A. No. 

Q. Do you recollect passing the Five Forks? — A. Yes. 

Q. In moving westward? — A. Yes. 

Q. What fighting, if any, do you know of, after passing the Five Forks? — A. The 
fighting was as I have described, from that point, the west side of the Sydnor 
field. It was simply little combats; little engagements. They never hailed there 
enough to make us form a line of battle, because it was easy always to strike their 
flank ; they could not get any great number of men out. Where these guns were 
taken there was no fight. I passed over there without any fight. The cavalry came 



112 

in immediately after, because the men that supported these guns had been taken to 
make those two lines of battle that I described there on the western side of the Syd- 
nor held, and they had been captured on the north side of the road. All the fighting 
had been here, and was as I have described it, and in fact you could hardly keep up 
with them — it was difficult to get men enough together to make a tight. 

Q. Where did you meet General Sheridan ? — A. In this held, by the Five Forks. 

Q. Did you know Colonel Locke, the chief of staff of the Fifth Corps? — A. Yes. 

Q. Did you see him during that day ? — A. Yes. 

Q. Where did you see him ? — A. General Sheridan called me out of the woods, in 
that opening by the Five Forks; I had a rebel flag, and he was afraid his cavalry 
would fire upon me from here, and while talking with him Colonel Locke came up. 

Q. Was that before or after dark? — A. That was before dark. I suppose it. was 
twenty minutes after this movement here was made, on the west side of the Sydnor 
field; perhaps less than twenty minutes. It might have been a little more. 

Q. Did you at any time upon that day obtain command of your division — Griffins ? 
—A. Yes. 

Q. When was that? — A. At this time that I speak of. 

Q. You were the ranking brigade commander in that division? — A. Yes. 

Cross-examination by Mr. Stickney, counsel for the applicant: 

Q. What do you refer to when you say you obtained command of Griffin's division t 
— A. General Sheridan said to me, " You are now in command of the First Division." 

Q. Where was that ? — A.. That was here. 

Q. At Five Forks? — A. Yes ; near there ; it was about thirty paces from the woods, 
and about sixty or eighty from those guns. 

Q. At what point of the occurrences was that? — A. It was probably twenty minutes 
or half an hour after I had taken those 2,000 prisoners. 

Q. Do you mean that it was when you reached Five Forks, when you were moving- 
west? — A. When I was continuing this movement down here, yes. 

Q. Then, in your movement west, from the west edge of the Sydnor field — when 
you reached about thirty or sixty yards? — A. About thirty yards out of the woods — 
about sixty yards from Hie guns at Five Forks. 

Q. When you got there, it was, that General Sheridan put you in command of 
Griffin's division? — A. Constructively. He did not give me the order. 

Q. Did not give you a written order ? — A. No. 

Q. Gave you an oral order ? — A. Yes. 

Q. What was the wording of it, as you recollect ? — A. " Now you are in command 
of Griffin's division." 

Q. Was there anything else? — A. Yes; there was something preceding that which 
led up to this. 

Q. Give us that. — A. Colonel Locke rode up and reported that General Warren 
" Has sent me to say that he has stationed two regiments back at the run," — and 
something else, which I do not recollect — " and General Warren wants to know what 
he shall do" — about some movement. General Sheridan's reply was, " Tell General 
Warren that I do not consider him in command of the Fifth Army Corps. I do not 
see him where the fighting is." 

Q. Then the rest of it? — A. Then Colonel Locke took his tablets out and his pencil,, 
and repeated the order, very respectfully, to General Sheridan, and said, " What shall 
I tell General Warren ?" Then General Sheridan repeated exactly the same words. 
Then General Sheridan turned to me and said, u You are in command of Griffin's divis- 
ion ; Griffin is in command of the corps." 

Q. What did he say as to General Griffin ? — A. " Griffin is in command of the corps." 

Q. What did he say upon that point ? — A. Nothing more. 

Q. You mean that is what General Sheridan said ?— A. That is what General Sheri- 
dan said. 

Q. Was General Griffin there ?— A. No, sir. 

Q. What General Sheridan said to you then there was, in effect, that General Griffin 
was in command of the Fifth Corps, and von. were in command of the first division? — 
A. Yes. 

Q. Then, if the stenographer will please read to you your statement that you have 
just given of this interview, will you notice and say whether it is correct as he has it 
down ? [The answer of the witness was read to him.] A. It is. 

Q. What run did you understand Colonel Locke to refer to ? — A. I understood him 
to refer to a run upon our right. It might have been a run over here, or here [indi- 
cates Hatcher's Run], and I think Mackenzie was therewith his cavalry [at the north 
of the Sydnor field], 

Q. Somewhere on Hatcher's Run, then? — A. I think it was Hatcher's Run. 

Q. Do you recollect whether he mentioned Hatcher's Run ? — A. I do not. 

Q. Was there any run except Hatcher's Run that you then understood him to refer 
to ? — A. No ; unless he might have meant any one of the innumerable little branches 
that run across the road. 



113 

Q. Did you then know where Hatcher's Run was 1 — A. I knew it was upon our right f 
as we were facing. I did not know the distance from that position to Hatcher's Run. 

Q. When you say. as you were then facing, you mean as to your moving along west- 
erly in the direction of the White Oak road? — A. Yes. I knew it was to*our right. 

Q. Did you then understand Colonel Locke to refer to some one of the 'crossings of 
Hatcher's Run f — A. Yes. 

Q. Did you know which one? — A. No; because that was the only conversation I 
had. He was not given any opportunity of making any explanation. It was just 
what I have stated. 

Q. What he reported, as you understood him at that time, was, that General War- 
ren had stationed two regiments at a crossing over Hatcher's Run ? — A. Yes. 

Q. But what crossing, you did not know ?— A. No (Record, pp. 1168, 1169, 1170. 
1171,117-2, 1173). 

Q. How far west of Five Forks did you go ? — A. Following down the road ? 

Q. Yes. — A. I do not know. I went down until after dark, until after the cavalry 
got in our front. There is a stream somewhere that this road crosses. 

Q. Did you in going west from Five Forks move along the line of the road or through 
those woods to the north of the road ? — A. Always to the north, through the woods 
entirely. 

Q. Then you were not close along on the line of the works ? — A. I touched the works 
where I met General Sheridan, and I touched them also here at different points. 

Q. Near the Five Forks, and then again where ? — A. Near where those guns were, 
and then kept in the woods all the way down here ; I think nearly all the way. I 
think I came out of the field (the Gilliam field) here somewhere, and saw Custer 
making one or two charges with cavalry against the enemy's cavalry. 

Q. Then you left the main line of the enemy's works somewhere near where those 
guns were at Five Forks ? — A. Yes. 

Q. And did not strike the line of works again, is that it ? — A. I struck them two or 
three times. I will not say how many, but my business was there in the woods, 
north of the line of works. Every time the enemy could make a stand they would 
form a line of battle from south to north, and my plan was to strike the left flank and 
double them up, and we would keep doing so all the way down those works. They 
would throw a line perpendicular to their works, whenever they could get enough 
together. We would strike them whenever we could. Sometimes we would only have 
twenty men ; sometimes more men than could be used. The woods sometimes did not 
admit it — sometimes the rapid rate did not admit of it. 

Q. Was nothing of our force there before you? — A. No, sir ; not a man of the Fifth 
Corps. 

Q. Then did your command capture the guns at the Forks? — A. They did. There 
was no right for the guns — everybody captured those guns. I will tell you why there 
was no fight ; because the support for those guns was taken to form these two lines 
of battle to recover this angle, and I came in behind these lines of battle and left no 
support for the guns ; the troops just walked over them — just a little straggling fire ; 
then the cavalry came over here and they captured them and every one else captured, 
them. 

Q. What was the time the cavalry captured them? — A. Just after I did. They 
rode in from the front and captured them, right face on. 

Q. Then after you and they had successively captured those guns, you moved, in 
general, to the west through those woods on the north side of the works ? — A. Yes ; 
all the time. 

Q. You cannot tell us at what point you again struck the line, after leaving those 
works? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Where do you think it was that Colonel Locke came up and met General Sheri- 
dan ? — A. Close by Five Forks, about sixty paces from those guns, I should think. 

By Maj. Asa Bird Gardner, counsel for the respondent: 

Q. You referred to Custer's cavalry. Do you know whether or not the cavalry you 
saw were General Custer's ? — A. I was told that they were Custer's. They had a band 
playing, and they were charging successively with one line. 

Q. You do not know what part of his command it was that you saw ? — A. No. I 
did not hold any communication with them at all. That was in an open field on the 
south side of the road. [Indicates the Gilliam field. ] I saw them charging in a west- 
erly direction. The first line of this regiment was broken and sent to the rear, and 
then the other line of that regiment made a charge (pp. 1182, 1183). 

The witness, General Bartlett, here had reference undoubtedly to the 
Eighth Regiment New York Volunteer Cavalry, which had been left 
by Custer to make a demonstration in the Gilliam field while he took 
8 GAR 



114 

the remainder of Wells' and Capeh art's mounted brigades around the 
enemy's right and rear. 

General Griffin, in his official report dated Headquarters Fifth Army 
Corps, Nottaway Court-House, Va., April 29, 1865, says, after referring 
to the meeting of the cavalry and his infantry at Five Forks: 

About this point Major-General Sheridan in person directed me to take command 
of the Fifth Corps and push the enemy down the White Oak road. I immediately 
directed General Ayres and the other corps commanders to push forward with all pos- 
sible dispatch ; and the pursuit was kept up until after dark, when the command was 
halted, the cavalry having pushed to the front out of sight an d hearing of the infantry 
(p. 1186). 

If Crawford's division had been any where near at that time General 
Griffin would undoubtedly have mentioned it. 

A verbal order was, of course, although suitable for the emergency, 
not sufficient in the usual course of military procedure for record, because 
it did not direct any other general officer to take command ; and soon 
alter, in the course of the hour, a formal written order assigning General 
Griffin, who was not the senior division commander, to the command 
was prepared. 

This was sent to him by the hands of Bvt. Maj. Yanderbilt Allen, 
United States Corps of Engineers. 

This was the order which Major Benyaurd, of the Corps of Engineers, 
of General Warren's staff, has testified (p. 1128) was handed or shown to 
General Warren, and then Allen went to find Griffin and delivered it 
to him. 

It is in consequence of this second written order which Allen carried 
that a confusion has arisen in the minds of those witnesses for General 
Warren who have testified on this point, and who did not see either of 
the two written orders, as to when General Warren was actually relieved; 
and it is possible that, even without the lapse of sixteen years, if they 
had been called on to testify at the time, they would have said probably 
what they have said here, as to their belief. 

The second written order, it will be perceived, was necessary as a 
matter of record, because the first one relieving General Warren did not 
state who should take command. General Griffin, as already stated, 
was not the senior division commander. 

Bvt. Maj. James Wadsworth, of Warren's staff, says (p. 1099) that he 
saw General Warren standing in the Gilliam field, about the middle of 
it, at dusk, and that he had been relieved. 

In truth, the position of General Warren was a very peculiar one. 

We have seen his indecision and indeterminate movements in the 
early part of the action, and how at last, instead of complying with the 
orders of General Sheridan, as conveyed by Major Gillies, that " General 
Sheridan wished to see him," he had diverged, without following the 
line of the White Oak road and the enemy's intrenchments, and gone 
away up through the Sydnor field and joined Crawford. 

Consequently, he had not been at any important point where the 
fighting was going on. 

The message of General Sheridan, as conveyed by Colonel Lccke, 
awoke him to the disagreeable fact that a great victory had been won 
and that he had no especial part in it, except to reiterate the peremp- 
tory orders that he had received from General Sheridan. 

Consequently, when General J. W. Forsyth handed him the order re- 
lieving him near the Five Forks and immediately rode off, he saw that 
his military reputation, from the position in which he had allowed him- 



115 

self to be placed during those two days, might be irretrievably ruined 
unless he did something that would attract attention. 

With those feelings disturbing him, he rode down to the White Oak 
road to the west, and passed General Sheridan. 

Just at that moment of time there was a little body of the enemy 
cooped in at the westerly side of the Gilliam field. 

Gilliam field. 

We now come to the consideration of this little skirmish in the Gill- 
iam field, which has been brought so prominently forward by the friends 
of the applicant, who were not well posted as to the facts of the case, 
in order to show that General Warren actually closed and won the final 
contest. 

Before discussing the little resistance that was met there, it is as well 
to ascertain how that little body of the enemy was found in that piece of 
woods at the westerly side of the Gilliam field. 

When General Wm. H. F. Lee moved oat to attack General Custer's 
two mounted brigades which had succeeded in turning their right, a 
few infantry and cavalry were probably left in that fringe of timber. 

There may not have been any left there even ; they may have gone 
in there subsequently, as the only place of refuge left on the field. 

By General Custer's going around the right tlank of the enemy, and 
driving William H. F. Lee away in the successive charges he made, he 
prevented the enemy moving off in that particular direction. 

Of course the rush of Ayres and Griffin's troops, headed by General 
Sheridan, down to the line of the enemy's works, and the assault of the 
cavalry on the front, drove them to the westward. 

Their effort was, if possible, to seek the Ford road and to cross 
Hatcher's Bun, or the road leading over to Ford's Station still further 
to the west, on the South Side Railroad. 

The charge of Custer's brigade away up on the right and rear of the 
enemy's works forced those who were not too near the Ford road to go 
up through the timber between him and the Young-Boisseau field or 
else to rush back and endeavor to escape, if possible, from the westerly 
edge of the breastworks. 

We know that Crawford met some of these people in the Young- 
Boisseau field, as they were trying to escape with two guns; and we 
know from the evidence of some of them, General Beale and others, 
that they tried to get off in a northwestern direction. 

A few were left, however, in this little fringe of timber to the west of 
the Gilliam field. 

They were veteran troops, but they did not see how to get out of that 
place. It was nearly night, and with the darkness there was a prospect 
of escape. 

Meanwhile our cavalry that had gone over the works, especially those 
that were mounted, had swept to the westward along the line of the 
White Oak road towards Ford's Station and the South Side Railroad, 
and also directly west along the line of the White Oak road. 

Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt says (p. 599) that his command went out 
four or Jive miles in pursuit in about an hour; and they kept on until it 
was dark. 

Consequently, when Crawford's people came down to the breastworks, 
near the Gilliam field, there was no cavalry there of our forces — they 
had all swept by— had gone to the westward. 

Major E. M. Baker, Second United States Cavalry (p. 842) saw only 



116 

skirmishing in that field, no regular stand : " They were getting away 
as fast as they could." 
At page 849 Maj. Gen. Wesley Herri tt says : 

I cannot recollect that any deckled stand "was made there ; I recollect a stand hav- 
ing been made there ; but as to that particular location I cannot recall ; there was 
more or less righting all the way there, such a resistance as troops would offer who 
had gotten out of works and who were fleeing before a successful enemy; they took 
advantage of the accidents of the ground ; it was not organized and continued resist- 
ance. 

Oapt. J. W. Felthausen, Mnety-First New York, who was one of the 
applicant's witnesses (p, 1087) says that when they were in the Gilliam 
field "it was dark enough to distinguish a flash." 

Capt. Edward G. Shirley and John Palmer and Private William J. 
Norwood, of the same regiment, corroborate this (Record, pp. 1112, 1116, 
1110). 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. C. E. La Motte, inspector to Ayres' division (p. 379) 
says there was a little iiriug after they passed Five Forks; "but it did 
not strike me as being so heavy as to make an impression upon me;" 
he also says that General Ayres's Division met no resistance along the- 
western edge of the Sydnor field, and had no further fighting after the 
capture of the line of works; and that no firing at the north made any 
impression upon him. 

Even Colonel Locke himself thinks that they had "a pretty good 
brigade of troops in the Gilliam field," and has to admit (p. 371) that 
" that thing was finished up very soon. 7 ' 

Now, it is a fact which is definitely and conclusively shown that Gen- 
eral Sheridan was at the northeast corner of the Gilliam field when Gen- 
eral Warren came up from the Five Forks and Ford road. 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Hollon Eichardson, Colonel Seventh Wisconsin, of 
Kellogg's brigade (p. 316), says, that General Sheridan personally ordered 
the movement which tooTc place across the Gilliam field to rout out a little 
detachment of the enemy ensconced in that fringe of timber; and that 
while he, Richardson, was moving out under these orders, with perhaps 
600 or 700 men, or more, and with his colors, General Warren came from 
the rear, leaped over the breastworks out into the open of the Gilliam 
field, to the south, and with his own corps flag undertook to lead his 
detachment across. 

General Chamberlain, of Griffin's division (p. 277), had seen General 
Warren on the Ford road coming southerly towards the White Oak 
road, and then go westerly. 

But Chamberlain did not see General Sheridan there, because Gen- 
eral Sheridan had moved to the west some time before. 

General Bankhead says he saw this enemy on the western side of the 
Gilliam field, " a line of mounted troops — mounted videttes and pickets; " 
he says they immediately fell back and disappeared at the advance of the 
infantry; " they kept up firing until the infantry got within striking 
distance. * * * The whole thing did not last ten minutes — the last 
part of it" (p. 317). 

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Richard Coulter, commanding third brigade of Craw- 
ford's division, was asked this question (p. 355): 

Q. There was not much firing there in the Gilliam field, was there? — A. No, sir; 
I don't think there was so much firing. We had come through here without much 
fire, and I guess the men were more surprised than anything else. They were checked 
by the fire, but I don't know that it was very bad. They thought it was a walk-over ; 
thought it was about done. I called to these troops on my right to see who they 
were. When I found out who they were, I took them in with me. I suppose the fire 



117 

was considered more severe from the fact that we had been getting along so finely for 
a short distance before. 

Q. Were there more than 300 of the enemy in that westerly line of woods at the 
Gilliam field? — A. I have no means of ascertaining; it was about night-fall; there 
was a good deal of confusion; the officers were at the front calling their men on; there 
was sucn a mixture of men and horses I would not pretend to say how it was. 

This confusion, it will be observed, was in Crawford's division, because 
the cavalry had swept down that line long before on the line of the 
White Oak road, and the fragments of the enemy in this fringe of woods 
had kept very quiet and escaped the notice of the cavalry. 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. W. T. Chester, aide-de-camp to General Crawford, 
says (p. 385) that he captured a prisoner when going down towards the 
Gilliam field, who mentioned that those in there " were troops of all 
commands, very much confused and demoralized." 

General Crawford then told him to go and tell General Warren, and 
he then went across the Gilliam field with Warren ; and further says 
(p. 386) they " did not make any special stand there j nothing like volley 
tiring; only an occasional shot." 

Bvt. Lieut. Col. J. P. Mead, aide-de-camp to Crawford (p. 397), says 
that it was after dusk when he got to the Gilliam field, and that General 
Warren was 200 yards in advance of him ; " a very small quautity of 
our men went across the field — not as many as 500 or 600." 

Col. J. A. Kellogg, commanding a brigade in Crawford's division (p. 
221), says, "I only saw very few men, myself, * * * it was nearly 
night at the time." 

The Confederate general, W. H. F. Lee, who had been stationed in 
the westerly side of the Gilliam field during the day, says (p. 538) as to 
the alleged "charge" across that field, "It must have taken place after 
we left and moved to the right." 

Lieut. Col. D. K. Smith, chief commissary Fifth Corps, says it was 
then cleverly dusk (p. 605). 

General Warren says (p. 752), there were 500 or 600 of the enemy on 
the west side of the Gilliam field. 

General Bankhead says (p. 341) he saw Colonel Eichardson in that 
field; and it must be recollected that General Sheridan had ordered him 
across it. He adds — 

The troops advanced up there, and this line of Confederate cavalry fell back. 

He says by that time he got up to General Warren, who had passed 
General Sheridan and moved into the field in person, and General W^arren — 

Said there was nothing but Confederate cavalry, and they had fallen lack, and he wanted 
instructions from General Sheridan what to do. 

General Bankhead rode right back, and met General Sheridan, and it 
was quite dark, for he rode up to General Sheridan without recognizing 
him $ upon calling out for General Sheridan's headquarters he was an- 
swered by the general, who had recognized his voice. 

As General Sheridan told him (pp. 341, 1098) that he had already sent 
instructions to General Warren, it is to be inferred from the positive 
evidence of General Forsyth, the chief of stall', that General Warren 
made that movement across the Gilliam field against that fragment of 
the enemy after he had been relieved. 

I assume that General Warren had some hope or expectation, from 
his movement across the field, under the eye of General Sheridan, that 
the latter would reconsider his determination to relieve him. 

And this is fortified by the evidence of Bvt. Lieut. Col. Archer ET. 
Martin, aide-de-camp to General Sheridan, who says that after the battle 



118 

Warren came up to the general and remonstrated at being relieved, and 
wished him to reconsider it (p. 1057). 

Of course, as it was then dark, and our cavalry under Ouster had 
gone off towards Hatcher's Eun, and the rest of the cavalry who had 
gone over the works had swept to the westward, beyond the works on 
the White Oak road, there was no difficulty on the part of that little 
detachment in the fringe of woods west of the Gilliam field escaping to 
the northwest through the woods. 

That which had been impossible to them before then, became possible, 
and they made good their retreat. 

The battle, however, was won when the " return" of the works was 
assaulted and captured, and 2,100 prisoners taken. 

General Sheridan has declared that the battle was then won, and 
General Ayres has expressed the same opinion (p. 264), General Forsyth 
has reiterated it, and the manner in which the cavalry came over the 
works, as Ayres' and Griffin's commands, led by General Sheridan, rushed 
down through the line from east to west, conclusively shows that the 
winning of the angle was the key -point. 

The enemy were surprised, outgeneraled, demoralized. 

Their commanding general arrived just at the close of the rout; the 
second in command never got on the field. 

They were doubled and driven out with a degree of rapidity quite 
unexampled in military movements, for it must not be forgotten that 
from the moment of the first firing of Ayres' division there was but 
one hour to sunset. 

It was about this time Bvt. Brig. Gen. Horace Porter had the follow- 
ing conversation with General Sheridan (p. 912) : 

Q. Did General Sheridan say anything to yon at the time in relation to the subject 
of General Warren's removal — the reasons for it ? — A\ I do not recollect that he said 
anything to me except that he had been compelled to relieve General Warren and 
place General Griffin in command. Immediately after that, I sent a bulletin by an 
orderly to General Grant with that message, and told him to ride fast, and immediately 
after I went back to report to General Grant in person. I went so rapidly as to arrive 
there before my orderly. At General Grant's headquarters I found that General Warren 
had called at General 'Grant's headquarters just before I reached there, and had re- 
ported to him (General Grant). 

General Grant, in a dispatch to General Meade from army head- 
quarters, Dabney, 10.30 p. m., 31st March, had instructed, as the latter 
was sending to General Sheridan, to notify General Sheridan ; 

To take general direction of the forces sent to him until the emergency for which 
they were sent was over (p. 1253). 

Again, General Horace Porter had come from General Grant to General 
Sheridan with the message that he (Grant) — 

Was fully alive to the importance of the movement ; that General Sheridan on the spot 
must judge of the circumstances himself; that he ivould beheld responsible for everything 
that occurred in his front — must assume responsibility and make everything bend to 
success (p. 910). 

Not long afterwards Bvt. Brig. Gen. O. E. Babcock, U. S. A. of General 
Grant's staff, arrived with the unsolicited authority to relieve the corps 
commander if he should not prove equal to the u emergency" (p. 917). 

The Confederate General Pickett's command having been routed, and 
the South Side Railroad, the only remaining line of rebel communica- 
tion to Kichmond and Petersburgh, laid open to destruction — it was ex- 
pected that the Confederate General-in-Chief Lee, would make a desperate 
effort to drive back General Sheridan, or else the two cities and lines, 
which had so long resisted our assaults, would have to be evacuated. 



119 

The perilous military situation of General Sheridan and the possibility 
of great and unusual exertions being required, left no room for senti- 
mental feelings. 

He was held responsible for the success of the operations to be con- 
ducted, and the Fifth Corps, which had shown itself capable of great 
things when properly led, was necessarily an important factor. 

How gloriously and efficiently it co-operated with the cavalry corps 
in the succeeding day's movements is a matter of history. 

General Warren had for the two days just passed failed to meet the 
emergency, and having deliberately formed that conclusion, General 
Sheridan's duty was plain. 

He accepted the responsibility without a moment's hesitation, and to 
make assurance doubly sure, he put the gallant Griffin in command. 

Thus did General Sheridan fulfill what he believed to be a duty to his 
country without partiality, favor, or affection, and although he has been 
cited into this court to explain and render an account of his official 
actions of sixteen years ago, he can say, after mature consideration and 
with no feeling of unkindness to any one or a desire to disparage any 
previous military record, that under precisely the same circumstances 
as presented to him at sunset of the 1st of April, 1865, he would do 
precisely what he did then. 

SUMMARY. 

Exclusive of the operations of General Sheridan which culminated in 
the battle of " Dinwiddie Court-House," and which, by the position it 
placed the enemy in, must necessarily be taken into consideration in 
determining the military situation and the urgency and importance of 
the orders received by General Warren on the 31st March, I submit the 
following brief merely for the convenience of the court in its delibera- 
tions : 

As to the action of " Gravelly Run," or " White Oak Ridge," of the 31st 

March, 1865. 

These points are substantiated by the evidence : 

First. That General Warren had no orders to advance or bring on an 
action when he did so. 

Second. That he was repeatedly warned by General Grant, through 
General Meade, the afternoou and evening previous, "that he was in 
danger of being attacked on his left flank in the morning " ; that he 
"should get himself strong to right," and "put himself in the best pos- 
sible position to defend himself" — to all of which warnings he appears 
to have given no heed. 

Third. That, in order to enable General Warren to give full effect to 
these warnings, Griffin's Division, which had been on detached duty, 
was returned to him at daylight, so that he could put him in " support- 
ing distance as soon as relieved," and thus have his whole corps well in 
hand. 

Fourth. That Warren did report as to being able to get possession of 
the White Oak road, for he sent a dispatch to Meade that the enemy had 



120 

their pickets this side, and that he had sent word to Ayres "to try to 
drive them off," thus misleading Meade to believe that only pickets 
were there, which a small force could drive off. 

Fifth. That Warren was duly notified in person and warned by his 
division commander, Ayres, "that there was a heavy force there," and 
"that an advance there would bring on a fight," and that no reconnais- 
sance could be made without bringing on a fight. Nevertheless, War- 
ren, on Ms oivn responsibility, ordered Ayres to advance. 

Sixth. That, according to the applicant's own witnesses, three rebel 
brigades, Hun ton's, McGowan's and Graves's, between 3,500 and 3,750 
strong, came out of the rebel works, under General E. E. Lee in person, 
and attacked Ayres's Division, and drove it back in the utmost disorder 
on Crawford's Division, and then routed that in turn, the two divisions 
that day aggregating 8,000 effectives on the field, and that they retreated 
with such rapidity that they got as far back as to Gravelly Run Creek 
at 11 a. m., within about half an hour of the first firing, and forded it 
and fell back behind Griffin's Division, 5,985 strong, posted on the south- 
ern side. 

Warren says, to his " great astonishment," the stream was there 60 
feet wide and 4 or 5 feet deep. As showing the utter rout of the two 
divisions he says, a The men came back very rapidly, without any par- 
ticular order at all, each man for himself." 

Seventh. That General Warren, after his repeated warnings, was re- 
sponsible for the disastrous repulse and resulting loss of life. 

He should not have made the advance, and he ought to have so dis- 
posed of his corps that no such rout should have occurred. 

He ought also to have been at the front. 

Eighth. That Warren was not able to resume the offensive against the 
exultant enemy until a quarter to two or 2 p. m., and that it was the 
attack of Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, on their left and rear, with four 
brigades of the Second Corps, which forced them to stop entrenching 
at Gravelly Eun and to retire back towards their earthworks. 

Ninth. That the paragraph in General Grant's official report com- 
plained of by Warren is true, except as to the enemy which attacked 
being in "superior" force, viz: 

"That Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White 
Oak road, and to accomplish it he moved with one division instead of 
his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and 
driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and in turn 
forced back on the third division, when the enemy was checked." 

As to Warren's movements on the night of the 31st March against the 

enemy. 

These points are substantiated by the evidence: 

First. That Warren, about 5 p. m. on the 31st March, after receipt of 
General Mead's 4.30 \). m. dispatch, sent Bartlett's Brigade of Griffin's 
Division, comprising nine regiments and 3,000 men, by the White Oak 
and Crump roads, "to try and communicate with Sheridan," or demon- 
strate on enemy's left with whom Sheridan was engaged. 



121 

Second. That the position Bartlett reached after dark at G. Boisseau's 
was on the left rear of the enemy, facing Sheridan at Dinwiddie, and 
most favorable, provided he was supported by Warren, which he was 
not, for a moment to crush the enemy between the two opposing fires. 

Third. That Warren believed, and so said in several dispatches 
through the night, that the enemy facing Sheridan would have to retire 
in the direction of their works at Five Forks. Nevertheless no positive 
withdrawal was effected until daylight, and then the enemy in retiring 
contested the grouud. 

Fourth. That at 5.15 p. m. (received 5.45) Meade directed Warren to 
send a brigade in the direction Meade had previously ordered a "small 
force,' 7 and to support it if necessary. 

That these orders were soon modified, and the brigade ordered instead 
down the Boydton plank to Sheridan. 

As, however, Bartlett had already gone and could not quickly be re- 
called, General Pearson was ordered by Warren, with three regiments 
conveniently placed, " right down to Dinwiddie" to Sheridan. 

Warren, at 6.30, so reported to Meade of this exercise of discretionary 
authority, but they never ivent, nor did he notify Meade that they did 
not go. 

Fifth. That Bartlett's withdrawal from his advanced position in rear of 
the enemy was due to the literal construction put by Warren on Meade's 
subsequent order, when he found he would not be allowed to make a 
movement just as he, himself, wished; but that, still later, peremptory 
orders from Meade were received in due season to have stopped Bart- 
lett's return. 

Sixth. That none of the orders received by Warren from Meade that 
night of March 31, for night operations, were efficiently, promptly, and 
earnestly executed, but that some of them were positively disobeyed. 

Seventh. That Warren proposed, at 8.40 p. m., to Meade to make a night 
attack by moving down and attacking the enemy on one side while 
Sheridan attacked on the other, Bartlett being then in suitable posi- 
tion, but that when Meade, at 9 p. m., ordered him at once to draw back 
from the White Oak road to the Boydton plank (of which he had pre- 
viously been notified at 8.30 to do on short notice) and send a division 
down the Boydton plank to Sheridan, Warren saw he would not be 
allowed to act "independently." 

Eighth. That under Meade's peremptory 9 p. m. order (received 9. 17), 
although eventually Ayres's Division was started towards Dinwiddie, 
the other two remained as they were, in bivouac on the White Oak road, 
until after daylight, April 1, and until near 6 a. m. 

Ninth. That although at 6.30 p. m. Warren reported to Meade that he 
had ordered General Pearson u right down to Dinwiddie," it was not 
until 10 p. m. that Warren notified Meade that the bridge was gone at 
Gravelly Bun, on the Boydton plank, although that point was but half 
a mile from his own headquarters. 

Tenth. That Meade's peremptory order, signed by himself in person, to 
Warren, "to move the balance of his (Warren's) command by the road 



122 

Bartlett was on and strike the enemy in rear," and to be " very prompt 
in this movement," and not to encumber himself with anything to im- 
pede his progress or prevent his "moving in any direction across the 
country," was not obeyed. That this order directed Warren to acknowl- 
edge receipt and when he should start. 

That at 10.55 p. m. Warren accordingly reported, "I will now send 
General Ayres to General Sheridan, and take General Griffin and Gen- 
eral Crawford to move against the enemy as this last dispatch directs I 
should." 

That although this was a report of immediate compliance, Warren 
never moved Griffin and Crawford out of their bivouac until after Bart- 
lett had returned, and after daylight, and never left his own headquar- 
ters at Mrs. Wilson's, on the Boydton plank, to go up to the White Oak 
road to the bivouac of those divisions until after 5.15 a. m. 

Eleventh. That had Warren made the night movement as ordered it 
is apparent that Generals Grant, Sheridan, and Meade believed great re- 
sults to the cause of the Union would have resulted therefrom. The rea- 
son why he did not obey is not to be found in the context of the orders. 

Twelfth. That W r arren did not intend to make the night movement 
against the enemy's rear with two divisions, as ordered, is found in his 
dispatch of 40 minutes after midnight, April 1, to Humphreys, command- 
ing Second Corps, that he would " do so to-morrow," and in his declara- 
tion here on cross-examination : " I never had any idea of doing it in 
such a night as that." 

Thirteenth. That it was after this determination had been formed, and 
at 1a.m., that Meade's 11.46 p. m. dispatch was received directing War- 
ren to give up the rear attack if it should be necessary to send troops to 
Sheridan by the Quaker road. 

At 2 a. m. the bridge over the fordable Gravelly Eun being practica- 
ble for Ayres's Division, Warren did not have to send troops around by 
the Quaker road, nevertheless he never made any movement whatever 
towards complying with the urgent order for the rear attack. 

Fourteenth. That Warren, believing the enemy would retire during 
the night, nevertheless, by his own delay in moving, entirely subverted 
and defeated the spirit and intent of General Grant's orders, as conveyed 
through General Meade. 

Fifteenth. That there is nothing before this court to show that Meade 
was satisfied, as alleged by the learned counsel in his summary, with 
Warren's conduct. The latter's report of 10.55 p. m. to Meade of " com- 
pliance" was calculated, although there was not compliance, to allay 
irritation. 

The fact, however, is highly significant, that General Meade, the next 
morning at 6 o'clock, felt it necessary to seend Gneral Warren a written 
order that "in the movement following your junction with General Sheri- 
dan you will be under his orders and will report to him" is highly sig- 
nificant. 

Sixteenth. That General Sheridan was disappointed in Warren's non- 
arrival in supporting distance is found in his inquiries of General 
Chamberlin and conversation with General Horace Porter. 



123 

Seventeenth. The first item of General Sheridan's report complained 
of by Warren is true, viz, that " had he moved according to the expec- 
tations of the Lieutenant-General (see Grant's 10.45 p. m. dispatch to 
Sheridan) there would appear to have been little chance for the escape 
of the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie Court-House." 

As to the battle of Five Forks. 

These points are substantiated by the evidence : 

First. That Warren should have arrived with Griffin's Division when 
it finally reported to Sheridan at 7 a. m. and was ordered to halt, and 
should not have remained with the rear of his column. 

That having arrived at 8 a. m. where Griffin was, and having at 9 a. 
m. received Meade's written orders to report, he should have sought 
General Sheridan at once to ascertain his plans and wishes and not 
have waited idly until 11 a. m. before doing so. 

He at the very least should have reported his own arrival by a staff 
officer, but did not. 

Second. That although Warren between 12 and 1 p. m. received and 
dispatched Sheridan's orders to the Fifth Corps to come up, those orders 
were not executed with vigor and promptitude. 

That two divisions (Griffin's and Crawford's), but 2^ miles from 
Gravelly Eun church, and the third (Ayres's), 2,600 strong, not quite 
three miles distant— each massed by the roadside — without trains or 
camp and garrison equipage, did not come up so as to be formed before 
4.30 p. m., and the firing began at 5.15 p. m., and the sun set at 6.23 p. m. 

That when General Sheridan expressed repeatedly his apprehension 
of the consequences from the delay in coming up, it was General War- 
ren's duty to have ceased making sketches of the proposed movement 
and to have gone in person to urge the march of his corps to the point 
of formation. 

That, as he claims, he supervised this exceedingly dilatory movement, 
he is properly responsible for it. 

Third. That the written orders prepared by Warren from the instruc- 
tions received from General Sheridan, for the simple movement ordered, 
were needless and involved the corps commander in an unnecessary 
mass of details when he should have been personally with his corps. 

Fourth. That the explanation of Warren to Sheridan, as heard by 
General J. W. Forsyth, chief of staff, that it was "simply for the corps 
formation, nothing more, nothing less," was the true one. 

That there was no misapprehension where the " return" of the ene- 
my's works was on the White Oak road. 

That General Warren had been, personally, through the fringe of 
timber north of Gravelly Eun church, and lenew and could see there were 
no works in the open on the White Oak road, or north of it even, and 
that he knew, and has so testified, that the cavalry was to engage the 
whole front of the works. 

That the theory set up by way of excuse and avoidance is an after- 
thought which, if carried out to its legitimate conclusion (by reference 
to the diagram), would make nearly the entire Fifth Corps strike the 
works on the face, thus displacing the cavalry, who were in communica- 
tion, and render entirely nugatory General Sheridan's instructions, 



124 

which required the whole infantry line to swing around perpendicular 
to the White Oak road upon reaching it. 

That the contradictory evidence from the officers of the Fifth Corps 
before this court of the explanations made to them at the time by War- 
ren of the simple movement to be executed, is not explained by the 
evidence, and can only be left to conjecture. 

Fifth. That the cavalry held the enemy close in their line of works and 
knew exactly their location, and that General Sheridan had been all 
along the line, and particularly at the angle. 

Sixth. That it was intended the Fifth Corps should wheel or change 
direction, so that Ayres should assault at the angle, but the deflection 
to the right, under skirmish fire, of Crawford, in order to get out of the 
fire and keep the protection of the ridge and trees, as admitted by 
Warren, and failure to wheel as ordered upon reaching the White Oak 
road, carried Ayres to the right and north beyond the original inten- 
tion, and compelled him with but 2,600 men to assault the return alone 
(led in person by Sheridan), where 2,100 prisoners were captured. 

Seventh. That Warren did not do all that was possible to remedy the 
confusion in Ayres's division or serious deflection in Crawford's. 

It was General Sheridan who first sent orders to the latter to come to 
the left, which Warren supplemented by ordering him "to push for- 
ward" in his serious deflection to the north, thus crowding General 
Mackenzie's fine cavalry division on Warren's right entirely out of the 
fight. 

That this deflection to the right and march of Crawford under a mere 
picket fire, followed by Griffin, of from a half mile to a mile north of the 
White Oak road through the woods and away from the heavy firing of 
the "return," which was witnessed before final disappearance in the 
woods, cannot, as it was being supervised by Warren, be excused on the 
plea that probably some works might be up in those woods, when the 
peremptory orders of Sheridan to Warren had been that Crawford 
should swing around to the left as soon as his division reached the 
White Oak road. 

That had General R. E. Lee attacked down the White Oak road while 
those two divisions were in such confusion in the woods they would 
have been destroyed. 

Eighth. That the serious confusion which twice took place in Ayres's 
Division when not exposed to a heavy fire while Warren was at hand, 
and which came near turning a subsequently great victory into the most 
disastrous defeat, should have been remedied by Warren. 

At the very least, when his army commander, Sheridan, was exposing 
himself between two fires to restore confidence and order, he also should 
have gone to the front of his own corps and given General Sheridan a 
helping hand. 

Mnth. That Warren displayed great indecision in his movements : 
First, following Ayres, then going after Crawford, then returning to 
the open by the White Oak road, then going to the "Chimneys" (see 
Colonel Newhall's evidence), then again returning to the White Oak 
road at the open, and then, after receiving, by Major Gillies, General 
Sheridan's message that he wished to see him (the "return" ha vnig 



125 

been taken), going again up through the Sydnor field and so west to 
the Ford road and joining Crawford's Division instead of obeying the 
order. 

Tenth. That Warren's manner on this day, when his divisions were slow 
in coming up and the day was wearing away, gave General Sheridan 
the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions 
for the attack could be completed. 

It is highly significant that so many officers of rank noticed and con- 
sidered Warren's manner on this day of "Five Forks." 

His gloomy talk to General Sheridan, corroborated by General J. W. 
Forsyth, about General Lee getting people into difficulties which so sur- 
prised them, and induced Sheridan to decide to remain and fight with 
the Fifth Corps, cannot be overlooked. 

Eleventh. That Warren's message, by his chief of staff, Locke, after 
reaching the Ford road, to General Sheridan as to the number of prison- 
ers taken there, and Locke's reply to the question Sheridan had asked 
Generals Horace Porter, Griffin, Chamberlin, Ayres, and J. W. Forsyth, 
" Where Warren was," was the last of a series of unfortunate circum- 
stances which bore the mind of General Sheridan to the conclusion, 
under the tremenduous responsibility put upon him by the General-in- 
Chief in the new situation as it presented itself when the Confederate 
General Lee would probably endeavor to crush him, that the strong 
arm of his command should be under one who could effectively com- 
mand it and efficiently and appreciatively carry out at once his orders. 

Twelfth. That Warren was relieved of his command on the White Oak 
road just west of the Ford road, and that he then moved west; passed 
General Sheridan, who was at the time looking into the Gilliam field 
and personally directing a movement by Col. Hollow Bichardson, of Kel- 
logg's brigade, which had been brought down by Bvt. Brig. Gen. George 
A. Forsyth, under Sheridan's orders, against some disorganized enemy, 
few in numbers, on the western edge of the field, and that Warren, hav- 
ing passed Sheridan, moved forward with that detachment, and that 
the written order received by him from Bvt. Maj. Yanderbilt Allen in 
the field Y, west of the Gilliam field, was the one which assigned Gen- 
eral Griffin to the command of the Fifth Corps. 

Thirteenth. That before Crawford's Division left the Young-Boisseau 
field General Custer, with two mounted brigades (Capehart's and Wells's, 
except the Eighth New York Cavalry, which made a diversion in the 
Gilliam field), had passed around the right and rear of the enemy's 
works, and driven them northeasterly towards the Young-Boisseau 
field, where Crawford's people fired at them, and proceeded as far as 
that field, Custer's cavalry having been seen by many witnesses up 
there. 

That when Kellogg's Brigade, of Crawford's Division, reached the 
White Oak road the cavalry, which had assaulted the front of the works, 
had previously passed over, and had swept westerly, under General 
Merritt, pursuing either towards Ford's Station or down the line of the 
White Oak road. 

That the enemy found afterwards to the west side of the Gilliam field 
was an insignificant disorganized detachment of cavalry and infantry, 
which had sought shelter there while trying to escape. 



126 

Lastly. That the extract from General Grant's report and the three 
extracts from Lieutenant -General Sheridan's report express the conclu- 
sions respectively formed by those general officers, and were fully borne 
out by the facts as presented to them. 

In conclusion, I have to thank .you, gentlemen of the court, for your 
considerate attention and unvarying courtesy during this protracted 
investigation, which have lightened my labors as well as those of the 
learned counsel for the applicant. 

The recorder of this court in the preparation of the voluminous printed 
record and in the correction of typographical errors, as well as in his 
laborious and painstaking efforts in revising proofs and supervising the 
printing of the maps, has performed a service in this investigation which 
will hereafter be fully appreciated by the student of history who refers 
to the record of this case for information as to the great battle which 
closed, practically, the great rebellion. 



I- 



Warren Court of Inquiry. Cotton, JWctp^ro. 2, See page-238 of Record. Jfstrorwmical notes from. Prof. ' JWicliie.see Appendix 

April J? 1865, positions of Sun in the Sky. Mean. Time of Rising & Setting or Sun, t- Setting 

COTTON" MAP N? 2. 



>!,■„„ Timr 


ASnmdf A^tsnaih 


1JE 


27'- 20 -Of i -r ,V -.;■! 



1S65. 


iSE 


Sun Set. 




X? 




"',* ' il " *'"', 




I 










D;u i LE r 


[El 


D ,„• FIVE i oKKS. 


Confederate Forres 


Brv Mai. Gen! Merriui ' 
Com'f U.S.Cay. 1 3 


'Div 


" . Custeri 










GEN^ PICKETT Com'l. the whole 






Wa 






B 


s J. Williams C is Br Andrews 


Infantry Gen'. Hansom's North Carolina Brigade 


5" 1 Army Corps - 


•ren 





. Old Gate Ford 


E 


B cTuni"' scr F • Sh * nt y t 


(from left ■ Wallace's South 




r 


«"t 


ade Chamberlaif 






H 


. Chimney 1 ■ J.W.Harmon's 


to right) . Steuart's Virginia ■ 


1" Div. Griffin 






Gregory 






K 


. Barnes L . J.D.Grants 


Col. Mayo's 




k 




Bartlett 




.. left of earthworks 


N 


. Tobacco barn . Mrs. Gilliam's 


Gen'. Corse's 




\"' 




Winthrop 


P 


. Bass' 


R 


. Gravelly Run Church 


Cayaby Commanded by Gen'. Fitz.Lee 


2" Di v. Ay res 


i r . 




Bowerman 


S 


Moody's 


T 


Jas.Boisseau's on Gillespie Map 


Gen'. Munfords Division on left 




\ 3* 




Givyn 


u 


. Old Mill ford 


v 


; Old graves 


• "ossers - '" resBrve 




, ,,t 




KelloiS 










WHF.Lees , on right 




\r. 






Small Figures in brae 




show relative elevations in feet 


Artillery Coin * by Col. Pegram 




\r 














One sir gun battery 














■1 mile. 


» eight gun. horse artillery battery. 








f 




r< f 









* Org anix.tr ticn of forces as .-displayed be fores the- Court. 



: 



I 



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60: G a 



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